United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel Co., Inc.
| Citation | 5 F.3d 39 |
| Decision Date | 14 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | 93-7056,No. 93-7026,AFL-CIO-CL,Nos. 93-7026,U,AFL-CIO-CLC,No. 93-7056,A,93-7026,s. 93-7026 |
| Parties | , 126 Lab.Cas. P 10,851, 8 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1281 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,, v. NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY, INC., North Star Steel Company, Inc., Appellant innited Steelworkers of America,, Appellant in |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Vincent Candiello (argued), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Harrisburg, PA, for North Star Steel Co., Inc.
Before: SCIRICA, COWEN and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.
United Steelworkers of America ("plaintiff") brought this action against North Star Steel Company, Inc. ("defendant") alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101-2109. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. See also 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2104(a)(5). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 over this appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment of the district court.
Plaintiff is the exclusive bargaining representative for production and maintenance workers at defendant's plant in Milton, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant laid off employees at the Milton plant without providing prior notice as required by WARN. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2102(a). The district court first granted summary judgment for plaintiff as to defendant's liability after concluding that the layoff was in violation of WARN's requirements. Defendant does not contest its liability on appeal. 1
Subsequently, the district court also granted summary judgment for plaintiff as to the number of days for which defendant is required to pay damages. 809 F.Supp. 5. 2 On this appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred in interpreting Section 2104(a)(1)(A) of WARN to require that defendant pay damages to each aggrieved employee for each day of the violation period--whether or not that day would have been a regular workday for that employee. Plaintiff understandably contends that the district court properly interpreted Section 2104(a)(1)(A). We turn to a review of this argument. Our review is plenary. See Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977).
The sole issue appealed by defendant is the number of days for which it must pay damages to its aggrieved employees under Section 2104(a)(1)(A) of WARN. The district court interpreted that section to require that defendant pay damages for each calendar day within the violation period. 3 Defendant argues that Section 2104(a)(1)(A) does not require it to pay damages to an aggrieved employee for any day within the violation period that would not have been a regular workday for that employee. To our knowledge, this interpretive issue has not yet been decided by any federal court of appeals. 4
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... must begin with the language of the statute itself." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). Section 2104(a)(1) states, in pertinent part:
(1) Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of [WARN] shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss as a result of such closing or layoff for--
(A) back pay for each day of the violation at a rate of compensation not less than the higher of--
(i) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 years of the employee's employment; or
(ii) the final regular rate received by such employee ...
Such liability shall be calculated for the period of the violation, up to a maximum of 60 days....
The district court concluded that this language was unambiguous and that it required a violating employer to pay damages to each aggrieved employee for each calendar day within the violation period--regardless of whether that day would have been a regular workday for the employee (e.g., Saturdays, Sundays and holidays). Defendant counters that this language is ambiguous and that, in light of legislative history, it should be interpreted to require only that damages be paid for each regular workday within the violation period. Defendant further argues that the interpretation of the statute adopted by the district court may produce anomalous results in other cases not presently before us.
We must first determine if the statutory language is clear on its face insofar as our issue is concerned. If so, our inquiry is generally complete and the plain language controls. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1030. We turn to that determination.
The statute states that a violating employer is liable to each aggrieved employee for "back pay for each day of the violation." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2104(a)(1)(A). Both parties focus on a selected portion of this quoted language to support their respective positions. Plaintiff focuses on the phrase "for each day of the violation" in arguing that the statutory language is unambiguous and that defendant must pay damages for each calendar day within the violation period--regardless of whether or not that day would have been a regular workday for the employee. Defendant focuses on the term "back pay" in arguing that the statutory language is ambiguous. We must examine the parties' interpretive arguments.
Plaintiff argues that a common sense reading of the plain language of Section 2104(a)(1)(A) supports its interpretation that defendant is liable for damages for each calendar day of the violation. As a necessary corollary to its argument, plaintiff takes the position that the term "back pay" is simply a label used to describe the amount of damages for which an employer is liable for each day of the violation. 5
It is undisputed that the days of the violation period are "calendar days" rather than workdays. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 639.1(a) (1992) (); id. Sec. 639.5(a) (). In fact, no section of WARN expressly refers to "workdays" (as opposed to calendar days). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a violating employer is liable for "back pay" for each of the calendar days of the violation.
Defendant argues that the term "back pay," which immediately precedes the phrase "for each day of the violation," renders Section 2104(a)(1)(A) ambiguous. Defendant points out that the use of the term "back pay" in a traditional labor relations context generally connotes a lost earnings concept. Under a lost earnings concept, damages would not be payable for days that would not have been regular workdays for the employee. Thus, defendant asks us to interpret the statute's reference to "back pay for each day of the violation" to mean lost earnings during the period of the violation.
Commonly accepted rules of statutory construction compel us to conclude that the meaning of the term "back pay" in WARN cannot be the lost earnings concept that defendant urges us to embrace. First, we have consistently held that "[c]ourts should avoid a construction of a statute that renders any provision superfluous." Pennsylvania v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 928 F.2d 1378, 1385 (3d Cir.1991); see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (). Second, "a court should avoid an interpretation of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonable results." Robert T. Winzinger, Inc. v. Management Recruiters, Inc., 841 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1988).
If "back pay" meant lost earnings, one of the aforementioned rules of statutory construction would necessarily be violated. That is, a section of WARN would be rendered superfluous or application of that section would produce unreasonable results. That section states:
(2) The amount for which an employer is liable under [Section 2104(a)(1) ] shall be reduced by--
(A) any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the period of the violation;
(B) any voluntary and unconditional payment by the employer to the employee that is not required by any legal obligation; and
(C) any payment by the employer to a third party or trustee ... on behalf of and attributable to the employee for the period of the violation.
29 U.S.C. Sec. 2104(a)(2).
If "back pay" meant lost earnings, Section 2104(a)(2) would be superfluous because a lost earnings calculation would automatically exclude the reductions it sets forth. Thus, there would appear to be no need for the above-quoted language and the rule of statutory construction that requires us to avoid constructions that render statutory provisions superfluous would be violated.
Alternatively, assuming again that "back pay" meant lost earnings, if Section 2104(a)(2) were not superfluous an employer would receive double credit for any of the payments set forth in that section. This double credit would occur because the payments set forth in Section 2104(a)(2) would be subtracted once to compute the "back pay" for which the employer is liable under Section 2104(a)(1) and then would be subtracted a second time because Section 2104(a)(2) mandates that the employer's liability under Section 2104(a)(1) "shall be reduced by" any of the specified payments. If we interpreted this section to permit employers to obtain such a double credit, the rule...
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