Uptown People's Law Ctr. v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–0161.,1–13–0161.
• Citation: 2014 IL App (1st) 130161,7 N.E.3d 102,379 Ill.Dec. 676
• Parties: UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2014 IL App (1st) 130161
7 N.E.3d 102
379 Ill.Dec. 676

UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–13–0161.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Fourth Division.

Feb. 27, 2014.

Alan Mills, Nicole Schult, Uptown People's Law Center, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Timothy K. McPike, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION
Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal arises from a dispute between plaintiff Uptown People's Law Center (Uptown) and defendant Illinois

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Department of Corrections (the IDOC). After Uptown commenced this action alleging that the IDOC had failed to turn over public records in violation of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2010)), the IDOC provided the requested records. The trial court subsequently dismissed the action as moot and denied Uptown's motion for attorney fees under FOIA. Specifically, the court found that absent a court order in Uptown's favor, it was not a “prevailing party” entitled to fees under FOIA, relying on the Second District's decision in Rock River Times v. Rockford Public School District 205, 2012 IL App (2d) 110879, 365 Ill.Dec. 117, 977 N.E.2d 1216. On appeal, Uptown asserts that Rock River Times was wrongly decided. The IDOC now agrees that a court order is not a prerequisite for a plaintiff to prevail under FOIA's attorney fee provision but nonetheless asserts that Uptown is not entitled to attorney fees because Uptown effectively proceeded pro se and because an issue of fact exists as to whether Uptown properly made a FOIA request before filing its complaint. We will address each contention in turn.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On January 4, 2012, Uptown, a not-for-profit organization that represents prisoners regarding conditions of confinement, filed a complaint against the IDOC, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the IDOC's refusal to provide Uptown with requested public records violated FOIA; (2) an order requiring the IDOC to produce such documents; and (3) an award of attorney fees. Uptown alleged that on three dates in November 2011, it requested that IDOC provide records relating to prison conditions, facility maintenance and sanitation reports but that the IDOC had not responded. Attached to the complaint were copies of Uptown's requests. IDOC denied receiving Uptown's requests.

¶ 4 On September 12, 2012, plaintiff filed a petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 11(i) of FOIA, which provides a plaintiff with an award of attorney fees where the plaintiff “prevails” in a FOIA proceeding. 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2010). Approximately two months later, the IDOC tendered all requested documents. Shortly thereafter, Uptown filed an amended fee petition arguing that an order compelling disclosure was not required in order to “prevail” in a manner consistent with the meaning of the FOIA language. In response to the fee petition, the IDOC argued that the complaint was moot because the IDOC had provided all requested records and that Uptown had not prevailed. Specifically, the IDOC argued that Uptown had not prevailed because all requested documents were tendered before litigation concluded, relying on Rock River Times, and Uptown represented itself pro se. Moreover, the IDOC maintained that it had never received Uptown's requests. In reply, Uptown argued that Rock River Times was wrongly decided and disputed that it was a pro se litigant. Uptown argued that it was a not-for-profit corporation in the legal services profession and was essentially represented by in-house counsel, Alan Mills and Nicole Schult. Moreover, attached was the affidavit of Uptown's paralegal, who alleged that he had mailed Uptown's FOIA requests.

¶ 5 On December 7, 2012, the trial court dismissed the case as moot and denied Uptown's amended petition for attorney fees because the IDOC tendered the documents of its own accord without an order by the court, relying on Rock River Times.

¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 7 A. FOIA Plaintiffs Can Prevail Absent a Court Order

¶ 8 On appeal, Uptown asserts that a party can prevail under FOIA absent a

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court order and that Rock River Times was wrongly decided. Changing its position in the trial court, the IDOC now agrees. Although the appellate court will not be bound by the parties' concession ( Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stranczek, 2012 IL App (1st) 103760, ¶ 20, 360 Ill.Dec. 224, 968 N.E.2d 717), we also agree that Rock River Times was wrongly decided. Whether a court order is a prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under FOIA presents a question of statutory construction, which we will commence to review de novo. In re Marriage of Murphy, 203 Ill.2d 212, 219, 271 Ill.Dec. 874, 786 N.E.2d 132 (2003) (citing Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill.2d 49, 57–63, 138 Ill.Dec. 222, 547 N.E.2d 191 (1989)).

