United Teachers of Dade FEA/United AFT, Local 1974, AFL-CIO v. Dade County School Bd.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1986
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 67430,67430
• Citation: 500 So.2d 508,12 Fla. L. Weekly 2
• Parties: 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2380, 55 USLW 2365, 37 Ed. Law Rep. 399, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2 UNITED TEACHERS OF DADE, FEA/UNITED AFT, LOCAL 1974,, et al. Petitioner, v. DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Superintendent Leonard Britton, and the State Board of Education of the State of Florida, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 508

500 So.2d 508

124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2380, 55 USLW 2365, 37 Ed. Law Rep. 399,

12 Fla. L. Weekly 2

UNITED TEACHERS OF DADE, FEA/UNITED AFT, LOCAL 1974, AFL-CIO, et al. Petitioner, v.DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, SuperintendentLeonard Britton, and the State Board of Education of the State of Florida, Respondents.

No. 67430.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 24, 1986.

Elizabeth J. Du Fresne of Du Fresne and Bradley, Coconut Grove, for petitioner.

Frank A. Howard, Jr., and Gerald A. Williams of Haygood & Williams, Miami, and Judith A. Brechner, General Counsel, State Board of Education, Tallahassee, and Leonard A. Carson and Richard T. Donelan, Jr. of Carson & Linn, P.A., Tallahassee, for respondents.

Thomas W. Young III, General Counsel, FEA/United, Tallahassee, for intervenors.

EHRLICH, Justice.

In December 1984, petitioner, the United Teachers of Dade (UTD), filed a three-count complaint in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against respondents, the Dade County School Board, its Superintendent, and the State Board of Education(State Board).Petitioners alleged that the so-called "Master Teacher Program,"sections 231.533and231.534, Florida statutes(Supp.1984), and rule 6A-4.46, Florida Administrative Code, was unconstitutional in that the program infringed on petitioner's collective bargaining rights guaranteed by article I, section 6, Florida Constitution.Petitioner voluntarily dropped two counts of the complaint in order to expedite determination of the constitutional issue; the respondentState Board's request for change of venue to Leon County was granted.Leon County Circuit JudgeMiner granted nine motions to intervene filed by teachers' unions representing teachers in Martin, Lake, Sarasota, Brevard, Charlotte, St. Lucie, Pasco, Broward and Alachua counties.

The trial court entered an "Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" declaring that the Master Teacher Program did not violate article I, section 6.On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, adopting the opinion of the trial court in its entirety, and certified the following question as being of great public importance:

IS FLORIDA'S MASTER TEACHER PROGRAM (FLORIDA STATUTES SECTIONS 231.533 and .534 (SUPP.1984)) AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?

472 So.2d 1269, 1271(Fla. 1st DCA1985).We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative.However, the reasoning and analysis we employ in reaching this result differs from that utilized below.

The legislative intent underlying section 231.533 is stated in the preamble:

There is established the State Master Teacher Program, the purpose of which is to recognize superior ability among Florida's instructional personnel and to provide an economic incentive to such personnel to continue in public school instruction.A person may participate in the program as an associate master teacher or as a master teacher; such participation shall be voluntary.

Section 231.533(1) sets forth the criteria which must be met in order to qualify as an associate master teacher; similarly, section 231.533(2) sets forth the requirements to qualify as a master teacher.Section 231.533(1)(b)2 contemplates the creation and utilization of "subject area examinations" which, once established and approved pursuant to section 231.534, both associate master and master teacher candidates must submit to in order to qualify for the award.Section 231.533(5)(a) provides for an annual award of $3,000 to those ultimately selected as the most highly qualified instructional personnel.Section 231.533(4) provides that the ultimate number of award recipients will be determined by the amount the legislature appropriates.

Petitioners(UTD and the Intervenors) characterize this statutory payment as a "merit wage" and allege that this direct payment to teachers, bypassing as it does the teacher's constitutionally recognized right to bargain over wages, amounts to nothing more than "old time union busting in a new state-approved incarnation."Respondent, ¹ on the other hand, claims that the teachers wish nothing less than to force the legislature and the state board to bargain with them, and further claim that the "unions are not attempting to vindicate legitimate teacher collective bargaining rights, but are merely attempting to destroy a program with which they disagree as a matter of policy."Neither characterization is accurate and it is worthy of emphasis at the outset that the wisdom of this program is not for our review.We agree with the observation of the Supreme Court of Nebraska when faced with similar arguments:

Whether or not the legislature has acted wisely in the premises is not a matter for judicial determination.The courts are not arbiters of legislative wisdom, but function as a check upon unauthorized and unconstitutional assumptions of power.

