US ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. CV 87-1840-WDK.,CV 87-1840-WDK.
• Citation: 714 F. Supp. 1084
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Roderick STILLWELL; and Roderick Stillwell, in his own right, Plaintiffs, v. HUGHES HELICOPTERS, INC.; McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.; Parker Hannifin Corp.; Edward E. Vukonich; James P. Coyne; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

714 F. Supp. 1084

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Roderick STILLWELL; and Roderick Stillwell, in his own right, Plaintiffs, v. HUGHES HELICOPTERS, INC.; McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.; Parker Hannifin Corp.; Edward E. Vukonich; James P. Coyne; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. CV 87-1840-WDK.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

June 1, 1989.

Law Offices of William R. Ramsey, William R. Ramsey, Louis J. Cohen, Encino, Cal., for plaintiff Roderick Stillwell.

Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, Robert F. Scoular, F. Michael Gaffney, Glenn E. Monroe, Andria K. Richey, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants Hughes Helicopters, Inc. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.

Crowell & Moring, Patrick W. Lee, Julie Crohovsky, Washington, D.C., Clinnin, Siracuse & Belcher, Philip Siracuse, Richard Salcido, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant Parker Hannifin Corp.

Quinn, Kully & Morrow, John J. Quinn, Eric L. Dobbersteen, Lisa L. Kantor, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant James P. Coyne.

Sharenow & Corbin, Robert L. Corbin, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant Edward E. Vukonich.

Morgan J. Frankel, Asst. Counsel, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae for U.S. Senate.

KELLER, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company and Parker Hannifin Corporation's motions to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The defendants ask this Court to declare the 1986 amendments to the qui tam sections of the False Claims Act, see 31 U.S.C.A. section 3730 (West Supp.1988), unconstitutional.

The defendants assert three bases for this challenge. First, they contend that the 1986 amendments violate the separation of powers doctrine because the new provisions confer litigative discretion on private plaintiffs and the judiciary, thus encroaching on the constitutional power of the executive branch to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const. art. II, section 3. Second, the defendants urge that the amended False Claims Act violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, section 2, because Congress "appoints" relators to prosecute qui tam actions, a power that is exclusively vested in the executive branch. Finally, the defendants contest the congressional grant of standing to bring a qui tam action to a private party. They argue that a relator cannot allege the constitutionally minimum injury-in-fact, and thus the amended False Claims Act abrogates the "case or controversy" limitation embodied in Article III.

I. General Presumptions:

In these motions, this Court has been asked to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress — "`the gravest and most delicate duty that the federal courts are called upon to perform.'" Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981). When reviewed for constitutional infirmities, congressional enactments are presumptively valid. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2771, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980). Thus, "when a federal court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons." Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 109 S.Ct. 647, 661, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3193, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). Whether this Court agrees or disagrees with the particular method chosen by the Congress to address this problem is immaterial. Without a constitutional bar, it is not for this Court

to limit the State in resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law. Whether proscribed conduct is to be visited by a criminal prosecution or by a qui tam action or by an injunction or by some or all of these remedies in combination is a matter within the legislature's range of choice.

Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1327, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957).

II. Separation of Powers:

Qui tam¹ laws originated in England and are firmly rooted in the American legal tradition. Of the fourteen statutes imposing penalties enacted by the First Congress, between ten and twelve authorized qui tam suits.² Although most of these statutes resembled simple informer laws, the idea of private citizen enforcement of public rights is embedded in our constitutional system.³ The First Congress' incorporation of the qui tam concept into American law "provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence" that the concept is consistent with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3187, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (citation omitted).

This challenge is something of an anomaly, because the executive branch — whose authority is purportedly undermined by this law — has not appeared in this action to contest the statutory scheme. As amicus curiae the United States Senate points out, and as this Court's review of the case law confirms, no reported decision has ever invalidated a statute because of undue intrusion on executive branch authority when the executive has expressly declined to oppose the law. Thus, the defendants ask this Court to entertain a separation of powers challenge to the amended False Claims Act without the participation of the affected branch.

A. General Principles:

The separation of powers doctrine springs from "the central judgment of the Framers that, within our constitutional scheme, the separation of governmental powers is essential to the preservation of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 659. The doctrine does not require, however, that each of the three branches must be entirely separate and distinct. Morrison v. Olson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). Nor does the doctrine require a "hermetic division" between the branches. Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 659. The separation of powers doctrine recognizes that our tripartite system of government embodies a flexible Madisonian system of checks and balances, which strives to achieve "`separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.'" Id., quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

The separation of powers doctrine arises from the realization that there is an "hydraulic pressure within each of the separate branches to exceed the outer limits of its power." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122, 96 S.Ct. 612, 683, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). The doctrine acts as "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another." Id. Thus, courts must be vigilant against provisions of law that concentrate in a single branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate branches or that undercut the authority and independence of one coordinate branch. Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 659-60.

The prohibition against encroachment or aggrandizement has resulted in the invalidation of congressional attempts to exercise the powers of other branches or to reassign authorities vested by the Constitution in either the judicial or the executive branches. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (Congress may not exercise removal power over officer performing executive functions); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (Congress may not enact laws except through Article I procedures); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (Congress may not assign Article III powers to Article I judges). However, the commingling of the functions of the branches, without encroachment or aggrandizement, presents but does not constitute a constitutional problem. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 647 (Congress' creation and placement of the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch is constitutional); Morrison v. Olson, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (judicial appointment of independent counsel upheld); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (agency's assumption of jurisdiction over adjudication of state law counterclaims does not undermine judicial branch authority); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (legislation providing for General Services Administration control of presidential papers after resignation upheld).

Because this case involves powers of the executive branch, this Court should consider whether the amended False Claims Act "impermissibly undermines" the powers of the executive, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856, 106 S.Ct. at 3260, or "disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches by preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443, 97 S.Ct. at 2790. Because the defendants also argue that the Act expands the powers of the judicial branch by allowing it to impact an executive function, the Court must further determine whether the Act assigns to the judicial branch "tasks that are more appropriately accomplished by other branches," Morrison v. Olson, ___ U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 2601, or "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch," Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851, 106 S.Ct. at 3258.

B. The Executive Branch's Litigative Function:

Under Article II, section 3, of the United States Constitution, the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." This...