United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Textron, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1987
• Docket Number: P,AFL-CI,No. 87-1241,87-1241
• Citation: 836 F.2d 6
• Parties: 108 Lab.Cas. P 10,252, 9 Employee Benefits Ca 2204 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,laintiff, Appellee, v. TEXTRON, INC., Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 6

836 F.2d 6

108 Lab.Cas. P 10,252, 9 Employee Benefits Ca 2204

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. TEXTRON, INC., Defendant, Appellant.

No. 87-1241.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Argued Sept. 10, 1987.

Decided Dec. 9, 1987.

Jason Berger, P.C. with whom Ruth L. Kaplan and Peabody & Brown, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.

William T. Payne, Asst. General Counsel, Pittsburgh, Pa., with whom Bernard Kleiman, Chicago, Ill., General Counsel, Warren H. Pyle and Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, GARTH, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

This case arises out of a dispute over the meaning of language in several collective bargaining agreements between the Steelworkers Union and Textron. The Steelworkers Union, representing metalworkers who retired from Textron's Waterbury Farrel Division, says the language means Textron must guarantee the payment of health and life insurance premiums for the rest of those retired workers' lives; Textron disagrees. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Textron to pay the premiums pending a trial on the merits. Textron now appeals from that preliminary order. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1) (1982). In our view, the order is lawful.

The contracts in question consist of a series of collective bargaining agreements between Textron and the Union dating back to 1961. Though the relevant language differs slightly among the agreements, it typically says (for example) that the Company (Textron) "shall pay" for retiree life insurance and that (specifically defined) medical benefits "shall be provided" to union members who retire. See Appendix.

In early 1985 Textron sold its Waterbury Farrel Division to Jones & Lamson Machine Co. (hereinafter "JL"). JL agreed to assume liability for "life insurance and medical benefits" payable under the agreement to Textron's "retired employees." The Union, however, did not agree to look to JL to fulfill Textron's obligation to pay. Instead, the Union asked Textron to guarantee JL's payment of retiree health and life insurance benefits; Textron refused, and the Union invoked a grievance procedure to obtain arbitration. (Evidently, the grievance is still pending.) To make a long story short, JL paid the insurance premiums for a while; it experienced serious business problems; it stopped paying; the Union sued Textron; and the court granted the preliminary injunction here at issue.

As is well known, a district court may grant a preliminary injunction if it finds that (1) without it the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, (2) the injury outweighs the harm the injunction will cause the defendant, (3) the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) the injunction is consistent with "the public interest." Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1981) (quoting Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F.Supp. 542, 544 (D.Me.1979)). The heart of the matter is whether "the harm caused plaintiff without the injunction, in light of the plaintiff's likelihood of eventual success on the merits, outweighs the harm the injunction will cause defendants." Vargas-Figueroa v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162 (1st Cir.1987) (emphasis in original); accord Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir.1983); cf. Securities & Exchange Commission v. World Radio Applying these typical standards, we have no difficulty finding the district court's preliminary order lawful. Neither Textron nor JL has paid medical insurance premiums for approximately 200 retired Waterbury Division workers. Suppose we take this specific, undisputed, fact and add general facts that either are commonly believed or which courts have specifically held sufficient to show irreparable harm; such general facts as (1) most retired union members are not rich, (2) most live on fixed incomes, (3) many will get sick and need medical care, (4) medical care is expensive, (5) medical insurance is, therefore, a necessity, and (6) some retired workers may find it difficult to obtain medical insurance on their own while others can pay for it only out of money that they need for other necessities of life. See, e.g., Zotto v. Scovill, Inc., Slip Op. No. 85-494 (D.Conn. Nov. 7, 1985) ("a reduction in medical benefits 'establishes the threat of irreparable harm' because 'the practical effect of the reductions could well be to preclude retirees from seeking needed medical treatment' "); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1280 (3d Cir.1979) ("surely the possibility that a worker would be denied adequate medical care as a result of having no insurance would constitute 'substantial and irreparable injury' "); Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir.1979) ("the threatened termination of benefits such as medical coverage for workers and their families obviously raised the spectre of irreparable injury."). We should then conclude that retired workers would likely suffer emotional distress, concern about potential financial disaster, and possibly deprivation of life's necessities (in order to keep up in insurance payments). In short, taken together, these facts would show harm that, in this sort of case, is 'irreparable.' See, e.g., UAW v. White Farm Equipment Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2878, 2882 (D.Minn.1984); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F.Supp. 563, 577 (S.D.Ohio 1983).

                Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir.1976) ("To the extent that a defendant can show harm, this must be discounted by the degree that a plaintiff can show likelihood of success.").  The district court has broad authority to apply these criteria to the facts of a case, the appellant bearing a "heavy burden" of showing "clear error ... or abuse" of that authority.    Roselli v. Affleck, 508 F.2d 1277, 1280 (1st Cir.1974) (citing Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Limited, 454 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir.1972))
                

The appellant argues, however, that the law does not permit the district court to take as true both the specific fact and the generally believed facts. We disagree. The specific fact is alleged in the complaint, supported by affidavit, and undisputed. Common sense suggests that generally believed facts (or something like them) are true. E.g., Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.1977) (courts may take notice of facts commonly known); cf. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 201 at 201-25 to 201-31 (1986) (suggesting that in bench trials a court should assume all facts unlikely to be challenged as well as those that are indisputable). And, plaintiffs presented an affidavit indicating the generally believed facts (or facts like them) do exist here, namely, an affidavit by the Local president, John Bly, which said the following:

I am not in touch with most of the retirees, but I do know that several of those with whom I am familiar are threatened with serious financial problems because of the cancellation of their retiree insurance. For example, ... Wilbur Chepul, who retired prior to the sale, was hospitalized with a brain tumor and died in December, 1986; his widow is left with unpaid bills.

Bly's affidavit also referred to two other workers who did not retire soon enough to receive the benefit of the injunction (which applies only to workers who retired before the sale to JL), but whose plight the district court could take as illustrative of what could occur among all retirees. Bly said:

For example, plaintiff Herbert E. Schlander, who worked 43 years at the plant and retired in June 1985 has a wife who has a serious heart condition which developed in September, 1986. He and his There is adequate support for the district court's finding of "irreparable harm" in respect to loss of medical benefits.

wife are under age 65 and they are faced with several thousand dollars in medical bills which would otherwise be covered by insurance. Domenic Montagano, who retired in 1986 has had brain surgery and is told he is not covered by the retiree insurance so that he is being billed for hospital and physicians services. Marcel Lavigne, who retired in May, 1986[,] has had open heart surgery and the insurer is refusing to pay.

What about the loss of life insurance? Textron argues that life insurance premiums are different because a money judgment at the end of the lawsuit can adequately compensate the union members for any loss of life insurance caused by Textron's failure to pay (the rather small) premiums. At oral argument, however, Textron conceded that the life insurance in question amounts to $2,000 payments designed to provide cash for funeral, or other similar, expenses incurred at the time of a death. It seems to us that lack of ready cash for such purposes threatens the sort of serious emotional harm that (for reasons similar to those just mentioned) can support a finding of irreparable harm, at least in the face of a record that contains no contradicting or countervailing evidence or concern. We find adequate grounds for "irreparable harm" here as well.

At the same time, Textron has failed to show how the issuance of the injunction will have harmed it should it ultimately prevail. The district court, as a condition of the injunction, required the Union to post a bond of $200,000. If Textron ultimately wins, it can recover from this bond the amount of money that it told the district court it would need to make insurance premium payments. The balance of harms supports the Union.

Plaintiffs have also shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The contract language--retiree medical benefits "shall be provided" and the "Company shall pay" for retiree insurance--is consistent with a Textron promise to...