University of Connecticut Chapter AAUP v. Governor

Decision Date08 July 1986
Citation200 Conn. 386,512 A.2d 152
Parties, 33 Ed. Law Rep. 1159 UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT CHAPTER AAUP et al. v. GOVERNOR et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Joel M. Ellis, with whom was William S. Zeman, West Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Daniel R. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were David M. Teed, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Barney Lapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and BARRY, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The principal issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of General Statutes § 4-85(b) 1 which permits the governor to reduce budgetary allotments by up to 5 percent under certain specified circumstances. The plaintiff unions, claiming that § 4-85(b) is unconstitutional, originally filed this action in the Superior Court on February 27, 1980, to enjoin the governor from making such reductions. The trial court, Satter, J., rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, found § 4-85(b) constitutional, and rendered judgment for the defendants. On appeal the plaintiffs argue that: General Statutes § 4-85(b) is unconstitutional (1) because it has the effect of permitting the governor to veto part of an appropriation; (2) because it confers upon the governor legislative power in violation of the separation of powers provision contained in article second of the Connecticut constitution; and (3) because, even if such power can be delegated, the statute does not satisfy the requirements for a valid delegation under the rule enunciated in State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A.2d 586 (1940). We find no error.

I

The defendants, in accordance with Practice Book § 3012, have presented two alternate grounds for affirming the judgment, the defenses of sovereign immunity and lack of standing. Both defenses were raised below, considered and rejected by the trial court.

It is well settled in Connecticut that the state cannot be sued without its consent and that since the state acts only through its officers and agents, a suit against an officer concerning a matter in which he represents the state is, in effect, a suit against the state. Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 342, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Where, however, the defendant officer is alleged to be acting under an unconstitutional statute, the interest in the protection of the plaintiffs' rights to be free from the consequences of such action outweighs the interest served by the sovereign immunity doctrine. Horton v. Meskill, supra, 624, 376 A.2d 359. The exception in Horton was limited to actions requesting declaratory relief. Id. In Sentner, however, we recognized a narrow exception for actions seeking prospective injunctive relief when the relief granted avoids undue interference with governmental functions. Sentner v. Board of Trustees, supra, 184 Conn. at 344-45, 439 A.2d 1033. We agree with the finding of the trial court that this case presented a significant and substantial question, the determination of which is manifestly in the public interest and thus is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. at 628, 376 A.2d 359.

The defendants next claim that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action because the plaintiff unions proved no injury as a result of the governor's action. The trial court, Corrigan, J., denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing. It found that the plaintiffs had a colorable claim of direct injury and that the allegations of their amended complaint sufficiently stated an "adversary presentation of the issues to withstand the motion to dismiss." After the completion of the trial, the court, Satter, J., issued its decision in which it stated in a footnote that it was adopting Judge Corrigan's opinion concerning standing.

As we recently stated in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 612-13, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). " 'The "fundamental aspect of standing ... [is that] it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before [the] court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942 [1952], 20 L.Ed.2d 947 [1968].' Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 485, 338 A.2d 497 (1973). 'Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court.... Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973).'... The requirements of justiciability and controversy are 'ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity.' " Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, quoting Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that the plaintiff had standing to bring this action.

II

The plaintiffs first claim that General Statutes § 4-85(b) is unconstitutional because it allows the governor to veto a part of an appropriation. "It is well settled that a party who challenges a statute on constitutional grounds has no easy burden, for every intendment will be made in favor of constitutionality, and invalidity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 679, 372 A.2d 99 (1976); State v. Dupree, 196 Conn. 655, 663, 495 A.2d 691, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 318, 88 L.Ed.2d 301 (1985); Eielson v. Parker, 179 Conn. 552, 560, 427 A.2d 814 (1980); State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 506, 353 A.2d 723 (1974). It is with this in mind that we examine the plaintiffs' claims.

General Statutes § 4-85(a) requires each budgeted agency to submit to the governor, through the secretary of the office of policy and management, a requisition for the allotment of the amount necessary to carry on the work of the agency during each quarter of the fiscal year. General Statutes § 4-85(b), the challenged statutes, provides: "[t]he governor shall approve ... requisitions for allotments unless ... [he] determines that (1) due to a change in circumstances since the budget was adopted certain reductions should be made in various allotments ... or (2) the estimated budget resources during such fiscal year will be insufficient to pay all appropriations in full, in which event the governor may modify such allotments to the extent ... necessary, provided no reduction in the budget adopted by the general assembly, by any requisition for an allotment made pursuant to subsection (a) or modification by the governor or both, shall result in any reduction in any fund of more than three per cent or in any appropriated account of more than five per cent of the amount appropriated for such fiscal year...."

In the fiscal years 1979-1980, 1980-1981, and 1981-1982, the governor reduced quarterly allotments to the University of Connecticut and to the Connecticut state universities, resulting in their receiving less than the full amounts appropriated to them in each of those fiscal years. The governor reduced the allotments due to anticipated decreases in state revenues and increases in state expenses, which were likely to cause a budgetary deficit. The plaintiffs argue that although the governor's authority under the statute is not, in form, a veto under article fourth, § 15, of the Connecticut constitution, the substance and effect of the governor's action is a veto. They contend that § 4-85(b) authorizes the governor to do indirectly that which the constitution directly prohibits. We disagree.

"Article fourth, § 15, of the constitution of Connecticut confers on the governor the power to veto any bill passed by both houses of the General Assembly but confers no power to veto any bill except as an entirety." Caldwell v. Meskill, 164 Conn. 299, 305, 320 A.2d 788 (1973). The only power of "partial veto" is that conferred by the provisions of § 16 of article fourth. See Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct. 252, 254, 81 L.Ed. 312 (1937). Section 16 permits the governor to disapprove any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, while at the same time approving the remainder of the bill, and the part or parts of the bill so approved shall become effective but the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall not take effect unless the same are separately reconsidered and repassed in accordance with the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive veto. Caldwell v. Meskill, supra, 164 Conn. at 305, 320 A.2d 788; see Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431, 207 A.2d 739 (1965). 2

The plaintiffs argue that General Statutes § 4-85(b) permits the governor to reduce appropriations which in effect constitutes a veto of part of an appropriations bill, rather than a distinct item of appropriation. This court has held that the terms "item or items" and "part or parts" as used in § 16 of the constitution do not have the same meaning. Patterson v. Dempsey, supra, 440, 207 A.2d 739. Under § 16, the governor may only veto distinct "items" of an appropriation, which are indivisible sums of money dedicated to a stated purpose. The governor may not veto any other "parts" of an appropriations bill. Patterson v. Dempsey, supra, 448, 207 A.2d 739. The authority given the governor under § 4-85(b), however, does not allow the governor to...

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