US v. Abbadessa, CR 92-925

Citation848 F. Supp. 369
Decision Date26 April 1994
Docket NumberCR 92-1231 and CR 93-1310.,No. CR 92-925,CR 92-925
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Alfred ABBADESSA, Joseph Antonucci, Michael Antonucci, Juan Ayala, Anthony Barone, Salvatore Cariola, Benny Chao, Peter DePrima, Nicola DeRiggi, Brian Ficeto, Jai Gurdyal, Ismael Hernandez, Andrew Komonski, William Kruczowy, Lawrence Lazewski, Richard Litwinkowich, Edwin Mercado, St. Elmo Moaze, Gilbert O'Connor, Raymond Quinones, Joseph Ridley, George Rodriguez, Ralph Sands, Raphael Sargeant, John Sarcone and Anthony Tetro, Defendants. UNITED STATES of America v. Victor SMITH, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America v. Andrew FICHERA and Jacob Rockson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
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Zachary Carter, U.S. Atty., by Gordon Mehler, Brooklyn, for U.S.

Barry Teller, Forest Hills, NY, for defendant Alfred Abbadessa.

Ronald Rubinstein, Queens, NY, for defendant Joseph Antonucci.

Ronald Rubinstein, Queens, NY, for defendant Michael Antonucci.

Paul Rinaldo, Forest Hills, NY, for defendant Juan Ayala.

LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross by Michael Ross, New York City, for defendant Anthony Barone.

Salvatore Marinello, Mineola, NY, for defendant Salvatore Cariola.

Phillip Katowitz, New York City, for defendant Benny Chao.

Alfred DeGrazia, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant Peter DePrima.

Murray Richman, Bronx, NY, for defendant Nicola DeRiggi.

Alan Hirschman, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant Brian Ficeto.

Paul Goldberger, New York City, for defendant Andrew Fichera.

Daniel Noble, New York City, for defendant Ismael Hernandez.

Michael Bachner, New York City, for defendant Jai Gurdyal.

Harold Borg, Kew Gardens, NY, for defendant Andrew Komonski.

Joel Walter, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant William Kruczowy.

Steven Siegal, Oceanside, NY, for defendant Lawrence Lazewski.

Kenneth Paul, New York City, for defendant Richard Litwinkowich.

Thomas White, New York City, for defendant Edwin Mercado.

Bernard Udell, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant St. Elmo Moaze.

Maurice Sercarz, New York City, for defendant Henry Muller.

Jerry L. Tritz, New York City, for defendant Gilbert O'Connor.

John Burke, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant Raymond Quinones.

Maria DelGaizo Noto, Matawan, NY, for defendant Joseph Ridley.

Neil B. Checkman, New York City, for defendant Jacob Rockson.

Richard E. Kwasnik, New York City, for defendant George Rodriguez.

James Neville, New York City, for defendant Ralph Sands.

Joseph Sorrentino, Staten Island, NY, for defendant John Sarcone.

Roger Archibald, Brooklyn, NY, for defendant Raphael Sargeant.

Joel Stein, New York City, for defendant Victor Smith.

Lloyd Epstein, New York City, for defendant Anthony Tetro.

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

Defendants are thirty New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission ("Commission") inspectors who have pled guilty to extortion. They accepted bribes in exchange for overlooking defects and for certifying inspections for taxicabs that were never inspected. Some of the defendants were line inspectors who conducted the fraudulent inspections, others were senior inspectors who condoned the corruption, and yet others were supervisors who furthered the scheme by manipulating work schedules to ensure that the corrupt line inspectors were on the same inspection team. All shared in the profits.

Sentencing here involves a key objective: corruption in government agencies charged with protecting public safety must be deterred by loss of liberty to the offender. In imposing punishment the court must nevertheless consider the fact that the endemic extortion was due in large measure to incompetence of high officials in the city government, that some of the inspectors were drawn unwillingly into this cesspool of corruption and that some cooperated fully in exposing the dirty details.

I. FACTS

All defendants have pled guilty to conspiracy to commit extortion by accepting illegal payoffs. Section 1951(a) of Title 18, the federal extortion statute, provides:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be guilty of a felony.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The maximum penalty for a violation of section 1951 is twenty years imprisonment, id., and a fine of $250,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3).

The Commission was created in 1971 to improve taxi and limousine service in New York City. It is responsible for establishing standards for taxicab safety and air pollution. Its regulations require that taxicabs be inspected to ensure structural and mechanical safety and appropriate exhaust emission levels. Since 1989 all safety and emissions inspections have taken place at the Safety and Emissions Division in Woodside, Queens. An estimated 200 taxicabs are inspected at that site each day. All the inspectors worked at the Woodside facility.

Taxicabs must be inspected three times a year. Additionally, field inspectors may issue "notices of violation" to taxicabs in the street that do not conform with Commission regulations. Failure to pass inspection or to correct a violation promptly can result in the suspension of the right to operate the taxicab until the defect is repaired, resulting in a significant loss of revenue to the owner and operator.

