US v. Chapa

• Decision Date: 26 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-3285.,09-3285.
• Citation: 602 F.3d 865
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jacinto CHAPA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

602 F.3d 865

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jacinto CHAPA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-3285.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 12, 2010.

Decided April 26, 2010.

Melanie C. Conour, Attorney (submitted), Bradley Blackington, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bruce D. Brattain, Atorney, Mario Garcia, Attorney, Brattain, Minnix & Young, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and SPRINGMANN, District Judge.^*

SPRINGMANN, District Judge.

This is a direct appeal from a criminal conviction in the United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, following the entry of a guilty plea by the Appellant, Jacinto Chapa, on April 24, 2009. Chapa pled guilty and was convicted on one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The Defendant asks this Court to vacate his conviction and remand this case to the District Court for trial because his guilty plea was invalid. Because we conclude that the Defendant waived his right to appeal his conviction, we dismiss the appeal.

I. Background

Jacinto Chapa was charged with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 on December 18, 2007. After the Government filed an information alleging a prior drug felony conviction, which enhanced the potential penalties pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), Chapa provided a statement to the Government for the purpose of meeting the qualifications for safety valve treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Chapa then entered into a plea agreement with the Government on April 7, 2009. At the time the plea agreement was signed, it was the understanding of both Chapa and the Government that Chapa would qualify for safety valve treatment, and thus receive a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years.

In the written plea agreement, under the subheading of "APPELLATE WAIVER," Chapa acknowledged his right to appeal the conviction and sentence, and waived that right. The section stated:

Defendant understands that he has a statutory right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed and the manner in which the sentence was determined. Acknowledging this right and in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Plea Agreement, Defendant expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and any sentence imposed on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Additionally, he also expressly agrees not to contest his conviction or sentence or seek to modify his sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any type of proceeding, including, but not limited to, an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Chapa appeared before the District Court to enter his plea of guilty on April 24, 2009. The Court ascertained that Chapa was 31 years old, was not under the influence of intoxicants, and had no difficulty reading and writing the English language or in communicating with his counsel. The District Court then made a finding that Chapa was aware of the charge to which he was pleading.

During the proceeding, the Court addressed the express waiver of appeal contained in the plea agreement. The Court read aloud the waiver nearly verbatim. When the Court asked if Chapa understood the waiver, he responded, "Yes, sir." When the Court asked whether Chapa understood that he would have the right to appeal absent his guilty plea, he responded, "Yes, sir."

The Court then addressed the issue of Chapa's voluntariness in pleading guilty. The Court stated, "Paragraph 13, sir, says that you acknowledge that no threats, promises, or representations have been made nor agreements reached other than those set forth in this document to induce you to plead guilty. Is that still true?" Chapa responded, "Yes, sir." Chapa stated that he had read the entire plea agreement, had discussed it with his attorney, and that the terms of the agreement correctly reflected the result of his plea negotiations. The Court then asked, "It says you're freely and voluntarily pleading guilty in this case because you are guilty. Is that still true?" Chapa responded, "Yes, sir." The Court then accepted the guilty plea, finding Chapa "fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; that he's aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea; that this plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact."

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared on May 28, 2009, noted that Chapa was not, in fact, eligible for safety valve treatment. At the ensuing sentencing hearing held on September 3, 2009, Chapa objected to the findings of the PSR, but did not move to withdraw his plea of guilty or present the argument that he had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Chapa was then sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of twenty years in prison.

II. Analysis

Before we can reach the merits of Chapa's arguments, we must determine whether to dismiss this appeal because Chapa entered into a plea agreement with the aforementioned appellate waiver.

We review the enforceability of a waiver agreement de novo. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). It is well-settled that appellate waivers in plea agreements are generally enforceable. United States v. Emerson, 349 F.3d 986, 988 (7th Cir.2003); see United States v. Nave, 302 F.3d 719, 720-21 (7th Cir.2002). "But an appellate waiver does not, in every instance, foreclose review." United States v. Mason, 343 F.3d 893, 894 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the waiver to be enforceable, the disputed appeal must fall within its scope. See United States v. Vega, 241 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir.2001) (per curiam). We will enforce an appellate waiver if its terms are "express and unambiguous," see United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir.1997), and the record shows that the defendant "`knowingly and voluntarily'" entered into the agreement. United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir.1999)).¹

A plea agreement is a type of contract subject to contract law principles tempered by limits that the Constitution places on the criminal process. See United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir.2005). To determine if a defendant knew and understood the plea agreement, we must examine the language of the plea agreement itself and also look to the plea colloquy between the defendant and the judge. Woolley, 123 F.3d at 632; see also United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir.2007) (the district court must inform the defendant of an appellate waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy).

In this case, Chapa does not contend that the terms of the waiver were not express and unambiguous. Nor could he. The waiver was set forth in plain language in the plea agreement...