Upkins v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 10 July 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:19-cv-088
• Parties: LAMONE UPKINS, Petitioner, v. NORMAN ROBINSON, Warden, London Correctional Institution Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

LAMONE UPKINS, Petitioner, v. NORMAN ROBINSON, Warden, London Correctional Institution Respondent.

Case No. 3:19-cv-088

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

July 10, 2019

District Judge Thomas M. Rose

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Lamone Upkins brings this Petition for Habeas Corpus pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). He seeks relief from his conviction in the Common Pleas Court of Shelby County, Ohio, on drug trafficking charges. Upon initial review, the Magistrate Judge ordered Respondent to file the State Court Record (ECF No. 4), and a Return of Writ (ECF No. 5), which has been done. Upkins has now filed his Reply to the Return of Writ (ECF No. 10), making the case ripe for decision.

Litigation History

On October 1, 2015, a Shelby County, Ohio, grand jury indicted Upkins on four fifth-degree felony Ohio Revised Code § 2925.03(A)(1) Trafficking in Drugs charges, seven fourth-degree felony Ohio Revised Code § 2925.03(A)(1) Trafficking in Drugs charges, and one third-degree felony Ohio Revised Code § 2925.03(A)(1) Trafficking in Drugs charge (State Court Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 1, PageID 29-31). In a plea agreement negotiated with the assistance of counsel, Upkins agreed to plead guilty to two fifth-degree felony Trafficking in Drugs charges, two fourth-degree felony Trafficking in Drugs charges, and one third-degree felony Trafficking in Drugs charge. The parties jointly recommended an aggregate four-year prison sentence. Id. at Ex. 3, PageID 33-41. Instead, the trial court sentenced Upkins to an aggregate 11 months in prison for the two fifth-degree felony Trafficking in Drugs convictions, an aggregate 17 consecutive months in prison for the two fourth-degree Trafficking in Drugs convictions, and 30 consecutive months in prison for the third-degree felony Trafficking in Drugs convictions, resulting in an aggregate 58 months in prison. Id. at Ex. 6, PageID 60.

On direct appeal, the Ohio Third District Court of Appeals found no arguable issues and dismissed the appeal as frivolous after counsel filed an Anders brief. State v. Upkins, Case No. 17-16-04 (3^rd Dist. Shelby Oct. 13, 2016) (unreported; copy at State Court Record ECF No. 4, Ex. 17. PageID 186-89). Although it initially accepted jurisdiction, State v. Upkins, 149 Ohio St. 3d 1405, 2017-Ohio-2822, the Supreme Court of Ohio later dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted, without ruling on the merits. 154 Ohio St. 3d 30, 2018-Ohio-1812.

Claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Upkins filed an Application to Reopen the direct appeal under Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) (State Court Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 26, PageID 330-90), which the Third District ultimately denied on the merits. State v. Upkins, Case No. 17-16-04 (3^rd Dist. Feb. 21, 2017) (unreported; copy at State Court Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 29, PageID 402-03). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to exercise further appellate jurisdiction. State v. Upkins, 149 Ohio St. 3d 1435, 2017-Ohio-4396.

In his Petition here, Upkins pleads the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: Character of the plea agreement: Specifically pursuant to Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(F) negates the requisite voluntaryand knowing character of the plea, thus void [sic] the plea. Ohio R.Crim.P. 11(F) provides for negotiating only to pleas of guilty or no congest to one or more lesser offenses and does not contemplate punishment will be subject to "Ple [sic] Bargaining." Prosecutor's inducement of a written plea agreement of (4) years punishment contrary to Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(F) and not withstand ding unsupported by the trial court for which has sound discretion, the prosecutor's unfulfillable promise, negates the knowing, volunt [sic].

Ground Two: Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C)(2). Trial court's compliance with Due Process in accepting the Appellant's written plea agreement & whether appellant was afforded and acknowledged the option to withdraw his guilty plea.

Supporting Facts: The trial court excepted [sic] the appellant's guilty plea as part of a jointly recommended plea agreement of (4) years for trafficking in (1.45g) one and forty-five one hundredths of a gram of drugs. The court after accepting appellant's guilty plea sentenced the appellant to 58 months for a non-violent drug offense new affording the opportunity to withdraw plea. Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C)(2) provides it is the trial court's responsibility to evaluate plea agreements, a decision rejecting a plea bargain should be accompanied by the trial court[']s reasons, absent facts and circumstances that speak so eliquently [sic] that no statement by the judge is required.

