US v. Chambless, Crim. A. No. 87-609.
Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 87-609. |
Citation | 680 F. Supp. 793 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Michael W. CHAMBLESS, Louis W. Bignar, John G. Schillace. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Gerry Deegan, Thomas C. Muehleck, Robert J. Boitmann, New Orleans, La., for U.S.
Virginia Schleuter, New Orleans, La., for Chambless.
Patrick Fanning, New Orleans, La., for Schillace.
Sheldon Fernandez, Harvey, La., for Bignar.
Three defendants who are to be sentenced this date have moved to set aside the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) on the alternative grounds that the statute creating the Commission is unconstitutional and that the Commission violated its statutory mandate. After considering the memoranda of the parties and the Sentencing Commission as amicus curiae, we conclude that the statute is constitutional and that the guidelines were lawfully adopted. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ( )("the Act") effected a drastic change in the sentencing practices of the federal courts. The Act established the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission") as "an independent commission in the judicial branch," 28 U.S. C. § 991(a), to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system," 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). The primary function of the Commission is to issue guidelines for the determination of sentences in criminal cases.
The Commission is composed of seven voting members and two ex officio, non-voting members. The voting members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and may be removed by the President "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Three of the seven voting members must be federal judges selected from a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. Voting members presently hold full-time positions, but, after the guidelines have been in effect for six years, the positions of the voting members other than the chairman will become part-time. 28 U.S.C. § 992(c). Appointments are for six-year terms (except that the initial terms are staggered), and no voting member may serve more than two full terms. 28 U.S.C. § 992(a), (b).
The guidelines issued by the Commission limit the discretion of sentencing judges by prescribing narrow sentencing ranges within the statutorily authorized maximum (and minimum) penalties. The guideline range in a particular case is determined by characteristics of the offender and the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b). A sentencing judge must impose a sentence within the range specified by the guidelines "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that prescribed." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In addition, the judge must take into consideration any relevant policy statements issued by the Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). Either the government or the defendant may appeal a departure from or incorrect application of the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Aside from the promulgation of guidelines and the issuance of policy statements, the Commission is charged with substantial administrative duties. The Commission has a continuing duty to study the effectiveness of sentencing practices and to review and revise the guidelines, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(2) and 994(o); the Commission also has a number of reporting and recommendatory responsibilities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(p)-(r), (w). In addition, the Commission hears petitions from defendants seeking to modify the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(s).
As a threshold matter, the government contends that the defendants lack standing to challenge the guidelines unless the court initially determines that the defendants would receive heavier sentences under the guidelines (or via authorized departures) than they would receive otherwise. We find, without prematurely determining the defendants' sentences, that the defendants are proper parties to contest the validity of the guidelines.
In order to have standing, a litigant must show "some actual or threatened injury." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). A party " Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (citations omitted) quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923).
Even if the sentences prescribed by the guidelines are not longer than those which the court would impose under pre-guidelines law, the actual time served under the new system is likely to be greater because the Sentencing Act abolished parole. Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 235. Moreover, under the guidelines each of the defendants faces a period of supervised release to which he would not otherwise be subject. Sentencing Guidelines § 5D3.1. Clearly, the defendants have a "personal stake" in the outcome of this matter. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11, 96 S.Ct. 612, 631, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
The constitutional attack is on three grounds: (1) Congress has unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Sentencing Commission; (2) the presence of judges on the Commission violates the doctrine of separation of powers; and (3) the President's power to remove Commission members constitutes an impermissible control by the executive over the judiciary in violation of due process and the principle of separation of powers.
The defendants contend that Congress has unconstitutionally delegated to the Sentencing Commission its authority to fix criminal penalties. While the defendants recognize that Congress may properly delegate its authority where the delegated power is confined by an "intelligible principle" established by Congress, see National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974), they maintain that "Congress has not provided the framework for the Commission's exercise of its critical delegated power." Defendants' memo at 35.
The Supreme Court has invalidated delegations of legislative authority to governmental bodies on only two occasions: Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). With the exception of those cases, the Court has consistently upheld expansive delegations by Congress. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court has explained that "only if ... there is an absence of standards ..., so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose." Id. at 426, 64 S.Ct. at 668.
The Supreme Court's failure to invoke the delegation doctrine in the more than 50 years since Schechter and Panama Refining indicates that the doctrine is of extremely limited application. See National Cable Television v. United States Federal Communications Commission, 415 U.S. 352, 352-53, 94 S.Ct. 1155, 1156, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974) (Marshall, J. concurring and dissenting). Unless faced with a case of completely unbridled delegation, tantamount to an abdication of Congress's role as lawmaker, a court should decline to resuscitate a doctrine which has remained dormant since 1935.
This case certainly does not compel revival of the delegation doctrine. The Sentencing Commission has not been given free rein to do as it pleases; to the contrary, the Act provides ample detail to confine the authority delegated to the Commission. The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations.
The Congressional policies underlying the Act are reflected in the purposes of the Commission, as set out in the statute. First, the Commission is to set sentencing policies and practices that (1) satisfy the specified purposes of sentencing (just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation), (2) avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility, and (3) reflect advances in knowledge of human behavior. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). Second, the Commission is to "develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2).
In effectuating those Congressional policies, the Commission is instructed to promulgate guidelines for the determination of sentences. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). The Act specifies that the guidelines should cover decisions as to whether to impose a fine, a sentence to probation, or a prison term; the length of probation or imprisonment and the amount of fine; whether to impose a term of supervised release and the appropriate length thereof; and whether multiple sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). The statute also directs the Commission...
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