Unzicker v. State
Decision Date | 06 May 1977 |
Citation | 346 So.2d 931 |
Parties | John A. UNZICKER et al. v. STATE of Alabama et al. SC 1945. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James W. Tarlton, III, and Raymond A. Corcoran, Mobile, for appellants.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Lucian L. Smith, Jr., and Robert A. Macrory, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees George C. Wallace Governor of Ala., and the Ala. Dept. of Conservation and Natural Resources.
This appeal is primarily concerned with whether or not the action is one against the State and therefore prohibited by Article 1, § 14, Constitution of 1901. We hold it is not prohibited as to other defendants than the State and reverse the trial court for granting motions to dismiss of those other defendants.
Under threat of condemnation, Alice Unzicker, a 79 year-old widow, entered negotiations with the State of Alabama through its Highway Department, to convey a right-of-way across property she owned in fee simple located in Mobile County. The written agreement, to deed a right-of-way, signed by Mrs. Unzicker, in 1964, provided in pertinent part:
Subsequently, in the same year, Mrs. Unzicker executed a deed supplied by the State, through its Highway Department, conveying a fee simple interest in Tract 63. The State paid the grantor $13,055, requested the tract be stricken from the condemnation proceedings and it was. Mrs. Unzicker died in 1967, leaving a will in which she devised all her real property to two of the plaintiffs in this case, John A. Unzicker and William L. Unzicker, Jr. In 1971, William Unzicker, Jr., conveyed, by deed, a 1/6th interest each in this property to William Unzicker, III, Patricia Unzicker, and Jane and David Boyd. The four last-named persons are also plaintiffs to this action. In 1972, the State of Alabama, through its Commissioner of Conservation, Claude Kelley, executed an oil, gas and mineral lease on the property to C. Barry Greer who later assigned the lease to Getty Oil Company.
The Unzickers filed their action seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that: the deed from Alice Unzicker to the State be construed to reflect that the State acquired only a right-of-way or easement; that plaintiffs are the fee simple owners of all the oil, gas and minerals in said property; that Tit. 19, §§ 1, et seq., Code, be construed so as to permit the State of Alabama in the exercise of eminent domain to acquire only so much of an estate as may be reasonably necessary; and the same statute is unconstitutional insofar as it permits the acquisition of a fee simple title.
The action was filed against the State of Alabama, Getty Oil Company, Claude Kelley as Commissioner of Conservation, George C. Wallace as Governor, and Ray Bass as State Highway Director. All defendants filed motions to dismiss, all were granted, either initially or on motions to reconsider. No evidence was heard by the court. Plaintiffs appeal.
There are five questions to be dealt with on this appeal: 1. Is the action against the State and therefore prohibited by § 14, Art. 1, Const. of 1901? 2. May the State condemn or purchase, in fee, real property for road purposes? 3. Under the allegations of their complaint, are plaintiffs entitled to attempt proof of fraud practiced upon their predecessor in title? 4. Do the pleadings show that plaintiffs have no standing to maintain the action? 5. Do the pleadings show the action is barred by the statute of limitations or by application of the doctrine of laches?
Two, three, four and five present genuine issues of material facts raised by the pleadings, that can be resolved only by trial of those issues and cannot be disposed of on motions to dismiss. Bowling v. Pow, 293 Ala. 178, 301 So.2d 55 (1974). That being true, and since the action against other parties than the State is not one against the State, there are no valid grounds to support the trial court's dismissal of the complaint; therefore we reverse.
Article 1, § 14, Constitution of Alabama of 1901 states:
"That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."
As a general proposition, an action involving property in which the State has a definite right or interest and in which a decree rendered would bind the State, is one against the State and cannot be maintained without its consent. Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So.2d 677 (1971); Southall v. Stricos Corporation, 275 Ala. 156, 153 So.2d 234 (1963). To the extent that the State of Alabama is impleaded as a defendant in this action, the action is prohibited by the Constitution. But, in a proper case, this same immunity will not extend to the officers of the State acting in their representative capacities.
In their complaint plaintiffs state:
With respect to the oil, gas and mineral lease executed by Claude Kelley, as Commissioner of Conservation, and approved by Honorable George C. Wallace, as Governor, plaintiffs alleged their acts They further contend the Eminent Domain Statute was unconstitutionally applied so as to amount to a taking of property without due process of law.
While the State itself may not be made a party to such action, it does not necessarily follow that its officers, Ray Bass, Claude Kelley and Governor Wallace, in their respective capacities, are also immune. The essence of plaintiffs' complaint is that these officers of the State acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Such allegations bring this case within those not protected by Section 14 of the Constitution. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So.2d 428 (1967); Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So.2d 193 (1962); Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 132 So. 2 (1930).
Defendant Getty Oil Company's motion to dismiss was among those granted. As this is an action for declaratory judgment to determine the rights of parties under a deed to the land on which the lease was executed, and to declare that lease void, then Getty Oil Company, as assignee of the lease, possesses a material interest in the subject matter of the suit sufficient to make Getty Oil a proper party to the action. Tit. 7, § 166, Code of Ala. (1940).
Motion to dismiss the State of Alabama as party defendant was properly granted. Motions to dismiss the other defendants were improperly granted.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
The State of Alabama should not be dismissed as a defendant. I agree with the majority opinion that Art. 1, § 14, of our Constitution prohibits the naming of the State as a defendant in a law suit. This section, however, if applied in the instant case, will result in a direct conflict with both §§ 13 and 23 of Art. 1, Constitution of Alabama.
§ 23 provides that the State's right of eminent domain shall not abridged, but private property shall not be taken without just compensation. To follow the majority's rationale would allow the State to enlargen, and abuse, its inherent power of condemnation without fear of legal recourse. Indeed, if the allegations of the plaintiff stated in the complaint are taken as true, that is what happened here.
Because this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6) ), we are required to treat the allegations of the complaint as true; and, if true, the State has not only broadened beyond constitutional limits its power of eminent domain, but it has also violated the due process of law requirement as set out in Art. 1, § 13. This fundamental concept of our law states:
"That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay."
It is plaintiffs' contention that their predecessor in title, Mrs. Unzicker, conveyed this property to the State under threat of condemnation. The State's constitutional right to take the property was limited to that interest necessary for a public highway or right of way. This was no arm's length sale. Had title passed through the condemnation proceeding, the State could not have acquired title to any interest beyond that necessary and incident to the public taking....
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