US ex rel. Weidner v. Thieret
| Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87 C 4157.,87 C 4157. |
| Citation | 683 F. Supp. 1195 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Randall WEIDNER (N-14385) Petitioner, v. James H. THIERET, Warden, Menard Correctional Facility, and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Randall Weidner, pro se.
Edward Feldman, Northwestern University Legal Clinic, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Mark Rotert, Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondents.
Petitioner Randall Weidner seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) from his murder and rape conviction. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is denied.
Weidner was arrested by the Calumet City police on August 14, 1979, for the murder of Sharon Visnak. At the time, he was seventeen years old with an eighth-grade education. The police brought Weidner to the police station, and Officers Kelly Matthews and Ronald Dorsey proceeded to interrogate Weidner without an attorney present. As a result of the interrogation, Weidner made certain incriminating statements. Prior to his trial, Weidner moved to suppress the statements. He argued that coercive techniques used by the police during interrogation, combined with his age, limited education, inexperience with police interrogation and mental incapacity, rendered the statements inadmissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and orally presented its decisions and reasoning. The trial court expressly found that Weidner was duly advised of his Miranda rights on at least three occasions; that the State met its burden of showing that Weidner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent; and that the "evidence elicited and the totality of the circumstances" demonstrated "that the statement or statements were given voluntarily and that no threats, coercion or otherwise induced such statements." Report of Motion to Suppress Hearings ("Record") at 313-14.
At trial, the prosecution relied primarily on Weidner's incriminating statements and the confessions of the co-defendants. Answer at 4. The jury found Weidner guilty of rape, murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Weidner was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighty years for murder and sixty years for rape.
Weidner appealed the conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing among other things that the incriminating statements were inadmissible and that the court's refusal to admit the testimony of Father Mahon, one of Weidner's witnesses, was reversible error. The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the record supports the trial court's decision that the confession was knowing and voluntary and that the proffered testimony was inadmissible hearsay under Illinois law and therefore properly excluded. People v. Visnack, 135 Ill.App.3d 113, 89 Ill.Dec. 901, 481 N.E.2d 744 (1st Dist.1985). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Weidner's petition for leave to appeal.
Weidner's first claim for habeas relief essentially restates his position at the state suppression hearing — that the combination of the following facts render his confession unknowing and involuntary and thereby inadmissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Weidner was subjected to threats from Officer Matthews, and, at the time of the confession, he was seventeen years of age with a limited education, inexperienced in police interrogation and suffering from the mental incapacitation of "organic brain syndrome." Weidner bases his claim on the suppression hearing record or, alternatively, seeks an evidentiary hearing. We find that the record of the suppression hearing fairly supports the explicit and implicit factual findings of the state trial court that Weidner was not subjected to threats or coercion during questioning and that organic brain syndrome did not render Weidner's confession unknowing. We accordingly conclude that the state court constitutionally admitted Weidner's incriminating statements at trial.
The federal habeas statute mandates that we presume correct any state court factual findings "evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia." 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d). Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). This presumption can be overcome if the petitioner demonstrates that the state court did not provide "a full, fair, and adequate hearing" on the petitioner's claim or the petitioner "was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6)-(7). The presumption is also overcome if we conclude on the basis of the record of the proceeding that the "factual determination is not fairly supported by the record." § 2254(d)(8). We must independently assess the evidence brought out in the record to assure that any state court factual findings that we accept and apply without our own evidentiary hearing are supported by the evidence presented to the state court. Demps v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., Demps v. Dugger, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 209, 98 L.Ed.2d 160 (1987). With these guidelines in mind, we now turn to the pertinent factual findings of the state court at the suppression hearing.
The parties do not dispute that at the time of the police interrogation, Weidner was seventeen, had not completed his education beyond the eighth grade and had no prior experience with police interrogation. The parties disputed at the suppression hearing whether Weidner received the Miranda warnings prior to his confession. The state court found that Weidner had received the warnings more than once, Record at 313-14, and Weidner does not contest that finding here. Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition at 1.
The central factual dispute in this habeas petition is whether Officer Matthews actually threatened or coerced Weidner into making the incriminating statements. Both parties presented testimonial evidence at the suppression hearing to support their respective positions. Weidner testified that Matthews brandished a gun during the interrogation and threatened Weidner with the electric chair if he failed to talk. Record at 253-54. Weidner further testified that Officer Dorsey told him not to be concerned with Matthews and that he "would feel better if he talked about what happened." Id. at 255. On the other hand, Matthews and Dorsey testified that neither brandished a gun during the interrogation. Id. at 13, 39. Dorsey admits that he was carrying a gun in his holster during the interrogation and assumes Matthews was as well. Id. at 54. Matthews denies that he had a gun during the questioning. Id. at 28. Matthews and Dorsey also denied that Matthews ever threatened Weidner with the electric chair or in other ways coerced his confession. Id. at 13, 39.
The state court found "that no threats, coercion or otherwise induced Weidner's statements." The state court did not state explicitly whose testimony it found more credible. Weidner contends here that the state court's finding could be interpreted in one of two ways. The state court either believed the testifying officers and found that no threats were made or believed Weidner that threats were made but concluded that such threats did not induce Weidner's confession. Weidner further contends that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to clear up this ambiguity. We disagree.
An ambiguity in the state court's findings on a pertinent factual issue does not necessarily make a de novo evidentiary hearing in federal court essential. When the state court's finding of facts are unclear, we must assume that the state court correctly applied the law and gleam from the court's legal conclusions the implicit factual findings. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973). This presumption fails only if there is some evidence that the state court incorrectly applied legal principles or the law applied presents a novel problem. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314-15, 83 S.Ct. 745, 758, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
The record demonstrates that the state court correctly applied the well-settled law on the admissibility of confessions. As in LaVallee v. Delle Rose, in which the Court implied a factual finding from the state court's legal conclusion that the confession was voluntary, the state court here considered the totality of the circumstances, including Weidner's age and the fact that he was read his rights to decide that his confession was voluntary. The factual dispute as to whether Matthews threatened Weidner was resolved on a credibility determination — Weidner's word against that of the officers. Weidner presented no evidence other than his own testimony that threats were made.1 Thus, this case differs from Fowler v. Jago, 683 F.2d 983 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 363 (1983), in which the federal appellate court refused to recognize an implicit factual finding that no threats were made when evidence in the record beyond the petitioner's testimony supported the petitioner's position, and the state court did not indicate the standards that it applied in coming to its legal conclusion.
In the absence of any evidence that the state court applied incorrect principles of law, we conclude that the only factual finding that could support the legal conclusion that Weidner's confession was voluntary was that no threats were made. As Weidner points out, and the respondent does not dispute, the applicable law is clear. State officials cannot extract a confession from an individual in custody by "any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by...
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