Urban v. Prims

• Decision Date: 10 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. SP-N-7903-234-NB,SP-N-7903-234-NB
• Citation: Urban v. Prims, 406 A.2d 11, 35 Conn.Supp. 233 (Conn. Super. 1979)
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Arthur URBAN et al. v. Anna PRIMS. -New Britain at New Britain

Page 11

406 A.2d 11

35 Conn.Supp. 233

Arthur URBAN et al. v. Anna PRIMS.

No. SP-N-7903-234-NB.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Housing Session, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain.

May 10, 1979.

John D. Bagdasarian, New Britain, for named plaintiffs.

David A. Pels, Waterbury, for defendant.

SPADA, Judge.

The plaintiff landlord brings this action in summary process seeking possession for the termination of a lease. The defendant tenant filed the present motion charging that "the plaintiff did not serve the defendant with a notice to quit as required by Connecticut General Statutes, Section 47a-23." No further explanation is provided. The tenant, at argument, contended in effect that the summary process proceedings were vitiated because the plaintiff's predecessor in title was the owner at the time of the service of the notice to quit. The named plaintiff, in the interval between the notice to quit and the issuance of the complaint, purchased the subject property.

The defendant does not propose that the plaintiff's predecessor in title should have issued the complaint; rather, she suggests an innovative and quaint theory which finds no basis in law, namely, that the designated plaintiff is required to commence the summary process proceedings anew. This court does not agree. The defendant's brief is bereft of any citations in support of that contention. Although the court agrees with the general principles she recites, those principles are not in accord with the facts at hand.

The flaw in the defendant's case is disclosed in the contention in her brief that "in order for a lease to be terminated, the plaintiff-lessor must prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship." This is no longer the law in Connecticut and is at variance with § 47a-23 of the General Statutes, the summary process statute.

No leasehold interest is required for dispossession under § 47a-23. If the defendant's statement of law were correct, then trespassers and squatters would enjoy far more rights than legitimate tenants. Section 47a-23 provides for dispossession against any person "who has no right or privilege to occupy such premises, or where one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated . . . ."

Section 47a-23 requires neither the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship nor the consistency of ownership for successful eviction. Parenthetically, § 47a-23 allows for the issuance of a notice to quit and the summary process complaint by the owner's representative, by his attorney in fact or by a commissioner of the Superior Court. Coincidentally, the "split owners" in the case at bar were represented by the same attorney who issued both the notice to quit and the summary process complaint.

The defendant seeks further to encumber a summary process proceeding by reading into the statute the requirement that, in order to dispossess a tenant properly, the owner of the premises at the time of the issuance of the notice to quit must remain the owner at the time of the issuance of the complaint. It is to be supposed that the defendant would argue, reductio ad absurdum, that the original owner ought to remain the owner during the pleadings, the trial and throughout the appeal stage, if any. The consequences would be both bizarre and humorous. In effect, the election by a landlord of a statutory right, according to the defendant, should act as a bar to the alienation of his property.

The defendant tenant is represented by competent counsel. The filing of this motion was, however, an attempt to joust at windmills. The court will review for counsel the basic principles of summary process law.

It is settled law in this state that a summary process action is to be limited to a few simple issues. Rosa v. Cristina, 135 Conn. 364, 365, 64 A.2d 680; Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 550, 7 A.2d 228; Davidson v. Poli, 102 Conn. 692, 695, 129 A. 716; Dreifuss v. World Art Group, Inc., 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 309, 312, 272 A.2d 144; Mac-Aire Aviation Corporation v. Corporate Air, Inc., 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 238, 251, 270 A.2d 849; Fortuna, Inc. v. Lyons,...