US v. Alafriz

Decision Date06 July 1988
Docket NumberNo. S 88 Cr. 0002 (RWS),88 Cr. 200 (RWS) and 88 Cr. 100 (RWS).,S 88 Cr. 0002 (RWS)
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Arturo ALAFRIZ, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, v. Rafael PEREZ and Juan Henriquez Mercado, Defendants. UNITED STATES of America, v. Levoster CHANDLER, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., S.D. N.Y., New York City (Reid M. Figel, Peter B. Sobol, Frances M. Fragos, Asst. U.S. Attys., of counsel), for U.S.

Ronald Carmon, New York City, for defendant Alafriz.

The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Abraham L. Clott, Paul Davison, of counsel), for defendant Perez.

Roger J. Schwarz, New York City, for defendant Mercado.

The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Ruth Chamberlain, of counsel), for defendant Chandler.

OPINION

SWEET, District Judge.

In three separate cases before this court, criminal defendants, subject to sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") recently promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission"), have challenged the Guidelines' constitutionality. Defendant Arturo Alafriz ("Alafriz") pleaded guilty to the crimes of which he is accused,1 and co-defendants Juan Mercado ("Mercado") and Rafael Perez ("Perez")2 and defendant Levoster Chandler ("Chandler") will decide whether to assert their right to trial based on the outcome of this motion.3 For the reasons set forth below, this court holds that the Guidelines are unconstitutional.

Statutory Background

The Commission was established pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19844 as "an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States" organized to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the criminal justice system." 28 U.S.C. § 991. The commission is to consist of seven voting and one nonvoting member, the voting members appointed by the President after consultation with criminal justice professionals. Id. at § 991(a). The Commission is to be bi-partisan. Id. At least three members are to be federal judges, and the Attorney General or his designee is to be an ex officio nonvoting member. Id. All voting members are subject to removal by the President for cause. Id. They are to serve staggered six year terms, each member eligible for reappointment to one additional term. 28 U.S.C. § 992.

The purpose of the Commission is to:

(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that—
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.

28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Thus it is their duty to promulgate guidelines reflecting these policies. Id. at § 994.

The broader congressional purpose behind the Commission and the Guidelines was to reduce disparity in sentencing practices nationwide. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-52 (1983), reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, 3182, 3220-35. Thus, Congress abolished the Parole Commission which it felt contributed to disparity and ordered the Commission to create more rigid sentencing rules. Id. at 3229-32, 3235. Additionally, the Commission wished to change what it perceived were common sentencing practice which did not follow mandatory minimum sentences in drug related offenses, and which tended to offer excessive leniency towards economic offenders. See Guidelines, ch. 1, part A, § 3 at 1.4.

The Guidelines, as promulgated by the Commission, are essentially a detailed list of charts and formulae. They set forth all federal crimes and assign to those crimes an offense level specified by point score. These levels are said to be derived from a study of presentence reports except where they are not. Guidelines, Ch. 1, part A, § 3 at 1.4. Within each category of crime are aggravating circumstances. These, if present, call for a specified increase in the number of points. Further, there are additional aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the offender which either increase or reduce the offense level by adding or subtracting points. Finally, a criminal history category is calculated, thus placing the offender in the appropriate criminal history category after all calculations are made.

The total offense level plus criminal history category indicates the range of the sentence the defendant is to receive. The calculations themselves are initially made by the Department of Probation, and the government and the defendant is given an opportunity to object to the calculus and to present grounds for departure from the Guidelines.

The sentencing judge is authorized to depart for causes not adequately considered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Guidelines sentences are appealable either on the grounds of miscalculation or of departure. If the judge has imposed a sentence higher than one Guidelines dictate, the defendant may appeal. If it is lower, the government may appeal. The Guidelines thus radically alter the practices and process by which sentences have been determined in the federal courts for over 100 years. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 & n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2613 & n. 5, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978).

Discussion

The constitutional challenges before this court are only three of scores that have been filed and determined almost daily across this country. At least one entire district, sitting en banc, has held them unconstitutional.5 Other districts have split on the issue.6 This question is so divisive of the courts and so crucial to futures of individuals that the Supreme Court has granted an expedited appeal from a district court decision.7 Despite several excellent opinions on this question,8 which are hereby adopted, this opinion will be filed in an effort to emphasize particular points and to state others not previously asserted.

Article III and Due Process as a Case or Controversy
Article III to the Constitution states that The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
. . . . .
The judicial Power shall extent to all Cases, in Law and Equity, ... and to Controversies....

This mandate, that Article III courts are to determine cases and controversies, limits Congress in its power to delegate adjudicative responsibilities to non-Article III bodies.9 Although Congress may grant administrative agencies the power to adjudicate questions of entitlement within that agency's sphere of expertise,10see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1982) (Employees' Compensation Commission may act as an adjudicative fact finding tribunal on workers compensation claim and neither party is entitled to trial de novo), in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the legislature could not empower non-Article III judges to preside definitively over cases concerning rights not created by Congress itself. Moreover, when a claim of constitutional right arises in the context of an agency adjudication, a court will generally make its own independent judgment rather than rely on the agency's fact finding on that matter. See Id. at 78-79, 102 S.Ct. at 2875; see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922); Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46, 52 S.Ct. at 290.

In the view of this judge the most vital claims of constitutional right are involved in sentencing. Consistently, the most difficult and agonizing decision a judge has to make is the punishment to be imposed upon an individual defendant in the light of the crime committed, the standard of the community where the crime was committed, the resources available for treatment or incarceration, the possibility of rehabilitation, and most significantly, the mens rea of the defendant. Individual justice is required to give the process not only moral but constitutional validity. Under the Constitution, no individual may be deprived of his liberty, a fundamental right, without due process of law. The questions then become how much process is due, and who decides whether a given individual has received the process that is due and does Congress have the power to limit the courts' authority to decide cases involving constitutional issues.

The procedural protections afforded defendants in the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding have evolved greatly from their common law roots. Prior to the enactment of English statutes prescribing specific punishment, all felonies were punishable by death. See 11 W. Holdsworth, The History of English Law 557 (1938).

As time went on, the English legislature enacted statutes that specifically prescribed the punishment to be meted out for any given offense. These statutes were often harsh and unpredictable. William Holdsworth in his history of English law sets forth a mid-eighteenth century example:

The punishments inflicted were unsystematic because they were inflicted by many unconnected statutes which come from all periods of the history of the law.... This influence of the old common law
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • August 11, 1988
    ...793 (E.D.La.1988). 3 In additional to those cited in note 1, supra, (cases listed alphabetically by defendant): United States v. Alafriz, 690 F.Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Bogle, 689 F.Supp. 1121 (S.D.Fla.1988) (en banc); United States v. Brodie, 686 F.Supp. 941 (D.D.C.1988......
  • Speight v. U.S., 85-385.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • November 28, 1989
    ...during the sentencing process, section 3147 was cited as an example of what, on the other hand, is permissible. United States v. Alafriz, 690 F.Supp. 1303, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 14. United States v. Rodriguez, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 1392, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (per curiam). At i......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • March 6, 1989
    ...have held, that there is a substantive due process right to discretionary individualized sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Alafriz, 690 F.Supp. 1303, 1309-10 (S.D.N.Y.1988). We find, however, that no such due process right Because appellant argues that the Act unconstitutionally denie......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • October 25, 1991
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