Upchurch v. Multnomah Univ., Case No.3:19-CV-00850-AC
| Decision Date | 16 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.3:19-CV-00850-AC |
| Parties | RAYMOND MAXWELL UPCHURCH, Plaintiff, v. MULTNOMAH UNIVERSITY and JAKE COBURN, and individual, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Introduction
Plaintiff Raymond Maxwell Upchurch ("Upchurch") sues Defendants Multnomah University ("MU") and Jake Coburn ("Coburn") for racial discrimination, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d against MU for disability discrimination; alleging a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and for racial discrimination in selling, renting, or leasing real property against MU; and alleging a violation of OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421(2)(c) against Coburn as an individual. Coburn moves to dismiss Upchurch's allegations against him with prejudice. Coburn's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 45 ("Mot.")) should be GRANTED, with leave to amend, because Upchurch fails to allege he and Coburn lived in anything more than a shared-living arrangement or had a contractual connection under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA").1
In August 2016, Upchurch, an African American, started college at MU, a school he selected because it claimed to provide "a diverse community that equips students to love Christ and serve their neighbors through their lives and work," and because at MU, he could fulfill his dream of playing college basketball. (Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 43 ("Am. Compl."), at ¶¶ 8-9, 78.) MU "was and is a domestic non-profit corporation, formed in the state of Oregon[.]" (Id. at ¶ 5.) Coburn was an agent and employee of MU. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Sometime during Upchurch's time at MU, he worked for Coburn in MU's athletic department. (Id. at ¶ 50.)
Upchurch first faced challenges at MU because of the offensive conduct of his basketball coach, Curt Bickley ("Bickley"). (Id. at ¶ 10.) In June 2017, Bickley routinely compared Upchurch and his teammates to "slaves" bound by their scholarships, and routinely threatened to revoke those scholarships. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) After Upchurch sat during the National Anthem before a January 2018 game, Bickley wrote slogans on the whiteboard in the locker room such as "good at bringing drama," "ungrateful," "soft," "spoiled," and "broken trust," and later red-shirted Upchurch. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-17.)
Upchurch's experience at MU worsened. In April 2018, MU staff members encouraged Upchurch to apply for the Student Government Association's "Intercultural Inclusion Chair,"which he accepted. (Id. at ¶ 18.) However, he asserts MU did not adequately train him, equip him for success, or supply him with mentorship and guidance for the position. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
In November 2018, Upchurch organized and executed MU's "Mosaic Week," a week of programming for which Upchurch participated in the theming, development, and execution of the agenda; helped to set-up rooms, secured speakers and sponsors, and attended every event and devotional. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Upchurch's Mosaic Week experience, however, led to deleterious personal consequences for him: "pressure" that caused him to "emotionally crash" into a "mental health crisis" caused by "significant mental and emotional strain from the racial trauma and weight of the issues" discussed at the event; and afterward, the "'guilt,' 'shame,' and conflict that MU's white 'progressive' students, faculty and attendants experienced following the Mosaic Week" that "were laid at Plaintiff's feet as feedback." (Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.)
That same month, someone "anonymously" reported Upchurch for having alcohol in his room. (Id. at ¶ 25.) In response, "MU staff marched Plaintiff to his room, collected the contraband and placed it in a conspicuous package," and proceeded to "perp walk" Upchurch across campus with that package. (Id. at ¶ 27.) This incident, combined with his "Mosaic Week" experience, "stoked Plaintiffs 'social anxiety.'" (Id. at ¶ 44.)
In December 2018, MU "mandated" that Upchurch attend counseling sessions with its Counseling Center and select a school employee as a mentor, as sanctions for the alcohol incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-37, 50.) Upchurch chose Coburn, an MU employee whom Upchurch knew and trusted through working for him in MU's athletic department. (Id. at ¶ 50.) In early January 2019, Upchurch discovered someone had vandalized his room during Christmas Break. (Id. at ¶ 45.) The incident caused him to become violently ill, suffering abdominal pains, vomiting, lossof appetite, and difficulty concentrating. (Id. at ¶ 47.) As a result, Upchurch made multiple hospital visits and missed time from school. (Id.) Upchurch later sought to move off-campus for his health, safety, and well-being, and his therapist recommended he do so to minimize his "symptoms." (Id. at ¶¶ 47, 51.) MU initially denied Upchurch's request, but ultimately allowed him to move off-campus after his parents met with MU's Dean of Students and several faculty members.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53.)
Upchurch chose to move in with Coburn, his school employee mentor, seeking a "safe haven to rest, heal and complete his education." (Id. at ¶ 56.) He paid Coburn $600 in rent. (Id.) Shortly after Upchurch moved in, however, Coburn "bombarded Plaintiff and his friends with racist and sexist remarks." (Id. at ¶¶ 57-59.) Coburn "provid[ed] and allow[ed] alcohol, drugs and opposite sex interactions that were contrary to MU policy" and "used intimidation, control, substances, and the staff/student power differential to secure [Plaintiff's] silence." (Id. at ¶¶ 60-61.)
On February 13, 2019, Upchurch called his father in a panic and begged him to "Get me out of here!" (Id. at ¶ 62.) Though his father initially insisted he remain at MU to complete the semester and maintain his academic standing, Upchurch's counselor urged his father to remove him from the MU environment for his son's "mental, emotional and psychological well-being." (Id. at ¶¶ 63-64.) The counselor advised Upchurch would need "extensive therapy to process and overcome his experiences at MU." (Id. at ¶ 65.) The next day, Upchurch's father allowed him to leave MU. (Id. at ¶ 66.)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A court may grant a motion to dismiss "'based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged'" under a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also CallerID4u, Inc. v. MCI Commc'ns Servs. Inc., 880 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. When a plaintiff's complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, the plaintiff's complaint "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 557 (brackets omitted). The court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).
Rule 8 requires complaints in federal court consist of "a short and plain statement of theclaim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard under Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). "[L]abels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But a claim "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [necessary] facts is improbable," and the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 556. Leave to amend should be given freely when justice so requires, unless the court determines the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
In Upchurch's third claim for relief, he alleges Coburn engaged in racial discrimination in renting real property in violation of OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421(2)(c). (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 105-119.) Upchurch alleges that while renting a room from Coburn, Coburn's racist comments and discriminatory behavior towards Upchurch were based on his race and resulted in his constructive eviction and denial of the privileges of his rental. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 108-111.)
Coburn argues that Upchurch alleges no facts that suggest Coburn made any distinction or restriction on the price, terms, or condition of his rental agreement or occupancy. (Mot. at 6.) Coburn admits Upchurch has correctly pleaded he is a member of a protected class, but notes he has made no allegations of a discriminatory housing practice. (Id. at 7.) Coburn also argues his rental is not available to the public and thus does not fall under the purview of OR. REV. STAT. §659A.421(2)(c), because the purpose of chapter is to "ensure individuals...
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