US v. Carlson
| Decision Date | 25 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | 87-01469.,Crim. No. 86-01253 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Eric J. CARLSON, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Randall L. JANSEN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
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Daniel Bent, U.S. Atty., and Janet Fenton, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff.
Hayden Aluli, Asst. Federal Public Defender, and Jack Schweigert, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants.
ORDER AFFIRMING JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION
At individual bench trials held before Magistrate Bert S. Tokairin, defendants Eric J. Carlson ("Carlson") and Randall L. Jansen ("Jansen") were convicted of motor vehicular offenses arising out of separate incidents that occurred upon federal military installations. Magistrate Tokairin found each defendant guilty of speeding on a military base in violation of Haw.Rev. Stat. § 291C-102, a state crime purportedly made federal under the Assimilative Crimes Act ("ACA"), 18 U.S.C. § 13. Accordingly, the magistrate imposed the relevant fines against each defendant for the speeding offenses; specifically, defendant Carlson was fined $11.00 and defendant Jansen $21.00.
The primary issue on these consolidated appeals from the magistrate's judgments of conviction is whether federal courts have jurisdiction by virtue of the ACA to adjudicate vehicular speeding offenses that occur within federal enclaves in Hawaii. Although apparently trivial at first blush, this novel question raises important concerns both of statutory construction and of federalism. Because the court finds Hawaii's speeding statute to be prohibitory rather than regulatory — that is, more criminal than civil in nature — and because the court dispenses with the remaining issues on appeal, defendants' separate convictions are affirmed.
After first being acquitted for driving under the influence of alcohol, defendant Carlson was convicted on September 9, 1986, for speeding on a military base; Carlson was sentenced to pay an $11.00 fine. On May 4, 1986, Carlson had been stopped by a military police officer at Schofield Barracks, a military installation in Hawaii, for driving 36 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. At the close of the government's case, defendant Carlson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government had failed to establish that the military base's speed limit signs had been officially authorized. Failing to provide the court with the proper authority to support his position, however, defendant's motion for acquittal was denied. Subsequently on September 11, 1986, Carlson moved for reconsideration of his speeding conviction on the basis of the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Lane, 57 Haw. 277, 554 P.2d 767 (1976). Defendant Carlson also appealed the magistrate's conviction to this district court on September 18, 1986.
In response to Carlson's motion for reconsideration, Magistrate Tokairin issued an order dated October 23, 1986, which found that he no longer had jurisdiction over the case, due to the notice of appeal already pending before this court. Accordingly, defendant Carlson filed a second notice of appeal with this court on October 24, 1986. On April 6, 1987, this court vacated Carlson's appeal and remanded the case to the magistrate, finding that the magistrate, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to decide whether the speed limit signs at issue had been authorized. Thus, Magistrate Tokairin was to address defendant Carlson's original motion for reconsideration.
On May 1, 1987, the government filed a "Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration" which raised a significant new issue material to Carlson's motion before the magistrate — whether the Hawaii speeding statute should be assimilated into federal law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13. The government's opposition also reiterated its previous two arguments: 1) the posted speed limit sign at issue had been properly established by law; and 2) the magistrate must take judicial notice of the lawfully established speed limit. Persuaded by the government's arguments, Magistrate Tokairin denied Carlson's motion for reconsideration on January 6, 1988. Specifically, the magistrate found that Hawaii's speeding law was assimilated into federal law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13. Additionally, Magistrate Tokairin took judicial notice as to the military installation commanders' proper authority to post speed limit signs on federal bases in Hawaii. On May 3, 1988, defendant Carlson timely filed this appeal pursuant to Local Rule 404-4.
At a separate bench trial held on December 9, 1987, defendant Jansen was tried by Magistrate Tokairin for speeding and driving with a suspended license at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. Jansen had been arrested by military police on September 17, 1987, for driving his car 36 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. zone. Upon completion of the parties' closing arguments, the magistrate took judicial notice of the fact that Fort Shafter's base commander had proper authority to set speed limits on the military base. Subsequently, the magistrate found defendant Jansen guilty of speeding and fined him $21.00; the magistrate, however, acquitted Jansen on the driving with a suspended license charge. Jansen then appealed his speeding conviction on May 3, 1988. In his appeal's initial supporting memorandum, defendant Jansen's sole argument was that Magistrate Tokairin had based his decision on insufficient evidence. Jansen then filed his present amended appeal of conviction on May 31, 1988, asserting for the first time that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the speeding charge under the ACA, 18 U.S.C. § 13.
Pursuant to Local Rule ("L.R.") 404-4, cited by defendants as controlling their individual cases on appeal, a defendant's scope of appeal from a magistrate's judgment of conviction in a misdemeanor case "shall be the same as on an appeal from a judgment of the district court to the court of appeals." Since speeding offenses in Hawaii are "violations" rather than "misdemeanors," however, see Haw.Rev. Stat. §§ 291C-102, 291C-161, L.R. 404-4 technically does not apply. For this same reason, L.R. 404-5, which regulates the scope of appeal from judgments in "civil" cases, also is not applicable. Thus, defendants' consolidated appeals must be taken pursuant to L.R. 404-6 which states as follows:
Appeals from any other decisions and orders of a magistrate not provided for in this rule should be taken as provided by governing statute, rule or decisional law.
Accordingly, since defendants' consolidated appeals concern novel issues of law, this court's standard of review will be de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). With this in mind, the court first addresses the jurisdictional issue regarding whether federal courts, pursuant to the ACA, may properly adjudicate speeding violations which occur on federal enclaves within the State of Hawaii.
Both defendants argue that their speeding convictions must be reversed, because Magistrate Tokairin lacked jurisdiction under the ACA to adjudicate their cases. In essence, defendants contend that their failure to comply with speed limits posted at the military bases in violation of Haw.Rev. Stat. § 291C-102 constitutes a "civil" offense that falls outside the aegis of the ACA, 18 U.S.C. § 13. Since Hawaii has failed to expressly define speeding as being "criminal" in nature, but rather has chosen to label such offenses as "violations," the State's speeding statute arguably can have no effect within federal enclaves.
To address this issue of first impression, the court first looks to the federal ACA statute itself which provides as follows:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
18 U.S.C. § 13. According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the ACA "makes state criminal laws applicable in federal courts exercising territorial jurisdiction over U.S. military bases." United States v. Bosser, 866 F.2d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.1988) (); United States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Hollinshead, 616 F.Supp. 160, 161 (D.Haw.1985). Thus, the ACA transforms state crimes into federal crimes. Although not expressly limited in its terms to the incorporation of state criminal statutes, the ACA has been so interpreted. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.1978) () (emphasis in the original). See also Hollinshead, 616 F.Supp. at 161. Accordingly, non-penal civil rules, regulations, and sanctions are excluded from the ACA's reach. E.g., Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474; Hollinshead, 616 F.Supp. at 161.
The jurisdictional issue on these consolidated appeals, therefore, turns on the apparently simplistic question of whether Hawaii's speeding statute is defined as being "civil" or "criminal" in nature; if the former, then these speeding...
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