Unruh v. Davison County

• Decision Date: 30 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 24511.,24511.
• Parties: John UNRUH II; Nathaniel Unruh and Amy Miller, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of John Harold Unruh, deceased; and Mollie Eichman, individually, Plaintiffs, v. DAVISON COUNTY, South Dakota; Hutchinson County, South Dakota; David Miles, individually and in his capacity as the Davison County Sheriff; Don Radel, individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Davison County Jail; Connie Ireland, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Glen Ellerton, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Jeff Miner, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Jerry McNary, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Cindy Voyles, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Roger Erickson, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Ginger Faas, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Linda Aldrich, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Tom Kulm, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Carol Radel, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; and other Unknown Persons, individually and in their capacity as employees of Hutchinson and Davison Counties, South Dakota, Defendants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

744 N.W.2d 839

2008 SD 9

John UNRUH II; Nathaniel Unruh and Amy Miller, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of John Harold Unruh, deceased; and Mollie Eichman, individually, Plaintiffs, v. DAVISON COUNTY, South Dakota; Hutchinson County, South Dakota; David Miles, individually and in his capacity as the Davison County Sheriff; Don Radel, individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Davison County Jail; Connie Ireland, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Glen Ellerton, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Jeff Miner, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Jerry McNary, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Cindy Voyles, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Roger Erickson, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Ginger Faas, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Linda Aldrich, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; Tom Kulm, individually and in his capacity as a Davison County employee; Carol Radel, individually and in her capacity as a Davison County employee; and other Unknown Persons, individually and in their capacity as employees of Hutchinson and Davison Counties, South Dakota, Defendants.

No. 24511.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Original Proceeding Argued November 7, 2007.

Decided January 30, 2008.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 2008.

Sheila S. Woodward, Michael F. Marlow of Johnson, Miner, Marlow Woodward & Huff, LLP, Yankton, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiffs.

Gary P. Thimsen, James A. Power, Cheri S. Raymond of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants, Davison County & Davison County Defendants.

Douglas M. Deibert of Cadwell, Sanford, Deibert & Garry, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants, Hutchinson County & Deb Gering.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Plaintiffs, John Unruh II, Nathaniel Unruh, Amy Miller, individually and as personal representatives and on behalf of the Estate of John H. Unruh, deceased, (Unruh) and Mollie Eichman, individually, brought an action against. Davison County and Hutchinson County and several of their employees known and unknown known¹ (collectively "Defendants") for negligent conduct and conduct deliberately indifferent to Unruh's civil rights, resulting in his death. Plaintiffs filed their suit in the United States District Court, District of South Dakota, Southern Division, Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Defendants asserted immunity from liability under SDCL 3-21-8 and 3-21-9. The District Court certified one question to the South Dakota Supreme Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we answer the certified question in the negative.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2] On the night of June 27, 2004, Unruh was arrested by the Freeman, South Dakota City Police and charged with third offense driving under the influence. Following a blood test conducted at the Freeman Hospital,² Unruh was transferred to the custody of the Hutchinson County Sheriffs Department. Hutchinson County contracted with Davison County for jail services. A Hutchinson County Sheriffs deputy transported Unruh to the Davison County Jail in Mitchell, South Dakota. Unruh was booked into custody by Davison County on June 28, 2007 at about 12:30 a.m.

[¶ 3.] Unruh, who had a history of excessive alcohol consumption and medical problems that included a heart attack and aneurism, had been prescribed a number of prescription medicines. Though the transporting deputy stopped at Unruh's house at his request, Unruh elected not to bring his medications, anticipating that he would make bail the next day. While in Davison County's custody, Unruh's physical condition deteriorated. By the evening of June 29, he had become delirious. That night, Unruh was transported to the Avera Queen of Peace Hospital in Mitchell at around 11:30 p.m. He was later evacuated by air to the Heart Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota where he died.

[¶ 4.] Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' negligence and failure to follow procedures resulted in Unruh's, death and violated his civil rights. Defendants asserted that they were immune from claims of liability in connection with Unruh's death as provided under SDCL 3-21-8 and 3-21-9. Plaintiffs argued that Defendants, who had liability coverage in effect at the time in question,³ had waived their immunity to the extent of that coverage as provided under SDCL 21-32A-1.

