United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO-CLC,No. 12775 and N,No. 3-181A16,12775 and N,3-181A16
• Citation: 436 N.E.2d 826
• Parties: 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3707 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,and its Local Unionso. 13796, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, a corporation; Continental Assurance Company, a corporation; and Washington National Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees (Defendants Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 826

436 N.E.2d 826

113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3707

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC and its Local Unions No. 12775 and No. 13796, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, a corporation Continental Assurance Company, a corporation; and Washington National Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 3-181A16.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District.

June 22, 1982.

Gregory S. Reising, Reising, Hirsh, Mindel, Schwartzman & Pannos, Gary, for appellants.

Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, for appellee Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

Hawk P. C. Kautz, Merrillville, for appellee Continental Assur. Co.

YOUNG, Judge.

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC and its Local Unions No. 12775 and No. 13796 appeal the trial court's dismissal of its complaint for an injunction and damages against Northern Indiana Public Service Company, Continental Assurance Company and Washington National Insurance Company. ¹ We affirm.

NIPSCO filed a motion to dismiss Steelworker's complaint arguing failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 12(B). The trial court entered the following findings and judgment:

1. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that they are voluntary associations and Local Unions of the United Steelworkers of America representing employees of the Defendant Northern Indiana Public Service Company.

2. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that the Defendant NIPSCO is an Indiana corporation engaged in the business of providing electric power to the public.

3. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that the Defendant Continental Assurance Company is an insurance company licensed to do business in the State of Indiana.

4. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that for many years the Plaintiffs and NIPSCO have been parties to collective bargaining agreements establishing the terms and conditions of employment for employees of the Defendant NIPSCO and that as part of said agreements NIPSCO agreed to establish a group accident and health insurance program and did procure a policy of insurance with Defendant Continental Assurance Company, a copy of which policy is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint as Exhibit C.

5. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that under the terms of the collective bargaining agreements between the parties the Defendant NIPSCO paid 85% of the cost of the accident and health insurance and the employees paid 15%.

6. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that over the years since NIPSCO contracted with Continental, the premiums paid by NIPSCO and the employees have exceeded the cost of said insurance and that a contingency reserve was created and that by agreement of the parties the money in the contingency reserve was to be used for the benefit of the employees covered by the policy by either reducing futher (sic) premiums or increasing future benefits as NIPSCO and Plaintiffs might agree.

7. The Court finds from the allegations of the Complaint that the Plaintiffs and Defendant NIPSCO have not agreed as to the disposition of the contingency reserve.

8. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that the contingency reserve contained approximately Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00) as of June 1, 1980.

9. Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that on May 31, 1980, the collective bargaining agreements between NIPSCO and the Plaintiffs expired and the employees represented by the Plaintiffs were on strike in furtherance of their demands for improvements in their collective bargaining agreements.

10. The Court finds that a labor dispute as contemplated by Indiana Code 22-6-1-1 et seq., exists between the Plaintiff Unions and the Defendant Northern Indiana Public Service Company.

11. During oral argument Plaintiffs' counsel asserted Indiana Code 22-6-1-4 to be unconstitutional. The Court finds I.C. 22-6-1-4 to be constitutional and to be applicable to the facts in this case.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1. The law is with the Defendants.

2. The Motion of Defendant Northern Indiana Public Service Company to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint is granted and Counts I and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint are ordered dismissed.

3. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of the Defendant Continental Assurance Company is granted.

4. The Court is without jurisdiction to enter the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs by reason of the provision of Indiana Code 22-6-1-4 restricting the Court's equity power in labor disputes.

5. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state of (sic) cause of action upon which relief can be granted by reason of the allegations of the Complaint "by agreement of all the parties, the money in the Contingency Reserve was to be used for the benefit of the employees covered by Policy No. L. 68048 by either reducing future premiums or increasing future benefits, as NIPSCO and plaintiffs might agree." The allegations of the Complaint further establish that the Plaintiffs and Defendant NIPSCO have not agreed to the disposition of the contingency reserve. The Court cannot coerce an agreement from the parties, nor can it restrain and enjoin the Defendant NIPSCO from interfering with the disposition of the contingency reserve in any manner other than as directed by Plaintiffs, nor can the Court restrain ane (sic) enjoin Defendant Continental from refusing to comply with the demand of plaintiffs to pay all premiums that have come due or may come due as prayed for in Plaintiffs' Complaint; to do so would force the parties into an agreement that they did not freely enter as disclosed by the pleadings.

6. Count III fails to state facts upon which damages can be awarded or upon which the Court could order Defendant NIPSCO to create a fund of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00) for the purpose of paying insurance claims.

7. The Court finds from the allegations of the Complaint that the Plaintiffs and Defendant NIPSCO have not agreed as to the disposition of the contingency reserve.

Count I of Steelworker's complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court held that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief because of the prohibitions in Ind.Code 22-6-1-4. Ind.Code 22-6-1-4 is a section of Indiana's Anti-Injunction Act. Ind.Code 22-6-1-1 (also referred to as a "little" or "State" Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101). ² The primary focus of the Act is to minimize judicial control over conduct related to labor disputes. ³ International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local No. 1227 v. McGill Manufacturing Co., (1975) 164 Ind.App. 321, 328 N.E.2d 761, 764. The policy of the State is set forth in the Act as an aid to its interpretation. Ind.Code 22-6-1-2 provides:

In the interpretation of this act and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the state is hereby declared as follows:

Whereas, under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership associations, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definition of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Indiana are hereby enacted.

The purpose of the Act is to protect employees and unions. We find nothing to indicate an intent to deny jurisdiction to issue injunctions against employers. ⁴ Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., (7th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 513.

The enactment of the Act was, of course, the responsibility of Congress, and not that of this court. That Congress may have been intent upon shielding organizations of employees from injunctions rather than employers was and is a matter within its province. The same can be said of the exemption of labor organizations from the sanctions of antitrust laws. Those are matters over which the courts have no control, in the absence of a constitutional attack.

The language used clearly negatives any intention to recognize any general reciprocity of rights of capital and labor. Essentially the Act is frankly a charter of the rights of labor against capital.

Id. at 518. (Notes omitted.) Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act does not deny the courts of this State the jurisdiction to issue injunctions against employers. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra.

Because we hold the Anti-Injunction Act does not preclude the issuance of an injunction against employers in this case, we need not resolve appellants' allegations that this litigation did not involve or grow out of a labor dispute under Ind.Code 22-6-1-4.

Before discussing Steelworker's T.R. 12(B)(6) allegations, we must determine whether the trial court had the power to even find the complaint failed to state a claim. The trial court dismissed Count I because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction as well as failure to state a claim. Appellant correctly states that once a trial court determines that it has no subject matter jurisdiction,...