US v. DF

Decision Date19 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-CR-202 (JPS).,93-CR-202 (JPS).
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. D.F., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen A. Ingraham, Asst. U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff.

Dean A. Strang, Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER (REDACTED)

STADTMUELLER, District Judge.

This tragic case began on January 5, 1992, when an infant girl was found dead in her parents' home redacted. Six days later, her sister was also found dead. Their deaths were initially attributed to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and influenza. Based on a series of statements made to mental health counselors and reported to law enforcement officials, however, the Government subsequently charged the infants' cousin, D.F., with murder. Today, the court decides whether the Government may use D.F.'s statements to support its case against her.1

Procedural History

On November 17, 1993, the Government filed an information charging D.F., a juvenile, with two counts of murder in the second degree, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, 1153, and 5031. D.F. made an initial appearance in U.S. Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein's court on November 18, 1993. On March 7, 1994, D.F. moved to suppress a series of inculpatory statements she made to redacted County Mental Health Center ("Center") therapists and staff members. In that motion, D.F. argued that the statements were procured in violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. D.F. reserved an argument that the statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege for trial.

In recommending that the statements be suppressed, Magistrate Goodstein found that although the protections against self-incrimination announced in Miranda v. Arizona did not apply to limit D.F.'s discussions with the Center staff, her statements made during the course of therapy were absolutely protected from disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Both parties objected to the Magistrate's Recommendation: the Government objected to the overall recommendation, and to the Magistrate's findings on the psychotherapist-patient privilege; D.F. objected to the Magistrate's findings on the Miranda issue, and renewed her argument that the statements were not voluntarily made.

Facts2

At all times relevant to the suppression motion, D.F. was thirteen or fourteen years old. She presents a history of runaway behavior, assaultive behavior, and drug and alcohol abuse. (Transcript of Proceedings Exhibit ("Ex.") J-1.) There is evidence that she suffered from extensive abuse, including physical and sexual abuse, during her childhood. (Ex. J-1 at 2.) She has had extensive exposure to the juvenile social services and justice system. (Ex. J-1 at 1.) Prior to being charged in this case, she had been charged with battery on at least three occasions, and was suspected in at least three other incidents. (Ex. 1 at 8, J-1 at 1-2.) She has lived with five different legal guardians, and has considered a sixth. (Ex. 1 at 9, J-1 at 1.)

From December 4, 1992 to May 14, 1993, D.F. participated in a residential treatment program at the Center. For our purposes, D.F.'s placement at the Center was less than voluntary.3 There is no evidence in the record that D.F. played any role in the admission decision.4 Moreover, the evidence suggests that Ms. A., D.F.'s aunt and the person who technically made the admission decision, was heavily influenced in making that decision both by a pending court order and by the Department of Social Services' suggestion that D.F. be placed at the Center. (Transcript of Proceedings ("T.") at 247-48; Third Supplemental Statement of Uncontested Facts ("Third Facts") at 6.) In light of D.F.'s alcohol and drug problems, the Department had the power to remove her from Ms. A.'s home or to move in court for an involuntary placement. (Magistrate's Recommendation ("R.") at 2; T. at 247-49; Third Facts at 6-7.)

Each patient5 at the Center interacted with and was treated by a number of different staff members. As a general matter, however, a team of professionals (including a psychiatrist, a social worker, a registered nurse, an occupational therapist, and a recreational therapist) was responsible for the progress and treatment of each patient. (T. at 128; Third Facts at 2.)

Children and adolescents at the Center were considered to be the patients of Dr. J.G., staff psychiatrist and Director of the Child and Adolescent Unit at the Center. (Third Facts at 3.) In his clinical role, Dr. G. performed a number of functions: he attended weekly team meetings, he supervised the social workers and registered nurses on the team, and he made high level clinical decisions, including decisions about medications and level of supervision. (Third Facts at 4.) He also had direct contact with each patient at least once a week. (Third Facts at 4.)

Day-to-day treatment responsibilities, however, were left to the remaining members of the team. Social workers, with occasional supervision from Dr. G., made the necessary treatment decisions. (Third Facts at 2, 4-5.) Initially, R.M. served as the social worker for D.F; B.K. assumed those duties at a later time. Registered nurses met directly with Dr. G. to review patients' charts on weekdays. (Third Facts at 2, 4.)

As a general rule, statements made by patients at the Center were considered "confidential," and were not to be reported to anyone other than the other members of the treatment team. (T. at 119, 194-95.) There were a host of exceptions to this rule of "confidentiality," however. Patient statements were shared with a liaison official from the redacted County Department of Social Services, who was part of the treatment team. In addition, general statements (statements not relating to child abuse) could also be passed on, at the social worker's discretion, to personnel from the redacted County Department of Social Services (including the Children's Protective Services Unit, or "Protective Services"), the redacted County Juvenile Court, and the redacted Public Schools. (T. at 128-31.)

