Unjian v. Unjian

• Decision Date: 28 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 29,29
• Citation: 73 N.W.2d 862,344 Mich. 423
• Parties: Isabelle UNJIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Arda UNJIAN, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 862

73 N.W.2d 862

344 Mich. 423

Isabelle UNJIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Arda UNJIAN, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 29.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 28, 1955.

Louis Rosenzweig, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.

William K. Kreston and George F. Taylor, Detroit, for defendant and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

DETHMERS, Justice.

Plaintiff filed a bill for divorce. Defendant filed an answer but no cross bill. At the conclusion of proofs taken thereon the court announced that plaintiff might have a decree of divorce. Before decree entered plaintiff requested that her bill of complaint be dismissed, but the court replied that she was too late. Cited in support of her claimed right to dismiss at that juncture are Coon v. Coon, 163 Mich. 644, 129 N.W. 12, and Eisenbach v. Eisenbach, 176 Mich. 354, 142 N.W. 345. Since those cases were decided, Michigan Court Rule No. 38, § 1, has twice been amended. Under its present provisions and our construction thereof in Goodspeed v. Goodspeed, 300 Mich. 371, 1 N.W.2d 577; Ratcliffe v. Ratcliffe, 308 Mich. 488, 14 N.W.2d 127; and Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 316 Mich. 208, 25 N.W.2d 171, plaintiff could no longer discontinue after filing of defendant's answer, except upon stipulation with defendant or on order of the court made upon special motion supported by affidavit setting forth sufficient grounds for dismissal. The rule not having been complied with, the trial court was correct.

Ought a decree of divorce to have been granted plaintiff? The sum of her uncorroborated testimony to support her charge of extreme and repeated cruelty consisted of the following:

'I stated in my Bill of Complaint that my husband has been guilty of acts of extreme and repeated cruelty. Well, his relatives criticized me in the presence of his friends and he never defended me, and, in May, 1952, while at a musical at our church, in which I partook in making background scenery for the church, and I took an interest in attending the musical and shortly after we left this progran we were anturally being greeted by our other church members, and it seemed to--my husband scolded me when he saw me in the presence of all these people and wanted me to shorten my little visit with them and put up a very, very nervous theme in the presence of my mother and our friends and it seemed as if he wanted me to work and help him anyway in his business. I did that willingly, but it seemed something bothered him. He wanted me to just work and just because they were working he thought I should work too, and I had--I was living in a nice neighborhood and I worked in the post office and I think I lowered myself just because he wanted me to work--he wanted me to work in the Franklin Post Office, and it seemed as if, during my brother's wedding, which was a year ago--last year--I had come to California for a funeral previously and I had seen my father's grave there, which I had promised my mother to do--it was a very gruelling trip--I rushed back within a week and a half to attend my brother's wedding--it was all strenuous and attended the wedding ceremony, and, shortly after the ceremony, at the time of the reception my husband wanted me to talk to them, which we did and we discussed that he didn't want to continue our marriage, he was very unhappy, the responsibility was too great for him and therefore he created a great disturbance and at a time like that. I didn't know what to think or what to do.'

In Brewer v. Brewer, 295 Mich. 370, 294 N.W. 715, 716, this Court quoted with approval from Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich. 205:

"The law does not permit courts to sever the marriage bond and to break up households, merely because parties, from unruly tempers or mutual wranglings, live unhappily together. It requires them to submit to the ordinary consequences of human infirmities, and of unwise selections, and the misconduct which will form a good ground for a legal separation must be very serious, and such as amounts to extreme cruelty, entirely subverting the family relations by rendering the association intolerable."

The quoted testimony in the instant case did not make out a case of extreme and repeated cruelty entitling plaintiff to divorce. See also Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N.W. 194, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 837; Le Blanc v. Le Blanc, 228 Mich. 74, 199 N.W. 601; Kloet v. Kloet, ...