Uphoff v. Indus. Bd. of Illinois

• Decision Date: 02 February 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10138.,10138.
• Parties: UPHOFF v. INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

271 Ill. 312

111 N.E. 128

UPHOFF

v.INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al.

No. 10138.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1915.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1916.

Error to Superior Court, Cook County; Theodore Brentano, Judge.

Petition by Frank Uphoff for writ of certiorari against the Industrial Board of Illinois and others to review an award to B. C. Bruner for personal injuries, made under the Workmen's Compensation La . The writ was denied, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions to set aside finding of Board.Emery Andrews and Raymond G. Real, both of Mattoon, and John H. Marshall, of Charleston, for plaintiff in error.

Bryan H. Tivnen, of Mattoon, for defendants in error.

CARTER, J.

In August, 1913, the plaintiff in error, Frank Uphoff, employed the defendant in error B. C. Bruner to help build a broom corn shed on Uphoff's farm near Mattoon, Ill. While Bruner was working on this structure, a piece of metal flew from the hammer he was using and struck his eye, destroying its sight. He filed a petition with the Industrial Board of Illinois, asking that damages be awarded him for the loss of his eye under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913. The arbitration committee appointed by the Industrial Board under the act awarded him $1,442 for his injury, and this award was affirmed by the majority of the Industrial Roard. Uphoff thereafter filed a petition in the superior court of Cook county for a writ of certiorari. Under that writ the proceedings of the Industrial Board were reviewed and an order entered sustaining said proceedings. This writ of error was then used out.

Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that the Industrial Board was without jurisdiction as to an injury of the character of the one here in question. The evidence shows that Uphoff has been engaged in farming for the past 18 years; that Bruner had worked as a carpenter for about 30 years; that the building that he was working on was a broom corn shed, 32 by 24 feet and 17 1/2 feet high, requiring for its construction the services of four men for about 10 days. Bruner had been employed by Uphoff for no certain time, but apparently to continue the work until the building was constructed. The accident happened during the seventh day of his employment. He received 30 cents an hour for 10 hours a day and was expected only to do carpenter work. He had never worked for Uphoff before.

[3][4][6] Section 1 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that any employer may elect to provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by employés arising in the course of employment and thereby relieve himself from all other liability. It is conceded here that plaintiff in error had given no notice to the Industrial Board of his acceptance of the provisions of said act. He therefore cannot be held liable thereunder unless it can be shown that he is one of the class of employers who are held liable under the act, even though they have not elected to come under it. While the entire act must be read in order to understand its intent and meaning, certain sections must be particularly considered and construed in order to reach a proper conclusion in this case. Paragraph (b) of section 3 of said act reads:

‘(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall only apply to an employer engaged in any of the following occupations, enterprises or businesses, namely:

‘1. The buildings, maintaining, repairing or demolishing of any structure;

‘2. Construction, excavating or electrical work;

‘3. Carriage by land or water and loading and unloading in connection therewith;

‘4. The operation of any warehouse or general or terminal storehouses;

‘5. Mining, surface mining or quarrying;

‘6. Any enterprise in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities;

‘7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities;

‘8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances, or for the protection and safeguarding of the employés or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extrahazardous.’

Section 4 defines what shall be understood by the term ‘employer’ in said act. There is nothing in said section which will throw especial light on the question herein involved. If that section were construed alone, Uphoff might be considered an employer coming within the provisions of said act. Section 5 provides that:

‘The term ‘employé’ as used in the act shall be construed to mean: * * * Second-Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, * * * but not including any person whose employment is but casual or who is not engaged in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.'

The intention of the lawmakers is the law. This intention is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. In construing a statute the courts are not confined to the literal meaning of the words. A thing within the intention is regarded within the statute though not within the letter. A thing within the letter is not within the statute, if not also within the intention. When the intention can be collected from the statute, words may be modified or altered, so as to obviate all inconsistency with such intention. Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 106 N. E. 341. When great inconvenience or absurd consequences will result from a particular construction that construction should be avoided, unless the meaning of the Legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is impossible. People v. Wren, 4 Scam. 269. The courts are bound to presume that absurd consequences leading to great injustice were not contemplated by the Legislature, and a construction should be adopted that it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated. 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. § 489; People v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill. 546, 38 N. E. 744;Canal Com'rs v. Sanitary District, 184 Ill. 597, 56 N. E. 953. A statute is passed as a whole, and not in parts or sections; hence each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section. In order to get the real intention of the Legislature, attention must not be confined to the one section to be construed, Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N. E. 837, and cited cases.

Numerous authorities from other jurisdictions construing Workmen's Compensation Acts have been cited, and frequent references have been made to acts in other jurisdictions. Both counsel have cited authorities which, it is argued, support the...