Other exceptions were created by statute. The Wisconsin Children's Code created mandatory reporting requirements for accounts of child abuse by victims. Wis.Stat.Ann. § 48.981. Under the reporting provisions, members of the treatment teams (physicians, nurses, social workers, occupational therapists) were required to report any suspicions that a patient had been abused. Id. The provisions also provided that "other persons" suspecting abuse of any child (i.e., including abuse by a patient of another child) may report those suspicions. Id. The provisions do not appear to address the situation at issue in this case, i.e., a team member suspecting that a patient had abused another child. To the extent that they do address that situation, they appear to preclude disclosure of such suspicions: "the purpose of this subsection is to allow children to obtain confidential health care services." Id.

Mr. M. and Ms. K. and, apparently, several other staff members misunderstood the reporting provisions during most of D.F.'s stay at the Center. Upon admission to the Center, D.F. was shown and signed a form that outlined the limits on confidentiality at the Center. (Ex. B-1; T. at 280.) Mr. M. presented the form to her, and suggested to her that any statements she made about abuse of other children would have to be reported. (T. at 280.)

Patients at the Center were told that their statements were confidential, at least with respect to the unit. (T. at 209.) There is evidence that D.F. thought that statements made during therapy and to staff were confidential. (Ex. F-1 at 1.) However, there is also evidence that she knew her statements would be reported. In January 1993, D.F. refused to answer an explicit query about whether she had ever murdered anyone. (Ex. B-3; T. at 288.) She also refused to talk during another encounter, stating that she couldn't because of staff's reporting requirements. (Ex. C-5; T. at 403.) Ms. A. also informed Mr. M. of a statement by D.F.: "if all is known about what she's done, she'd go to jail for a long time." (Ex. B-4.) To the extent that D.F. knew about mandatory reporting, however, it is not at all clear that she knew the destination and consequences of any reporting.

While at the Center, D.F. did enjoy some level of freedom. Although she lived in Unit One, a locked unit, she was able to move around within the unit and to other buildings for school and meals. (R. at 3; T. at 25-28.) Supervision while on campus varied depending on behavioral and safety concerns. (R. at 3; T. at 26.) Patients could negotiate temporary supervised trips off campus after they had earned sufficient behavior "points" (see discussion, infra). (T. at 28-31.) Patients under fourteen could only leave the Center permanently with family help. (T. at 28.) Those who were fourteen years old or older could leave the Center without family help, but only after waiting a period of forty-eight hours. (R. at 3; T. at 250-51.) During that forty-eight hour period, the medical director could go to court to prevent the patient from leaving. (R. at 3; T. at 251.) D.F. invoked her right to leave the Center on April 8, 1993; she later rescinded. (Ex. B-8; T. at 308-311.)

Staff at the Center "encouraged" the patients to discuss their problems openly and honestly. This "encouragement" took many forms. As a general matter, patient privileges and relative freedoms were determined through the use of a point system. (T. at 261.) Points could be earned for, among other things, open and sincere participation in group therapy sessions, as well as open and honest discussion in one's journal; failure to do these things could result in a loss of points. (T. at 165, 262.) Patients also had to have regular conversations with their "person...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • State v. Evans, C-000565.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 13 Julio 2001
    ...Connelly, supra, at 165, 107 S.Ct. at 521, 93 L.Ed.2d at 483 (emphasis added). 61 Id. (emphasis added). 62 See United States v. D.F. (E.D.Wis.1994), 857 F.Supp. 1311, 1325-1326, affirmed (C.A.7, 1995), 63 F.3d 671, remanded for reconsideration (1996), 517 U.S. 1231, 116 S.Ct. 1872, 135 L.Ed......
  • State v. Julius Evans, 01-LW-2679
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 13 Julio 2001
  • U.S. v. D.F., 94-2900
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 17 Noviembre 1995
    ...self-incrimination, but on the ground that the The district court agreed that the statements ought to be suppressed. United States v. D.F., 857 F.Supp. 1311 (E.D.Wis.1994). It declined to base its ruling either on the psychotherapist-patient privilege or on non-compliance with Miranda. Inst......
  • Timothy C., In re, 1
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Arizona
    • 13 Agosto 1998
    ...be read so narrowly, however, as to limit the inquiry to "the actions of traditional 'law enforcement' personnel." United States v. D.F., 857 F.Supp. 1311, 1325 (E.D.Wis.1994), aff'd, 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir.1995), cert. granted, 517 U.S. 1231, 116 S.Ct. 1872, 135 L.Ed.2d 169 (1996) (remanded ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT