US v. Evans

• Decision Date: 26 February 1987
• Docket Number: Crim. A. No. 85-337.
• Citation: 655 F. Supp. 243
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Linda Sue EVANS a/k/a Louise Robinett.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

655 F. Supp. 243

UNITED STATES of America v. Linda Sue EVANS a/k/a Louise Robinett.

Crim. A. No. 85-337.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

February 26, 1987.

Reneé C. McGinty, Howat Peters, Assist. U.S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Ronald Rakosky, New Orleans, La., for defendant.

ORDER AND REASONS

FELDMAN, District Judge.

In this criminal action, defendant, Linda Sue Evans moves to suppress evidence which she alleges was seized without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. She further urges that the substance of this motion to suppress has already been fully litigated in another case against her in the District of Connecticut, and, therefore, relitigation of these same issues here is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Court agrees. The same issues have been fully and exhaustively litigated in another U.S. District Court and the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars still another inquiry.

The defendant was indicted in the District of Connecticut on May 16, 1985, on a number of offenses, including possession of false identification documents and harboring a fugitive. In that case, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence which was seized on May 11, 1985 from 5714 The Almeda Apartment D, Yorkwood Apartment Complex, Baltimore, Maryland. The motion was the subject of extensive briefing by the parties and a lengthy evidentiary hearing was held prior to Judge Dorsey's ruling on the motion. See, United States v. Evans, 629 F.Supp. 1544 (D.Conn.1986). The motion to suppress was denied, except as to the weapons, explosive devices, mechanisms, and ammunition seized from the Baltimore apartment.

It is beyond dispute that all of the issues raised in connection with the present motion to suppress were raised and fully litigated in the prior suppression proceeding before Judge Dorsey in Connecticut. The thrust of the government's position is that all of the evidence seized from the Baltimore apartment should have been admissible under the independent source or inevitable discovery doctrine, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant. The government relies upon the recent Supreme Court decisions in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) and Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). While this Court expresses no opinion as to the correctness of Judge Dorsey's ruling, a review of the post-suppression hearing memoranda submitted by the parties as well as the court's opinion reflect that these issues were specifically raised and fully considered by the court.

Rather than appeal Judge Dorsey's ruling, the government chose to dismiss the Connecticut indictment. (The defendant was indicted in the Eastern District of Louisiana on numerous firearms violations on September 6, 1985. The Louisiana indictment has been pending throughout the Connecticut proceeding.)

The defendant contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is applicable in criminal cases, prevents relitigation of the merits of the suppression motion and that this Court is bound by the prior determination. The government counters that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because the government chose to dismiss the indictment prior to the time jeopardy attached. Essentially, the government argues that unless jeopardy has attached, notions of collateral estoppel are not implicated; that collateral estoppel has no life other than what is borne out of notions of double jeopardy. In support of its position, the government relies upon the Supreme Court decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). However, Ashe speaks to a different issue. The question in Ashe was whether, after a jury determination of acquittal, the state could constitutionally bring the defendant before a new jury in a subsequent prosecution for a different offense and relitigate issues which were necessarily determined in the prior action. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart concluded that the established rule of collateral estoppel as grounded in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy prevented relitigation of those factual issues necessarily determined in the prior trial. But here there was no trial. Instead, the prosecution dismissed the Connecticut indictment. Having done so prior to the time jeopardy attached, the government now attempts to use Ashe to foreclose the defendant's plea of collateral estoppel. However, Ashe does not purport to address the issue of whether collateral estoppel applies to bar relitigation of issues between the same parties in a subsequent criminal prosecution independent of double jeopardy concerns. The question posed by this motion, whether collateral estoppel may apply to bar relitigation in a subsequent prosecution of matters necessarily decided in the context of a prior indictment and notwithstanding the dismissal of the indictment, was left open by the Court in Ashe. While the Fifth Circuit has yet to address the issue, the Second Circuit has considered the question and has stated that collateral estoppel is applicable to bar relitigation in a subsequent prosecution of matters necessarily decided in the context of a prior indictment, notwithstanding the dismissal of that indictment.

The flaw in the government's position here is that collateral estoppel is doctrinally involved with notions of due process, as well as double jeopardy.

In the case of United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262 (2nd Cir.1975), cert. den., 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976), the Second Circuit framed the question as whether "due process, unaided by the double jeopardy clause" requires the government to apply collateral estoppel in favor of a criminal defendant. Id. at 1265. The court concluded that it does.

In DiGiangiemo, the defendant sought federal habeas relief because the government had used evidence at trial which had been adjudged to be illegally seized in the context of a prior indictment which had been dismissed. The government argued that Ashe foreclosed any such contention because the defendant had never been placed in jeopardy on the prior indictment. Writing for the court, Judge Friendly concluded that Ashe was not...