School District of Seward Education Association v. School District of Seward, 188

Neb. 772, 783, 199 N.W.2d 752, 759(Neb.1972).

The sole and narrow issue before us is whether the legislature and the State Board of Education, acting pursuant to their respective authority under article IX, section Iandsection 2, in enacting and implementing the Master Teacher Program, have intruded on the right to collective bargaining guaranteed public employees by article I, section 6.

The broad rights of public employees to join labor unions and bargain collectively is of relatively recent origin in Florida, having first found its expression in article I, section 6 of the Constitution of 1968.In Dade County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903, 905(Fla.1969), we held that "with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by Section 6."In Dade County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. v. The Legislature, 269 So.2d 684, 687(Fla.1972)(The Legislature ), we reaffirmed our holding in Ryan, and stated:

The question of the right of public employees to bargain collectively is no longer open to debate.It is a constitutionally protected right which may be enforced by the courts, if not protected by other agencies of government.

In both Ryan, 225 So.2d at 906, and in The Legislature, 269 So.2d at 684, we recognized that the legislature had the authority and duty to enact guidelines implementing the rights guaranteed by article I, section 6.In fact, The Legislature dealt, in large part, with this Court's responsibility to fashion appropriate guidelines should the legislature fail to do so.

Subsequent to our mandate in The Legislature, Part II of Chapter 447, Ch. 74-100, Laws of Florida, was enacted to implement article I, section 6.In City of Tallahassee v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 410 So.2d 487(Fla.1981), we had our first occasion to review the legislature's regulation of public employees' bargaining rights.The issue before us was the constitutionality of the legislature's attempt to remove retirement matters from the collective bargaining process.In finding these sections of Chapter 447 unconstitutional, we agreed with the reasoning of the district court, who, relying on our decision in Ryan, held that since private employees had the right to bargain as to retirement benefits, public employees must also.We explicitly rejected the City's argument that the sections in question did not infringe or abridge bargaining rights, but only represented a reasonable regulation by the legislature of the "scope" of the rights guaranteed by article I, section 6:

This argument seems to us an exercise in semantics which ignores the real impact of the deleted phrases.The two sections, as enacted, affected much more than the "scope" of collective bargaining by public employees.Their practical effect, in barring negotiations on retirement matters, was to eliminate a significant facet of the collective bargaining process.To prohibit bargaining on so important an aspect of an employment agreement is, in our judgment, an abridgment of the right to collectively bargain.

Id. at 489.

Sub judice, the trial court below premised its decision that the program is constitutional in part on the legislature being a "stranger to the employment relationship."We find this too to be an "exercise in semantics" which ignores the real impact or practical effect legislation may have on the rights guaranteed by article I, section 6.²City of Tallahassee;See alsoUnited Faculty of Florida, Local 1880 v. Board of Regents, 365 So.2d 1073(Fla. 1st DCA1979).It would be an abdication of our duty to protect and enforce constitutionally guaranteed rights were we to base our holding on such a tenuous premise.Cases arising from disputes between local school boards (the legally defined "employer,"section 447.203(2)) and teacher's bargaining representatives may produce different factual or procedural scenarios than do cases arising because of legislative action allegedly impacting unconstitutionally upon collective bargaining rights.The correct analysis of each of these situations, however, must encompass not only the legislature's, the State Board of Education's, or the local school board's constitutional authority to make educational policy decisions, but also must focus on the impact such decisions have on public employees constitutionally guaranteed collective bargaining rights.Constitutional provisions are to be construed so as to make them meaningful.Plante v. Smathers, 372 So.2d 933(Fla.1979).

Employing this analysis to the issues before us, it is clear that sections 231.533and231.534 reflect a legislative policy decision, enacted pursuant to article IX, section 1, which contemplates encouraging superior instructors to continue teaching in Florida's public schools.The program is to be of...