Urban v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 25 January 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 39328,39328 |
| Citation | 214 N.E.2d 737,34 Ill.2d 159 |
| Parties | Bernadine URBAN, Appellee, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. Appeal of The METAL ARTS CO., Inc. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
George W. Angerstein, Sidney Z. Karasik, and James F. Gorman, Chicago, for appellant.
Jack L. Sachs, Chicago, for appellee.
On February 21, 1961, petitioner's husband, Edward J. Urban, was employed by the Metal Arts Co., Inc., the respondent, as a traveling salesman. At approximately 3:35 P.M. on that date, Urban was traveling alone in his automobile in a northerly direction on Eden's Expressway in Cook County when his automobile crashed into an abutment of a bridge at the Old Orchard crossing resulting in injuries causing his death. An arbitrator of the Industrial Commission, upon hearing, awarded petitioner death benefits, but the Industrial Commission reversed, finding that the decedent's fatal injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. On writ of certiorari the superior court of Cook County reversed the Industrial Commission and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Upon hearing additional evidence, the Industrial Commission again entered a decision in respondent's favor. Petitioner then failed a second writ of certiorari to the circuit court of Cook County which reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission and ordered that the award of the arbitrator be reinstated.
The undisputed facts as revealed by the record show that at the time of Urban's death the respondent had office space on Touhy Avenue about three or four miles south of the bridge where Urban's automobile struck the abutment; that the employer's principal place of business and production was outside the State of Illinois; that the decedent's work was solicitation of business from many customers located both within and without the Chicagoland area; that he had sold nameplates to and had customers in the area of Northbrook, Illinois, and that his home was in Northbrook, the general direction in which he was going. He had left his office that morning to make calls and was expected to return.
The employer contends that there is some disputed evidence that the deceased was on his way either to pick up a dog at a veterinarian's office or to pick up his child at school at the time of the accident. This evidence consists of statements by Mrs. Urban at the inquest and to respondent's investigator shortly after the death. Mrs. Urban's statement regarding the trip to the veterinarian was obviously confused because the veterinarian's records and a canceled check show that the dog was picked up a day prior to the accident. The record further indicates that the time at which the deceased could pick up his daughter would be some time after the accident.
The respondent contends that the decision of the Industrial Commission that the decedent did not sustain accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.
We do not quarrel with respondent's contention that it is error for the circuit court to substitute its judgment for that of the Industrial Commission upon questions of fact where the decision of the Industrial Commission is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence, or that where evidence is conflicting, the question of whether an accidental injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for the Commission. It is also fundamental that it is the province of the Industrial Commission, rather than the courts, to draw reasonable conclusions and inferences from evidentiary facts.
However, in the present case the essential facts are undisputed although proved in part by circumstantial evidence, and a question of law is presented. Ordinarily it is held that accidents that occur while an employee is going to or from his place of employment do not arise out of and in the course of employment. (Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois v. Industrial Comm., 370 Ill. 334, 18 N.E.2d 914,) but this is not true where the employee's trip is determined by the demands of his employment. (Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill.2d 40, 210 N.E.2d 209.) One of the well recognized exceptions to the general rule of...
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