US v. Febre, 89 C 1588.

• Court: United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
• Writing for the Court: ANN C. WILLIAMS
• Citation: 764 F. Supp. 110
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. FEBRE, Defendant.
• Docket Number: No. 89 C 1588.,89 C 1588.
• Decision Date: 13 May 1991

764 F. Supp. 110

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. FEBRE, Defendant.

No. 89 C 1588.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

May 13, 1991.

Carol A. Davilo, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

David G. Wentz, H. Kent Heller & Associates, Inc., Naperville, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

In 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the defendant, Robert J. Febre, ("Febre"), pled guilty to various criminal charges including mail fraud, conspiracy, and income tax evasion. On November 10, 1983 the Ohio District Court sentenced Febre to 22 months of imprisonment and a $100,000.00 fine. On February 23, 1987, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the defendant's criminal fine judgment was registered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. On February 27, 1989, again pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the criminal fine judgment was registered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. To date, none of the $100,000.00 fine has been paid.

Having registered a certified copy of the Ohio judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, the United States now seeks to enforce the $100,000.00 Ohio judgment. The defendant argues that the registration of judgment in the Northern District of Illinois is barred by the Illinois five-year statute of limitations for non-specified civil actions and now moves this Court to vacate the registered judgment and dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)¹ on the ground that the decision is void. For the following reasons, both the defendant's motions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss this action are denied.

Discussion

This case appears to present the Court with an issue of first impression: whether the government, in registering a criminal fine judgment from a federal district court of one state to a federal district court of another state pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, is subject to state statutes of limitations that would appear to bar registration of the judgment.

United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1963, provides that,

A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or hereafter entered in any district court which has become final by appeal or expiration of time for appeal may be registered in any other district court by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.

28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).

Some of the primary purposes of the § 1963 registration statute have been stated as follows:

... to simplify and facilitate the enforcement of federal judgments, at least those for money, to eliminate the necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to avoid the impediments, such as diversity of citizenship, which new and distinct federal litigation might otherwise encounter. Citations omitted. If for judgment purposes, registration under § 1963 were to be given a lesser status than a judgment on the judgment, some or all of these purposes are thwarted and the judgment creditor, in order to fully protect himself, must resort to the old an more formal procedure.

Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir.1965). "The language of the statute is absolutely clear that once the judgment is registered in the new district, it shall have the same effect as a judgment of a district court of the district where registered." United States v. Palmer, 609 F.Supp. 544, 547 (D.C.Tenn.1985). While the majority of case law employing § 1963 concerns litigation between private parties, if the United States elects to register a judgment under the registration statute, it may clearly do so. United States v. Palmer, 609 F.Supp. at 548.

The defendant argues that in determining whether a judgment can be registered in another United States district court, the law of the state in which registration is sought must be applied to determine whether the registration of that judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Illinois law provides that "all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within five years next after the cause of action accrued." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 13-205 (Smith-Hurd 1984). Consequently, the defendant argues that the § 1963 registration of the Ohio judgment in the Illinois District Court is void since more than five years have passed since the judgment was originally rendered in the Ohio court.²

The defendant relies on Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.1966) to support this conclusion. In Matanuska, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska in 1956. 365 F.2d at 359. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the judgment was registered in 1964 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Id. Under Alaska law, the effective life and lien of a judgment was ten years; under Washington law, a foreign judgment was not registerable in the state after the expiration of six years following entry of the foreign judgment. Id. Since eight years had passed between the original rendering of the judgment and the attempt to register the judgment in another district, which state law the court chose to apply would determine whether the registered judgment was enforceable or void. In holding that the Alaska judgment was not registerable in Washington, the 9th Circuit stated,

It has long been established that the enforcement of a judgment of a sister state may be barred by application of the statute of limitations of the forum state state where registration is attempted. Any attempt by Matanuska to enforce its judgment in the Washington state courts after the lapse of six years would have been fruitless despite the "liveness" of the judgment according to the Alaska statutes.

365 F.2d at 360. The Matanuska court further held that,

where jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, the district courts are to apply the substantive law of the forum state (Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), including the forum state's conflict of laws rules (Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Application of the Klaxon doctrine results in the use of the Washington statutes ...

365 F.2d at 360 (emphasis added). The defendant properly recognizes that the application of the Matanuska holding to the facts in the instant case would result in the unenforceability of the subsequently registered Illinois judgment.

However, this Court finds Matanuska markedly distinguishable from the instant action. In researching case law concerning the use of the § 1963 registration statute, this Court found no decisions involving the United State's registration of a criminal fine judgment. All case law found, like the Matanuska decision, involved civil disputes.³ This is not to say that § 1963 is inapplicable to criminal fine judgments. This Court holds that the United States can register a criminal fine judgment, pursuant to § 1963, in any district court. However, unlike its position in civil disputes, the United States is not subject to any state statute of limitations barring the registration of judgments involving fines rendered upon conviction for a crime. Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 729, 65 S.Ct. 65, 89 L.Ed. 585 (1944); See also, United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940); United States v. Welborn, 495 F.Supp. 833 (M.D.N.C.1980); United States v. Jenkins, 141 F.Supp. 499 (S.D.Ga.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 1029, 77 S.Ct. 595, 1 L.Ed.2d 598 (1957) (United States revived a 23 year-old criminal fine judgment against the defendant).

In Smith, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to a prison and a $10,000.00 fine in the Southern District of California. The defendant failed to pay the fine and served an additional 30 days in prison. Still unable to pay after the additional 30 days, the defendant took a pauper's oath and was released from prison. The government sued the defendant 17 years later in the Western District of Washington to collect the unpaid fine. 143 F.2d at 228. The defendant asserted state statutes of limitations and a federal statute, presently codified at 28 U.S.C. 2462,⁴ 143 F.2d at 228-29. In Smith, the court held that

in the absence of a specific act of Congress to the contrary, state statutes of limitations do not bind the sovereign. Citations omitted. It has always been assumed that there is no time limitation for the enforcement of a judgment, whether of fine or imprisonment, rendered upon conviction for a crime.

143 F.2d at 229 (emphasis added.) With respect to the federal statute (a specific act of Congress), the Smith court held that the statute, now 28 U.S.C. § 2462,

imposes a time limit within which prosecutions must be commenced by indictment, information or suit. It imposes no time limit upon the enforcement of a penal judgment. Thus we have a situation where Congress, the only body possessing authority in the premises, has not seen fit to limit the time within which penal judgments for money can be collected or enforced by suit.

143 F.2d at 229; See also, United States v. Memphis Retail Package Stores Ass'n, 334 F.Supp. 686 (D.C.Tenn.1971).

The facts of the Smith case are similar to the instant case. As in Smith, the defendant is now in a state other than where the original criminal fine judgment was first rendered. The United States is attempting to enforce its judgment in the district court of the new state and the defendant is claiming that the judgment is barred by the state's statute of limitation. While the Smith case did not involve the use of the § 1963 registration statute, w...