Univ. of Or. v. Phillips

Decision Date24 March 2022
Docket NumberCase No. 6:21-cv-00619-MK
Parties UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, Plaintiff, v. Troy PHILLIPS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Andrea D. Coit, Jonathan M. Hood, Hutchinson Cox, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiff.

Emerson L. Lenon, Daniel E. Thenell, Thenell Law Group, LLC, Portland, OR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge:

In this action, the University of Oregon ("Plaintiff") brings four claims against Troy Phillips ("Defendant"): (1) in its capacity as assignee of the Estate of Eliborio Rodrigues, Jr., a claim for unlawful seizure in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) in its capacity as assignee of the Estate of Eliborio Rodrigues, Jr., a claim for malicious prosecution in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (3) in its capacity as assignee of the Estate of Eliborio Rodrigues, Jr., a claim for fabrication of evidence in violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and (4) an indemnity claim under Oregon state law. First Am. Compl. 6–11, ECF No. 24 ("FAC"). Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and requests attorney fees under ORS 20.105. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 2, 16, ECF No. 9 ("Def.’s Mot."); see also Def.’s Suppl. Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 25 ("Def.’s Suppl. Mot."). All parties have consented to jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. See ECF No. 15. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's FAC and are accepted as true for the purpose of the pending motion. See FAC, ECF No. 24.

A. Defendant's Encounter with Eliborio Rodrigues, Jr.

On October 27, 2018, Defendant was on duty working as a police officer for Plaintiff's police department. Id. at 2. Defendant wore his uniform and badge, operated a department-owned and marked police vehicle, and was armed with a department-issued taser and handgun. Id.

While driving on a local street in Eugene, Defendant began to trail Eliborio Rodrigues, Jr., a Hispanic man riding a bicycle in the street's designated bicycle lane. Id. Defendant pursued Rodrigues, activated the vehicle's lights and siren, and ordered Rodrigues to stop. Id. Rodrigues stopped his bicycle within fifteen seconds of receiving Defendant's instruction. Id. As he approached Rodrigues, Defendant pulled out his handgun, pointed it at Rodrigues, and asked Rodrigues why he did not stop when Defendant activated his siren. Id. at 3. Rodrigues pointed at a small speaker in his hand and explained that he did not initially hear the siren due to the music he was playing. Id. Defendant noticed a knife in a sheath attached to Rodrigues's waistband, and repeatedly ordered Rodrigues to get down on the ground. Id. Rodrigues then held both of his hands up in the air, holding a small bag in one and the speaker in the other, and explained that he did not want to sit on the ground because it was wet. Id. Rodrigues also asked to speak with a supervisor. Id. Defendant yelled to Rodrigues that he needed to get on the ground because he was armed with a knife and not following orders, and Rodrigues—still with his hands in the air—noted that his knife was in a sheath. Id.

Defendant told Rodrigues that he would be tasered if he did not get on the ground. Id. Defendant also told his cover officer to "go lethal." Id. In response, Rodrigues pleaded: "No. Please sir. You see my hands. Get your sergeant." Id. Defendant then yelled at Rodrigues that he was under arrest. Id. Rodrigues told Defendant: "You can't do that to me. Let me – I couldn't hear due to the music." Id. With the audible sound of police sirens arriving as back-up, and only forty seconds into the encounter, Defendant tackled Rodrigues to the ground and arrested him. Id.

B. Prosecution of Rodrigues

After arresting Rodrigues, Defendant prepared reports about the incident and viewed the audio and video recording of the encounter. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendant made intentionally false statements in his reports that are shown to be false based on the audio and video recording of the encounter. Id. In his reports, Defendant failed to disclose that the encounter with Rodrigues had been audio and video recorded. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's motivation for making false statements was to "fabricate reasonable suspicion for the stop of Rodrigues, and to fabricate probable cause for his arrest and to create justification for his use of force." Id. at 5.

Defendant submitted his reports to the Eugene municipal prosecuting attorney, who then filed charges against Rodrigues in reliance on the assertions set forth in Defendant's reports. Id. The day before Rodrigues's trial, the prosecuting attorney emailed Defendant to ask if there was a video recording of his encounter with Rodrigues. Id. Defendant did not respond to the email, nor did he disclose the existence of the audio and video recordings to the prosecuting attorney at any point before Rodrigues's trial. Id. During the trial, Defendant was called to testify as a witness. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant repeated false statements from his reports. Id.

C. Defendant's Termination and Plaintiff's Settlement with the Estate of Rodrigues

Plaintiff later investigated Defendant's actions with respect to Rodrigues and concluded that Defendant had engaged in "egregious misconduct." Id. Plaintiff then terminated Defendant's employment on November 25, 2019. Id.

Rodrigues served Plaintiff with a tort claim notice on April 4, 2019, giving notice of his intent to bring tort claims against Plaintiff based on Defendant's encounter with Rodrigues. Id. at 6. Rodrigues passed away in November 2019. Id. On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Estate of Rodrigues entered into an agreement to toll the statute of limitations on Rodrigues's claims until April 26, 2021. Id.

In April 2021, Plaintiff and the Estate of Rodrigues entered into a settlement agreement. Id. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay the Estate of Rodrigues a total of $115,000 in exchange for Rodrigues's agreement not to pursue any claims against Plaintiff or Defendant arising out of or related to his encounter with Defendant. Id. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement: (1) $15,000 of the settlement amount was paid to compensate Rodrigues for his damages relating to Defendant's use of force against him, and (2) in exchange for the remaining settlement amount of $100,000, the Estate of Rodrigues assigned Plaintiff all its remaining claims against Defendant. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Gunn v. Minton , 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). As such, a court is to presume "that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted); see also, e.g. , Robinson v. United States , 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) ; Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer , 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of "subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived." United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). An objection that a particular court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by any party, or by the court on its own initiative, at any time. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 506, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court must dismiss any case over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ; see also Pistor v. Garcia , 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, the court must dismiss the complaint, even sua sponte if necessary).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either "facial" or "factual." See Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039. A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction is based on the assertion that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. "A jurisdictional challenge is factual where ‘the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.’ " Pride v. Correa , 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039 ). When a defendant factually challenges the plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction, a court does not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations and may consider evidence extrinsic to the complaint. See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq , 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Robinson , 586 F.3d at 685 ; Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039. A factual challenge "can attack the substance of a complaint's jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency." Dreier v. United States , 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. , 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. , 668...

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