Unkert by Unkert v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1997
• Citation: 694 A.2d 306,301 N.J.Super. 583
• Parties: James W. UNKERT, an incompetent by his Guardians Ad Litem, Dennis J. UNKERT and Shirley A. Unkert, and Dennis J. Unkert and Shirley A. Unkert, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Respondents, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., Defendant-Respondent, Cross-Appellant. and Robert A. ROGERS, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 583

301 N.J.Super. 583

694 A.2d 306

James W. UNKERT, an incompetent by his Guardians Ad Litem, Dennis J UNKERT and Shirley A. Unkert, and Dennis J. Unkert and Shirley A. Unkert, individually Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Respondents, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., Defendant-Respondent, Cross-Appellant and Robert A. ROGERS, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued April 22, 1997.

Decided June 4, 1997.

[694 A.2d

307] Robert A. Vort, Hackensack, argued the cause for appellants, cross-respondents (Mr. Vort, on the brief).

Edward J. Fanning, Woodbridge, argued the cause for respondent, cross-appellant (Tansey, Fanning, Haggerty, Kelly, Convery & Murray, attorneys; Mr. Fanning, of counsel and on the brief; Sharon McConvery, on the brief).

Before Judges DREIER, D'ANNUNZIO and NEWMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

D'ANNUNZIO, J.A.D.

On October 25, 1988, James Unkert was operating his Chevrolet pickup truck when his vehicle crossed into the oncoming lane and collided with a dump truck. James was immediately rendered unconscious as the result of severe head injuries, including an injury to his brain stem. The injuries rendered James incompetent, and he remains so to date. He resides in a rehabilitation institution.

On March 23, 1989, plaintiffs, James' parents, were granted letters of guardianship for James. The record suggests that this was done to facilitate the collection and administration of benefits on James' behalf, such as motor vehicle personal injury protection benefits. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.

On October 22, 1990, plaintiffs sued a hospital and various health professionals on James' behalf, alleging that their negligence had caused James to suffer from a severe condition of bedsores. That case was settled for $200,000 in August 1992.

On January 7, 1993, plaintiffs filed this action against General Motors Corp. (GM) alleging that James' truck was defective because it lacked head restraints on its seats, and that this defect contributed to James' head injuries.

GM moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs filed the complaint more than two years after the cause of action had accrued, and, therefore, it was barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion. It ruled that although N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21 tolls the limitations period for the duration of a person's "insanity," the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiffs were appointed James' guardians in January, 1989. Therefore, the complaint against GM, filed four years later in January 1993, was barred. The court memorialized its ruling in an order dated May 10, 1996. Plaintiffs appeal.

GM cross-appeals from an order dated September 9, 1994, denying its earlier motion for summary judgment. In that motion, GM contended that the entire controversy doctrine barred this action because it should have been asserted when plaintiffs filed the medical malpractice action.

We first address the statute of limitations issue. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21 (section 21) provides:

If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action or right to title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such time as limited by said sections, after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.

The issue is whether section 21 applies in this case and, if so, whether the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person triggers the running of the limitations period. The issue is one of legislative intent.

"In construing a statute we must effectuate the Legislature's intent." Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Director, Div. of Civil Rights, 294 N.J.Super. 101, 105, 682 A.2d 750 (App.Div.1996) (citing Monmouth County v. Wissell, 68 N.J. 35, 43-44, 342 A.2d 199 (1975)). "[W]e must first look at the evident wording of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning and intent." Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 440, 435 A.2d 540 (1981). "Our duty is to apply the legislative intent as expressed in the statute's language, and we are not to presume that the Legislature intended something other than what it expressed by its plain language." Essex Crane, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 105, 682 A.2d 750; see In re Jamesburg High Sch. Closing, 83 N.J. 540, 548, 416 A.2d 896 (1980); In re Howell Township, Monmouth County, 254 N.J.Super. 411, 419, 603 A.2d 959 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548, 606 A.2d 362 (1991).

In Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513 (1965), our Supreme Court addressed section 21 and reviewed its history, tracing its antecedents to an English statute adopted during the reign of James I in 1623. Id. at 103, 207 A.2d 513. The Court construed section 21 to be inapplicable in cases where the "insanity" occurred after the cause of action accrued. The Court stated:

From our historical analysis we conclude that [ N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21] forecloses a tolling of the running of this statute of limitations unless plaintiff was within the prescribed categories at the time the cause of action accrued and that no 'time out' for the period of time covered by the disability is possible if the disability occurred after the cause of action accrued.

[Id. at 106-07, 207 A.2d 513.]

The Court applied these principles to the claim before it, holding that the plaintiff, Kyle, could not benefit from section 21's tolling provisions because "plaintiff could not be found to have become insane on the day of the accident." Id. at 107, 207 A.2d 513. The record established that Kyle had fallen at defendant's premises on January 21, 1957. She was adjudicated insane in October 1957. At her deposition, she testified that "it was the next day or two days" after the fall that she felt that the accident had affected her "nervous system." Id. at 102, 207 A.2d 513.

In discussing the applicability of section 21 to Kyle's claim, the Court referred to Nebola v. Minnesota Iron Co., 102 Minn. 89, 112 N.W. 880 (1907), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court "adopted the rule which has been followed by a limited number of jurisdictions that when the injury and the resulting insanity occur on the same day, the two events will be considered legally simultaneous and the statute will not begin to run until sanity is restored." Kyle, supra, 44 N.J. at 107, 207 A.2d 513. The Kyle Court, however, determined that Nebola would not apply because "plaintiff could not be found to have become insane on the day of the accident." Ibid.

Kyle aids our construction of section 21 in the present case. In Kyle the Court engaged in a literal application of section 21's language, which requires that the disability exist "at the time of any such cause of action ... accruing." We are not bound, however, by Kyle's determination that section 21's benefits were not available to the plaintiff in that case because the present case is factually distinguishable. In the present case, unlike in Kyle, James' incompetence occurred simultaneously with the accrual of his alleged cause of action against GM.

In a similar case, Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J.Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228 (App.Div.1969), certif. denied, 55 N.J. 448, 262 A.2d 702 (1970), we held that the simultaneous occurrence of injury and unconsciousness, which persisted for 100 days, fell within section 21's tolling provisions. There, we stated:

The facts before us establish conclusively that John's unconsciousness (insanity) occurred simultaneously with the injuries he suffered and, therefore, simultaneously with the accrual of his cause of action against both defendants. Under these circumstances, he must be regarded as having been "insane" at the time that such cause of action accrued. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. In our view, to read the words "... is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action ... accruing ... insane", to be applicable only if John could be found to have been insane a split-second before he hit the ground would amount to nothing more than casuistry. Cf. Nebola v. Minnesota Iron Co., 102 Minn. 89, 112 N.W. 880 (1907); City of Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So.2d 917 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1952); compare Roelefsen v. Pella, 121 Iowa 153, 96 N.W. 738 (Sup.Ct.1903); Taylor v. Houston, 93 U.S.App. D.C., 391, 211 F.2d 427, 41 A.L.R.2d 724 (1954).

[Id. at 105, 260 A.2d 228.]

The Court, in Kyle, also addressed the meaning of "insane" as used in section 21. The Court concluded "that 'insane' in the statute of limitations means such a condition of mental derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action." Id. at 113, 207 A.2d 513. In Sobin, supra, 108 N.J.Super. at 104, 260 A.2d 228, we observed that section 21's use of the word "insanity" referred to a person "who actually lacks the ability and capacity, due to mental affliction, to pursue his lawful rights." There, we held that a plaintiff's "unconsciousness" for one hundred days "rendered him 'insane' as that word is used in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21...." Ibid.

In the present case, we conclude that James' incompetence rendered him "insane" within the meaning of section 21 and that section 21 tolled the running of the statute of limitations because James' incompetence and the accrual of his alleged cause of action occurred simultaneously.

The trial court determined, however, that the appointment of James' parents as guardians terminated section 21's tolling provision and started the running of the two year statute of limitations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. We disagree. As previously indicated, Kyle applied section 21's language literally in requiring that the plaintiff's insanity, though caused by the injury, exist when the cause of action accrues. We perceive no reason to...