At the time most of these inspectors were arrested, the top position in the Safety and Emissions Division was vacant. The division was run by the Assistant Commissioner for Safety and Emissions and the Deputy Director of the Safety and Emissions Division; neither of them has been prosecuted criminally. Immediately below them were defendant chief supervising inspector Nicola DeRiggi and defendants supervising inspectors Andrew Komonski and Anthony Barone. All three received bribes and participated in the extortion conspiracy. Seven senior inspectors reported to the supervising inspectors. Three of those senior inspectors participated in the payoff scheme and are defendants. Forty-four line inspectors were employed. Twenty-four of them are defendants.

Inspection lanes are equipped with computerized testing equipment. There are six inspectors on each lane. Inspectors who were receiving illegal payoffs generally worked together on one lane. The roles played by supervising inspectors DeRiggi, Komonski and Barone were critical to the success of the corruption scheme because they were responsible for assigning personnel to the various inspection lanes. Corrupt inspectors were grouped together and assigned to particular positions to facilitate the scheme. The senior inspectors were also essential to the success of the plan because they were present during the performance of the inspections, had immediate supervisory responsibility for the line inspectors and acted as conduits for payoffs to the supervising inspectors.

Methods of evading or disabling the inspection tests were devised. The inspector in position 1 was responsible for inspecting the credentials and other paperwork for the taxicab; this position offered little opportunity for illegal manipulation. The inspector in position 2 was responsible for checking the emission system of the taxicab; in order to get a false passing result, the inspector would run the taxicab for an excessive period of time before measuring the emission, or would manipulate the way the measuring probe was placed in the tailpipe. The inspector in position 3 was responsible for wheel alignment; the inspector would run the rear wheels over the test plate twice instead of running both the front and rear wheels over the plate so that the taxicab would appear to be properly aligned. The inspector at position 4 was responsible for testing headlights; the inspector would manipulate the testing apparatus until the computer registered a passing mark. The inspector at position 5 was responsible for testing brakes; the inspector would test the rear brakes twice instead of testing the front brakes which were usually in worse condition. The inspector in position 6 was responsible for visually inspecting the undercarriage of the taxicab; the inspector would ignore defects.

One inspector on a corrupt lane would serve as the "treasurer" or "banker" of the day, responsible for collecting and disbursing the payoffs. Money was divided among the six line inspectors and inspectors who directed the taxicabs to the corrupt lane.

The scheme also involved inspections designed to verify that defects cited by field inspectors had been corrected. Compliance was checked in a special lane with four inspectors. If a taxicab passed, a "condition corrected receipt" was issued. Corrupt inspectors received payoffs in exchange for issuing for receipts for taxicabs that had not been repaired and for some that had not even been brought into the Woodside facilities, referred to as "phantoms" by defendants.

There was a schedule of bribes. It costs between $50 and $100 to pass a routine inspection. Overlooking notices of violation cost less, about $20 per notice. Often, however, the field inspectors would find several things wrong with one taxicab and would issue multiple notices of violation resulting in bribes of $100 or more.

Payments were made in many ways. Cash was left in ashtrays, behind visors, between car seats, in packages of cigarettes and passed through a nearby coffee stop.

The government cannot specify with certainty the total amount the corrupt inspectors received. Its conservative estimate is $208,000. That figure was calculated by averaging the inspectors' estimates of their weekly payoffs on a "low" week. The average was divided by five to reach a payoff per day; using time and attendance...

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7 cases
  • US v. Ferranti
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • June 5, 1996
    ... ... 66 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (sentencing options available for defendants must be compatible with the statutory directives); United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F.Supp. 369, 378-79 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (statute requires that the most appropriate sentence be imposed taking into account a defendant's special ... ...
  • US v. DeRiggi, 92-CR-925.
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    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • July 12, 1995
    ... 893 F. Supp. 171 ... UNITED STATES of America ... Nicola DeRIGGI, Michael Antonucci, Alfred Abbadessa, Ismael Hernandez, Raymond Quinones, and Anthony Barone, Defendants ... No. 92-CR-925 ... United States District Court, E.D. New York ... ...
  • U.S. v. K
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    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • May 31, 2001
    ... ... United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F.Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y.1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F.Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y.1992), disapproved ... ...
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    • May 17, 1995
    ... ... §§ 3553(a)(1)-(7). See United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F.Supp. 369, 378-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated, remanded sub nom., United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir.1995); United States v ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • Every day is a good day for a judge to lay down his professional life for justice.
    • United States
    • Fordham Urban Law Journal Vol. 32 No. 1, December 2004
    • December 1, 2004
    ...(113.) 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) (1994). (114.) United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). (115.) United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by United States v. DeRiggi 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 1995). modified on remand, 893 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. (116.) Unit......

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