The District Court certified one question to this Court, which we accepted: Does a county's purchase of liability insurance or participation in a risk sharing pool, pursuant to SDCL 21-32A-1, waive the county's and its employees' immunity granted by SDCL 3-21-8 and 3-21-9 to the extent of such insurance or participation in a risk sharing pool?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 5.] Technically, this Court does not sit as an appellate court in this case as the matter came to us as a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Nevertheless, we employ the same legal standards for this analysis that we use when reviewing appellate cases.

The construction of a statute is a question of law. We interpret statutes in accord with legislative intent. Such intent is derived from the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of statutory language. "[I]ntent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject." "Where statutes appear to conflict, it is our responsibility to give reasonable construction to both, and if possible, to give effect to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them `harmonious and workable.'"

Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 1996 SD 16, ¶ 4, 543 N.W.2d 787, 789 (internal citations omitted).

ANALYSIS AND ANSWER

[¶ 6.] Does a county's purchase of liability insurance or participation in a risk sharing pool, pursuant to SDCL 21-32A-1, waive the county's and its employees' immunity granted by SDCL 3-21-8 and 3-21-9 to the extent of such insurance or participation in a risk sharing pool?

[¶ 7.] The States' sovereign immunity derives from English law and was ratified in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246-47, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). The Eleventh Amendment extends the States' immunity from suits to those commenced by citizens of another State or citizens or subjects of a foreign country. Id. at 713, 119 S.Ct. at 2246, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (citing U.S. Const amend 11).

[¶ 8.] Sovereign immunity is established on a state level by Article III, Section 27 of the South Dakota Constitution: "The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state." Still, this Court recognizes that sovereign immunity arises in part from the common law. Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454, 457 (S.D. 1980) (citing High-Grade Oil Co., Inc. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736, 738 (S.D.1980)). Sovereign immunity is limited in that it only exists in the absence of consent to be sued. Cromwell v. Rapid City Police Dept., 2001 SD 100, ¶ 13, 632 N.W.2d 20, 24 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 754, 119 S.Ct. at 2267, 144 L.Ed.2d 636; citing In re Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court Relative to Constitutionality of SDCL 21-32-17, 379 N.W.2d 822, 825 (S.D. 1985)).

[¶ 9.] In 1981, the Legislature authorized the State of South Dakota to obtain liability insurance for the purpose of insuring the State, its officers, agents and employees. SDCL 21-32-15. During the same legislative session SDCL 21-32-16 was enacted, therein providing that to the extent of liability insurance coverage, the State is "deemed to have waived the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and consented to suit in the same manner that any other party may be sued."⁴ SDCL 21-32-16 (emphasis added).

[¶ 10.] In 1986, the Legislature extended sovereign immunity and the waiver provisions of SDCL chapter 21-32 to all public entities, including counties,⁵ with the enactment of SDCL chapter 21-32A.⁶ SDCL 21-32A-1 provides:

To the extent that any public entity, other than the state, participates in a risk sharing pool or purchases liability insurance and to the extent that coverage is afforded thereunder, the public entity shall be deemed to have waived the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and shall be deemed to have consented to suit in the same manner that any other party may be sued. The waiver contained in this section and §§ 21-32A-2 and 21-32A-3 is subject to the provisions of § 3-22-17.

(Emphasis added). SDCL 21-32A-2 essentially applies the provisions of SDCL 21-32-17, see supra note 4, to employees, officers or agents of any public entity. SDCL 21-32A-3 provides:

Except insofar as a public entity participates in a risk sharing pool or insurance is purchased pursuant to § 21-32A-1, any public entity is immune from liability for damages whether the function in which it is involved is governmental or proprietary. The immunity recognized herein may be raised by way of affirmative defense.

[¶ 11.] During the same legislative session in which SDCL chapter 21-32A was enacted, the Legislature also enacted SDCL 3-21-8 and 3-21-9, related to the operation and maintenance of jails and correctional facilities, and administration of prisoner parole and release.⁷ SDCL 3-21-8 provides:

No person, political subdivision, or the state is liable for failure to provide a prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility, or if such facility is provided, for failure to provide sufficient equipment, personnel, programs, facilities, or services in a prison or other correctional facility.

SDCL 3-21-9 provides in pertinent part:

No person, political subdivision, or the state is liable for any injury resulting from the parole or release of a prisoner or...