¶ 9 The lodestar of statutory construction is the legislature's intent. Id. The best indication of such intent is the statute's language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 233 Ill.2d 125, 136, 330 Ill.Dec. 187, 908 N.E.2d 39 (2009). Where a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to other rules of interpretation. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, however, we may consider extrinsic aids of construction to determine the legislature's intent. Young America's Foundation v. Doris A. Pistole Revocable Living Trust, 2013 IL App (2d) 121122, ¶ 25, 375 Ill.Dec. 802, 998 N.E.2d 94. A statute is ambiguous when reasonably well-informed persons could interpret the statute in different ways. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department, 233 Ill.2d at 136, 330 Ill.Dec. 187, 908 N.E.2d 39.

¶ 10 The Illinois FOIA was originally patterned after the federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). Dumke v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, ¶ 14, 373 Ill.Dec. 804, 994 N.E.2d 573. Section 1 of the Illinois FOIA states that “all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2010). Thus, FOIA's purpose is to assist in the exposure of governmental records to public scrutiny. State Journal–Register v. University of Illinois Springfield, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, ¶ 21, 373 Ill.Dec. 936, 994 N.E.2d 705. In addition, FOIA must be construed to require disclosure of requested information as expediently and efficiently as possible. 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2010). In furtherance of that objective, a public entity generally has five business days to respond to a request for information (5 ILCS 140/3(d) (West 2010)), and any person denied access to public record may file suit for relief (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2010)). Moreover, the purpose of FOIA is to encourage requestors to seek judicial relief where a government agency wrongfully withholds records. Callinan v. Prisoner Review Board, 371 Ill.App.3d 272, 276, 308 Ill.Dec. 962, 862 N.E.2d 1165 (2007). Although the general rule in the United States is that parties pay their own fees (In re Marriage of Murphy, 203 Ill.2d at 222, 271 Ill.Dec. 874, 786 N.E.2d 132), FOIA provides otherwise. It is within this framework that we consider this statute.

¶ 11 Effective January 1, 2010, section 11(i) was amended to state as follows:

“If a person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record prevails in a proceeding under this Section, the court shall award such person reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In determining what amount of attorney's fees is reasonable, the court shall consider the degree to which the relief obtained relates to the relief sought.” (Emphases added.) Pub. Act 96–542

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(eff. Jan. 1, 2010) (amending 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2008)).

¶ 12 Contrary to our learned colleagues in the Second District of this court, we find the term “prevails” to be ambiguous in this context, as reasonable people could understand such language in multiple ways. But see Rock River Times, 2012 IL App (2d) 110879, ¶ 41, 365 Ill.Dec. 117, 977 N.E.2d 1216 (finding the statute to be unambiguous). The plain language of “prevails,” which is not defined elsewhere in FOIA, could be read to encompass a requirement that the court actually enter an order in the plaintiff's favor. Such language could also reasonably be read, however, to encompass situations where the plaintiff obtains the relief sought by commencing a proceeding that leads the government to produce records, with or without a court order. Either interpretation would arguably further FOIA's goals, albeit in varying degrees, of expeditiously disclosing information to the public and encouraging the public to seek judicial relief. Accordingly, we consider the history of FOIA's attorney fee provision to resolve this ambiguity.

¶ 13 Prior to 2010, section 11(i) permitted, rather than required, the court to award a plaintiff attorney fees where it substantially prevailed, rather than merely prevailed. Section 11(i) stated as follows:

“If a person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record substantially prevails in a proceeding under this Section, the court may award such person reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. If, however, the court finds that the fundamental purpose of the request was to further the commercial interests of the requestor, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if the court finds that the record or records in question were of clearly significant interest to the general public and that the public body lacked any reasonable basis in law for withholding the record.” (Emphasis added). 5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2008).

In addition, several Illinois...