Ground Three: Breach of the plea agreement by the State; The State signed a written plea agreement to jointly recommend a specific term in prison of (4) years, the plea agreement being contract in nature, the state breached the agreement with end-run comments at sentencing of danger that gave rise to doubt in that the judge states: "As everyone has echoed here today," clearly influenced the judge's decision to enhance a greater sentence as the comments were meant to do.

Ground Four: Whether the Appellant was afforded Effective Assistance of Counsel.

Supporting Facts: In conflict trial counsel acted as appellate counsel and immediately files an Anders Brief stating defendant's appeal was totally frivolous when the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel wanted to be raised by the appellant. As well, Appellate/Trial counsel deliberately misrepresented the facts surrounding the use of materially false in formation at sentencing toenhance a greater sentence upon the appelant [sic] for which was objected to by the App.

Ground Five: Whether the trial court errored [sic] in imposing fines.

Supporting Facts: The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the issues concerning fines has to be raised at sentencing, the appellant requested his fines be waived do [sic] to the amount of time in prison and the appellant would not be making more than twenty dollars per week, making the appellant indigent by law. The court failed to conduct any inquiry to determine whether the defendant had the ability to pay any fines. If the court finds the defendant doesn't have the ability to pay them, the court must suspend all or substantially all of the fine. Court failed to do so.

(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 6-12.)

Analysis

Ground One: Invalidity of the Plea Agreement

In his First Ground for Relief¹, Petitioner argues the plea agreement in this case is not permitted by Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(F) which does not contemplate that punishment will be subject to plea bargaining. He reasons that because the plea agreement is invalid, his guilty plea is also. He also claims that the prosecutor's promise to recommend a sentence of four years was unfulfillable, thereby rendering the plea agreement a nullity.

The plea agreement in this case is memorialized in what appears to be a form document of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas. ¶ 6 provides in typescript "I understand that there isan underlying agreement upon this plea is based and it is as follows:" On the spaces below this typed language there appears in handwriting "plea to Count X; Count I, Count II; Count III, Count IV; joint recommendation at sentencing of four (4) years." (State Court Record, ECF No. 4, PageID 34). Other handwritten portions of the form include a request that the court accept a plea of guilty to Counts I, II, III, IV, and X and a recitation of the maximum penalties for each of those counts. Id. at PageID 35. Petitioner also acknowledged that the maximum sentence could be ninety-six months. Id. at PageID 35-36. In printed language, the form declares that no one had made any promise of a lighter sentence in exchange for the guilty plea and "that the sentence that I will receive is a matter solely within the discretion and control of the Judge despite any and all recommendations made to the Court. . . . I respectfully request the Court to consider, in mitigation of punishment, that I have voluntarily entered a plea of guilty." Id. at PageID 37.

Upkins alleges this plea agreement violates Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(F) (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 6). That rule reads

(F) Negotiated plea cases. When a negotiated plea of guilty or no contest to one or more offenses charged or to one or more other or lesser offenses is offered, the underlying agreement upon which the plea is based shall be stated on the record in open court. To the extent required by Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution or by the Revised Code, before accepting the plea, the trial court shall allow an alleged victim of the crime to raise any objection to the terms of the plea agreement.

No part of this Rule forbids the prosecutor from agreeing to make a recommendation on sentence, nor has Petitioner cited any Ohio case authority to that effect. All the rule on its face requires is that, whatever the agreement is must be stated on the record in open court. That was accomplished by having the plea agreement be in a filed court document and also by the manner in which the trial judge discussed the plea agreement in the plea colloquy.

Just as there is nothing in Criminal Rule 11(F) that prohibits a plea agreement from including a sentence recommendation promise, there is also nothing known to this Court in Ohio law apart from the Rule which forbids a prosecutor from making such a promise. On its face, then, the plea agreement does not violate Ohio R. Crim P. 11(F) and the prosecutor's promise, reflected in the plea agreement, is not unfulfillable.

In addition to these points, to the extent Upkins is claiming that the trial judge did not follow Ohio law (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 7), he has not stated a claim for relief in habeas corpus. On questions of state law, a habeas court is bound by state court interpretations. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). And even if there were a violation of Ohio R....