US ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis
Decision Date | 12 February 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90 C 04359.,90 C 04359. |
Citation | 754 F. Supp. 1245 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Daniel HOLLAND, Petitioner, v. Kenneth McGINNIS, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Donald Honchell, Cook County Public Defender, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Jack Donatelli, Terrence Madsen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
On May 4, 1980, Daniel Holland abducted a suburban female teenager and, at knife-point, sexually assaulted her. A Cook County, Illinois circuit court jury subsequently found him guilty of rape, deviate sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery. Holland now seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), challenging the state's use of peremptory challenges at trial and, additionally, alleging both physical and mental coercion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we grant his petition.
The facts underlying Holland's conviction can be briefly set forth:
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Holland's conviction. It found, among other things, that: (1) failure of the police to notify Holland that his attorney had attempted to reach him invalidated Holland's purported waiver of the right to counsel (id. at 336, 100 Ill.Dec. at 877-78, 497 N.E.2d at 1239-40); and (2) an interrogating officer's knowing false statement to Holland that Chicago police had seen his car "in the alley involved in the rape incident," and that while Holland could not be identified, "he would have to explain why the vehicle was there" rendered Holland's confession involuntary and thus inadmissible (id. at 340, 100 Ill.Dec. at 880, 497 N.E.2d at 1242).
Holland, a white man, also argued that the state's improper use of its peremptory challenges at trial had violated his "constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." Id. at 326-27, 100 Ill.Dec. at 871, 497 N.E.2d at 1233. The prosecution used two of its ten peremptories to excuse the only two black venirepersons of a venire of forty. Id. at 326, 100 Ill.Dec. at 871, 497 N.E.2d at 1233. The appellate judge noted that the Supreme Court had recently decided a case, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), involving the constitutional propriety of peremptory challenges used to systematically exclude jurors on the basis of race. Id., 147 Ill. App.3d at 327, 100 Ill.Dec. at 871, 497 N.E.2d at 1233. In Batson, the Court held that such a practice violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees. Batson, 476 U.S. at 90, 106 S.Ct. at 1719.1
The appellate court found it unnecessary to adjudicate Holland's Batson argument because: (1) it overturned Holland's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on other grounds; (2) Batson was handed down by the Supreme Court during the pendency of Holland's appeal, meaning that "the parties and trial judge in the instant case did not have the benefit of the ... decision when the alleged peremptory challenge improprieties occurred"; and (3) "with Batson now controlling, it is highly unlikely that this issue will recur on retrial." People v. Holland, 147 Ill.App.3d at 327, 100 Ill.Dec. at 871, 497 N.E.2d at 1233.
The state, however, appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed and affirmed Holland's conviction. People v. Holland, 121 Ill.2d 136, 163-64, 117 Ill.Dec. 109, 121, 520 N.E.2d 270, 282 (1987). The state supreme court determined that Holland's waiver of the right to counsel was valid "despite the fact that he was not told that an attorney wanted to confer with him prior to any interrogation or lineup." Id. at 153, 117 Ill.Dec. at 116-17, 520 N.E.2d at 277-78. Additionally, the court found that the interrogating officer's false statement to Holland would not invalidate Holland's confession because "there is no indication that the defendant lacked the capacity to understand his rights," the officer questioned Holland only briefly, and the statement did not threaten Holland "or imply that either the defendant or a loved one would be harmed in some way if the defendant asserted his right to remain silent rather than explain the presence of his automobile in the alley." Id. at 155, 117 Ill.Dec. at 117, 520 N.E.2d at 278.
Id. But see id., 121 Ill.2d at 173, 117 Ill. Dec. at 125-26, 520 N.E.2d at 286-87 (Simon, J., dissenting) (). The court also rejected Holland's argument that the state violated his right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community when it excused the two black venirepersons. Id. at 158, 117 Ill.Dec. at 118-19, 520 N.E.2d at 279-80 (majority opinion).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Holland's Sixth Amendment "fair cross-section" claim. Holland v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 1051, 109 S.Ct. 1309, 103 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989). Indeed, in his brief before the Supreme Court, Holland presented only the "narrow question" of whether state conduct violative of the equal protection clause (as in Batson) also violates Sixth Amendment protections. Brief for Petitioner at 6, ...
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Holland v. McGinnis
...a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court, in a thoughtful opinion, granted the writ on two grounds. 754 F.Supp. 1245 (N.D.Ill.1990). First, it held that Holland's confession had been physically coerced and obtained through subterfuge, that admitting it at trial had......