US Football League v. National Football League

• Citation: 644 F. Supp. 1040
• Decision Date: 02 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84 Civ. 7484 (PKL).,84 Civ. 7484 (PKL).
• Parties: UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

644 F. Supp. 1040

UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al., Defendants.

No. 84 Civ. 7484 (PKL).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 2, 1986.

Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg Manley, Myerson & Casey, Spengler Carlson Gubar Brodsky & Frischling, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Davis Polk & Wardwell, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York City, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

LEISURE, District Judge:

In this action, the United States Football League and certain of its member clubs (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "USFL") have brought suit against the National Football League, its commissioner and certain of its member clubs (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "NFL") for the NFL's alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and of the common law. After ten weeks of trial, the jury unanimously rendered a series of general verdicts and answered numerous special interrogatories by entering their responses on a jury verdict sheet, Court Exhibit 16, which had been prepared by the Court after consultation with the parties and due consideration of their respective objections.

With regard to the USFL's claim of actual monopolization, the jury found the NFL liable, concluding that defendants had willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in a relevant market consisting of major league professional football in the United States. See Court Exhibit 16 at 3 (Question No. 4).¹ The jury also found that the NFL's unlawful monopolization of a relevant market had caused injury to plaintiffs' business or property. Id. (Question No. 5). Despite these findings, the jury chose to award plaintiffs only nominal damages, concluding that the USFL had suffered only $1.00 in damages as a result of the NFL's unlawful conduct. See id. at 11 (Question No. 17).

Plaintiffs were less successful on the remainder of their antitrust claims. The jury found that none of the defendants had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to monopolize a relevant market, id. at 5 (Question No. 7), or by conspiring to monopolize. See id. at 8-9 (Questions Nos. 12-14). In addition, the jury found that even though one or more of the defendants had participated in a contract, combination or conspiracy to exclude competition within major league professional football, id. at 12 (Question No. 20), that combination did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. (Question No. 21). The jury also found that the NFL's contracts with all three television networks for the right to broadcast the league's regular season and championship games through the 1986-87 season were not an unreasonable restraint of trade violative of Section 1. See id. at 14 (Question No. 24). Finally, the jury rejected plaintiffs' "essential facilities" claim, specifically finding that defendants did not have the ability to deny actual or potential competitors access to a national broadcast television contract. Id. at 17 (Question No. 33).

None of the defendants were found liable on plaintiffs' common law claims, see id. at 20, 23, 26, a result to which the USFL has not objected. The USFL has, however, moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to each of the antitrust claims which were rejected by the jury.² In addition, the USFL has moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, for a new trial. The USFL has specifically requested that the new trial be limited to the issue of damages, since plaintiffs see no error in the jury's determination that the NFL unlawfully monopolized professional football in the United States.

The NFL opposes the USFL's motions in all respects, and has itself moved for judgment n.o.v. with respect to the jury's verdict on the USFL's claim of actual monopolization.

Having carefully considered all issues raised by counsel's extensive submissions, I have concluded that there is no justification for disturbing any of the jury's verdicts in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs' and defendants' post-trial motions are denied in their entirety. The explanation for this ruling set forth below is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the plethora of arguments raised by counsel in their papers and on oral argument of the motions. To the extent that a specific objection to the verdicts or to the Court's jury instructions is not discussed herein, it may be presumed that the argument has been considered and found to be without merit.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs argue that a new trial is warranted on several grounds, including: 1) jury confusion, manifested by the jurors' public statements and by the inconsistency of the verdicts; 2) the compromise nature of the verdict; 3) the inadequacy of the award; and 4) the trial court's failure to give correct instructions, particularly with respect to damages.

A. Jury Confusion

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), "a new trial may be granted ... in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law." The NFL does not dispute the proposition that "a trial judge may order a new trial if he suspects that the jury verdict reflects confusion." Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1538 (5th Cir.1984). Defendants do, however, take issue with the admissibility of certain evidence offered in support of plaintiffs' claim of jury confusion, as well as to plaintiffs' insistence that the jury's verdicts are so irreconcilable that a new trial must be granted.

1. Post-Trial Statements by Jurors

The USFL's lawsuit against the NFL attracted an extraordinary amount of public attention through the media. The trial was covered on a daily basis by many newspapers throughout the country, and was the subject of analysis on several network and cable television programs. Following the verdict, those jurors courageous enough to exit the courthouse by the front door were immediately surrounded by swarms of reporters eager to develop a story. Although an experience to which they were obviously unaccustomed, a few jurors did choose to subject themselves to interviews, both on that afternoon and the following day. The comments elicited from two jurors in particular, Miriam Sanchez and Margaret Lilienfeld, were widely publicized. In moving for a new trial, the USFL has cited the public comments of Mrs. Sanchez, Mrs. Lilienfeld, and two other jurors, in response to the reporters' various inquiries, as clear evidence that the verdict in this case was the result of jury confusion. See generally Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for New Trial and for Judgment N.O.V. on Certain Claims ("Plaintiffs' New Trial Memorandum") at 53-56; Affidavit of Harvey D. Myerson ("Myerson Aff.") and Exhibits ("Ex.") 1-40 annexed thereto (newspaper articles; transcripts of television and radio broadcasts; videotaped and audiotaped segments of television and radio broadcasts).

Specifically, the USFL asserts that the jurors' post-trial statements demonstrate: 1) that at least one juror, Mrs. Sanchez, agreed to award the USFL a single dollar in damages based upon her belief that the Court could increase the amount of damages; and 2) that the jurors were generally confused, both by the Court's instructions and by their own notions of the possible consequences of their verdict.

The USFL's desire to impeach the verdict by what plaintiffs have described as the "public record of confusion" raises a threshold issue — whether this Court may properly consider any evidence of post-trial statements by jurors in deciding plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

At common law, it was well-settled that "a juror cannot impeach his own verdict," and that courts should not disturb "verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned ... on the testimony of those who took part in their publication." McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). According to the United States Supreme Court, a general rule of juror incompetency was necessary to avoid "making what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference." Id. at 267-68, 35 S.Ct. at 784-85 (emphasis added); accord Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 110 (2d Cir.1985).

In McDonald, the Court declined to adopt an "inflexible rule" barring post-trial testimony by a juror, since "there might be instances in which such testimony ... could not be excluded without `violating the plainest principles of justice.'" Id. at 268-69, 35 S.Ct. at 784-85. The Court declined, however, to enumerate the exceptions to the general rule. See id. Eventually, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which set forth the rule of McDonald and codified its exceptions. That rule provides as follows:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

Fed.R.Evid. 606(b).

Plaintiffs insist that Rule 606(b) does not render the post-trial statements of Mrs. Sanchez and other jurors incompetent for...