United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski

Citation457 U.S. 102,102 S.Ct. 2339,72 L.Ed.2d 707
Decision Date14 June 1982
Docket NumberP,AFL-CIO-CL,No. 81-395,81-395
PartiesUNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,etitioner v. Edward SADLOWSKI, Jr., et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Petitioner union amended its constitution to include an "outsider rule" which prohibits candidates for union office from accepting campaign contributions from nonmembers and creates a committee to enforce the rule, the committee's decisions being final and binding. Respondents, including a union member who had been an unsuccessful candidate for union office before adoption of the outsider rule and had received much of the financial support for his campaign from sources outside the union, filed suit against petitioner in Federal District Court, claiming that the rule prohibited nonmember contributions to finance campaign-related litigation and thus violated § 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), which provides that a union may not limit the rights of its members to institute an action in any court or administrative agency. The District Court found for respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the outsider rule violated § 101(a)(4). It also accepted respondents' argument, first raised on appeal, that the rule violated the "freedom of speech and assembly" provision of § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA giving every union member the right to assemble freely with other members and to express at union meetings his views about candidates in union elections or any business properly before the meeting. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's argument that the outsider rule was protected by § 101(a)(2)'s proviso, which gives a union authority to adopt "reasonable" rules regarding its members' responsibilities.

Held :

1. Petitioner's outsider rule does not violate § 101(a)(2). Although it may interfere with rights Congress intended to protect, it is rationally related to a legitimate and protected purpose, and thus is sheltered by § 101(a)(2)'s proviso. Pp. 108-119.

(a) In light of the legislative history, § 101(a)(2) cannot be read as incorporating the entire body of First Amendment law so as to require that the scope of protections afforded union members by the statute coincide with the protections afforded by the Constitution as to a political election candidate's freedom to receive campaign contributions. Union rules are valid under the statute so long as they are reasonable; they need not pass the stringent tests applied in the First Amendment context. Pp. 108-111.

(b) Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision of § 101(a)(2) in order to promote union democracy, particularly through fostering vigorous debate during election campaigns. Although petitioner's outsider rule does affect rights protected by the statute and may limit somewhat the ability of insurgent union members to wage an effective campaign against incumbent officers, as a practical matter the impact may not be substantial. The record shows that challengers have been able to defeat incumbents or administration-backed candidates, despite the absence of financial support from nonmembers. Pp. 111-115.

(c) Petitioner's purpose in adopting the outsider rule was to ensure that nonmembers would not unduly influence union affairs and that the union leadership would remain responsive to the membership. The policies underlying the LMRDA show that this is a legitimate purpose that Congress meant to protect. Nor is the rule invalid on the asserted ground that it is not rationally related to that purpose because the union could have simply established contribution ceilings, or need not have limited contributions by relatives and friends, or could have simply required that candidates reveal the sources of their funds. Petitioner had a reasonable basis for its decision to impose a broad ban seeking to eradicate the threat of outside influence. Pp. 115-119.

2. Petitioner's outsider rule does not violate § 101(a)(4)'s right-to-sue provision. The rule simply does not apply where a member uses funds from outsiders to finance litigation. Neither the rule's language nor the debates leading up to its passage indicate that petitioner intended the rule to apply in such context. Moreover, petitioner's rule-enforcement committee issued an opinion stating that the rule's limitations "do not apply to the financing of lawsuits by non-members for the purpose of asserting the legal rights of candidates or other union members in connection with elections." Pp. 119-121.

207 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 645 F.2d 1114, reversed and remanded.

Michael H. Gottesman, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington, D. C., for respondents.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we confront the question whether § 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), precludes the membership of a union from adopting a rule that prohibits candidates for union office from accepting campaign contributions from nonmembers. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that such a rule violated § 101(a)(2). 207 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 645 F.2d 1114 (1981). We granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 962, 102 S.Ct. 500, 70 L.Ed.2d 376 (1981), and now reverse.

I
A.

Petitioner United Steelworkers of America (USWA), a labor organization with 1,300,000 members, conducts elections for union president and other top union officers every four years. The elections for these officers are decided by referendum vote of the membership. In the 1977 election, which was hotly contested, two candidates ran for president: respondent Edward Sadlowski, Jr., the Director of USWA's largest District, and Lloyd McBride, another District Director.1 Both Sadlowski and McBride headed a slate of candidates for the other top union positions.

McBride was endorsed by the incumbent union leadership, and received substantial financial support from union officers and staff. Sadlowski, on the other hand, received much of his financial support from sources outside the union. During the campaign, the question whether candidates should accept contributions from persons who were not members of the union was vigorously debated. The McBride slate contended that outsider participation in USWA elections was dangerous for the union. App. 27, n. 2, 298. See also id., at 129, 398; see generally id., at 40-48. McBride ultimately defeated Sadlowski by a fairly wide margin—57% to 43%. The other candidates on the McBride slate won by similar margins.

After the elections, union members continued to debate the question whether outsider participation in union campaigns was desirable. This debate was finally resolved in 1978, when USWA held its biennial Convention. The Convention, which consists of approximately 5,000 delegates elected by members of USWA's local unions, is USWA's highest governing body. At the 1978 Convention, several local unions submitted resolutions recommending amendment of the USWA Constitution to include an "outsider rule" prohibiting campaign contributions by nonmembers. The union's International Executive Board also recommended a ban on nonmember contributions. Acting on the basis of these recommendations, the Convention's Constitution Committee proposed to the Convention that it adopt an outsider rule. After a debate on the floor of the Convention, the delegates, by a margin of roughly 10 to 1, voted to include such a rule in the Constitution. Id., at 35-36, 81-105.

The outsider rule, Article V, § 27, of the USWA Constitution (1978), provides in pertinent part:

"Sec. 27. No candidate (including a prospective candidate) for any position set forth in Article IV, Section 1, and supporter of a candidate may solicit or accept financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind (except an individual's own volunteered personal time) from any non-member." 2 Section 27 confers authority upon the International Executive Board to adopt regulations necessary to implement the provision. It also creates a Campaign Contribution Administrative Committee, consisting of three "distinguished, impartial" nonmembers to administer and enforce the provision. The Committee may order a candidate to cease and desist from conduct that breaches § 27, and may declare a candidate disqualified. Its decisions are final and binding.

B

In October 1979, Sadlowski and several other individuals 3 filed suit against USWA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They claimed, inter alia, that the outsider rule violated the "right to sue" provision of Title I of the LMRDA, § 101(a)(4), 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), because it would prohibit a candidate from accepting nonmember contributions to finance campaign-related litigation. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The District Court found that the rule violated § 101(a)(4). 507 F.Supp. 623, 625 (1981). The District Court further decided to invalidate the rule in toto, because the portion of the rule that "limits meaningful access to the courts . . . cannot be separated or isolated from the rule in its entirety." Ibid.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 207 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 645 F.2d 1114 (1981). The court agreed that Article V, § 27, violated the right-to-sue provision. However, it chose not to decide whether this violation alone justified an injunction restraining enforcement of the entire rule. It accepted respondents' argument, first raised on appeal, that the outsider rule also violated the § 101(a)(2) "freedom of speech and assembly" provision, and that this violation justified the injunction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statutory goal of union democracy could be achieved only if "effective challenges can be made to the often-entrenched...

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