US v. Dransfield
Decision Date | 03 January 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 93 Cr 0567 (SJ).,93 Cr 0567 (SJ). |
Citation | 913 F. Supp. 702 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. John DRANSFIELD and Robert Tucker, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, by Joel M. Cohen, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, for U.S.
Bythewood and Associates by David Bythewood, Garden City, NY, for Defendant Dransfield.
Murray & McCain by Francis J. Murray, Rockville Centre, NY, for Defendant Tucker.
Before the Court are Defendant Robert Tucker's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Defendants Robert Tucker and John Dransfield's motions to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are denied.
On April 20, 1993, government agents executed arrest warrants against fourteen individuals for their alleged participation in bribery and bid rigging schemes at the New York City School Construction Authority ("SCA"). Two of the arrested individuals were Defendants Robert Tucker and John Dransfield. The complaint underlying the arrest warrants charged Tucker and Dransfield with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), § 666 ( ),1 and § 1341 (mail fraud). On May 20, 1993, the grand jury indicted defendants Tucker and Dransfield, together with another individual named Mike Batalias.
On January 21, 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, Defendant Dransfield pled guilty to a Superseding Information which included one count of receiving bribes in violation of § 666(a)(2) and one count of structuring currency transactions in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324. On February 22, 1994, the grand jury returned two Superseding Indictments. One of the Superseding Indictments (S-3) (the "Superseding Indictment") charged Defendant Tucker and another individual, Evangelos Gatzonis, of engaging in a scheme to pay bribes to two SCA employees in violation of § 666(a)(2).2
On March 31, 1994, Evangelos Gatzonis filed a motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment for failure to comply with Fed. R.Crim.P. 7(c) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to dismiss the Superseding Indictment with prejudice for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq. Defendant Tucker joined in Gatzonis's motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment for failure to comply with Rule 7(c) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on April 7, 1994.3 Although he had already pled guilty, Defendant Dransfield subsequently informed the Court that he might seek permission to withdraw his plea following the Court's decision on the present motions.4 Dransfield then joined in Gatzonis and Tucker's jurisdiction motion on April 29, 1994.
The Court heard argument on the jurisdiction and Speedy Trial motions on September 21, 1995. As to Evangelos Gatzonis, the Court dismissed the Superseding Indictment without prejudice based on the government's admitted failure to indict Gatzonis within the permissible period of time set forth in the Speedy Trial Act. In regard to the jurisdiction motion, the Court reserved judgment and invited Defendants Tucker and Dransfield to supplement their previously filed memoranda. As part of this additional briefing, the government provided a proffer of facts in support of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the government provided copies of four Grant Agreements which memorialize agreements between the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), a federal government agency, and the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (the "Port Authority"). The Grant Agreements are dated June 12, 1991 (as to two grants), August 4, 1992, and August 24, 1992. The government contends that these grants provide the jurisdictional basis for charging the Defendants under § 666.
In support of his motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment, Defendant Tucker sets forth two separate grounds for dismissal. Defendant Dransfield joins in only one of these motions.
First, Defendant Tucker contends that the Superseding Indictment should be dismissed because it fails to comply with Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He claims that the Superseding Indictment is deficient because it fails to allege that the SCA directly receives the requisite federal funding required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
Second, Defendants Tucker and Dransfield argue that, even if the Superseding Indictment could be read to state a federal offense, it should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the SCA does not in fact receive benefits under a Federal program. Specifically, the Defendants assert that the government's proffer does not provide a basis for the "$10,000 in federal funding element" required by 18 U.S.C. § 666.
Title 18, U.S.C. § 666 provides in pertinent part:
18 U.S.C. § 666.
Paragraph One of the Superseding Indictment alleges that "the SCA's funding included forms of federal assistance in excess of $10,000 per year." Paragraph Eight alleges that the SCA was an "agency of state and local government that received in excess of $10,000 of federal assistance in a one-year period." Defendant Tucker contends that the Superseding Indictment is fatally defective on its face because it fails to allege that the SCA receives benefits "under a Federal program," as required under § 666. Defendant Tucker argues that the Superseding Indictment is additionally deficient because, at most, it can be read to allege that the SCA is an indirect beneficiary of funding from state and local government which received, in turn, benefits from the federal government.
An indictment is sufficient under Rule 7(c) when it informs the defendant of the charges he must meet "with sufficient precision" in order to prepare a defense and "with enough detail that he may plead double jeopardy in a future prosecution based on the same set of events." United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 926, 112 S.Ct. 1982, 118 L.Ed.2d 580 (1992); see also United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir.1984). The Second Circuit has stated that "`an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.'" Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d at 693 (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975)). Furthermore, succinct criminal pleading is encouraged under Rule 7(c). Where the allegations are brief, an indictment must be read with "common sense" and to include facts which are implied by the allegations made. Id. at 693.
In the present case, a reading of the Superseding Indictment in its entirety and with a modicum of common sense cannot leave Defendant Tucker with any doubt as to the time, place and offense with which he is being charged. The Superseding Indictment alleges that Tucker gave, offered and agreed to offer things of value to two SCA employees intending to influence and reward them in connection with SCA-related business. The Superseding Indictment defines the approximate time period involved—August 1991 through April 20, 1993—and names the two SCA employees with whom Tucker allegedly had corrupt relationships. Finally, although it does not use the specific words "under a Federal program" that appear in § 666(b), the Superseding Indictment alleges that the SCA received federal funding in excess of $10,000 per year.
The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7(c), which requires merely "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."5 Accordingly, Defendant Tucker's motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment pursuant to Rule 7(c) is denied.
Having denied Defendant Tucker's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 7(c), the Court now considers, as a threshold matter, whether it has authority under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) to make a pretrial factual determination as to subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.6 Rule 12(b) provides for pretrial motions which raise "any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue." "Questions about subject matter jurisdiction...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. LaHue
...these funds after they had reached the intended target of the pertinent program. The government also relies on United States v. Dransfield, 913 F.Supp. 702, 712 (E.D.N.Y.1996), which held that the New York City School Construction Authority ("SCA") was an organization that received more tha......
-
U.S. v. Elson
...513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975)); see also United States v. Dransfield, 913 F.Supp. 702, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In this case, Count One of the Indictment tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which makes it "unlawful for a......
-
U.S. v. Wright
...under Rule 12(b) to make a factual determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction at that time. See, e.g., United States v. Dransfield, 913 F.Supp. 702, 707 (E.D.N.Y.1996). In the present case, Wright contends that "[a]ll relevant fact on the issue of jurisdiction are stipulated to and......
-
U.S. v. Roberts
...that the question of whether the DOF received federal funding in excess of $10,000 is a jurisdictional matter. See U.S. v. Dransfield, 913 F.Supp. 702, 707 (E.D.N.Y.1996). Accordingly, this Court may properly decide this issue on Roberts' pre-trial motion to dismiss. See id. Roberts claims ......