US v. Gambino, CR-90-1051 (S-3).
Decision Date | 15 April 1993 |
Docket Number | No. CR-90-1051 (S-3).,CR-90-1051 (S-3). |
Citation | 818 F. Supp. 541 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Thomas GAMBINO, Philip Loscalzo and Guiseppe Gambino, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Laura Ward, Geoffrey S. Mearns, Asst. U.S. Attys., for U.S.
Michael Rosen, New York City, for Thomas Gambino.
Judd Burstein, New York City, for Thomas Gambino.
Murray Richman, Bronx, N.Y., for Philip Loscalzo.
Jay Goldberg, New York City, for Guiseppe Gambino.
The defendants, Thomas Gambino, Guiseppe Gambino, and Philip Loscalzo have filed motions which seek to (a) dismiss the superseding indictment against Thomas Gambino; (b) dismiss Count Three of that indictment for improper venue; (c) strike prejudicial surplusage from the indictment; (d) exclude certain evidence; and (e) obtain disclosure.
Thomas Gambino was initially charged in an indictment that was filed on December 12, 1990 with two counts alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) (RICO) and 1962(d) (RICO conspiracy). The racketeering acts incident to those counts with which he was charged were alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1955; § 892 and § 894. Pretrial bail and detention hearings followed. On December 12, 1990 an order of excludable delay was entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) based upon a determination that this was a complex case.
A superseding indictment was filed on July 18, 1991. The charges against Thomas Gambino were not altered. On that day several other matters were considered. Mr. Rosen, counsel to Thomas Gambino, advised the court that he would not move for a severance. A trial date of September 23, 1991 was reaffirmed. The motion made by Mr. Rosen on behalf of Gambino for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), was granted, the hearing, if still warranted, to be held at the conclusion of the trial. That motion is, technically, still pending. The disqualification of counsel for then codefendants Gotti and Gravano, and the need that this disqualification created for them to obtain new counsel, caused the September 23, 1991 trial date to be deferred. At a status conference held on August 28, 1991, Mr. Rosen advised the court that his client was required to appear for trial in the state court in January, 1992.
On September 30, 1991 the government, by motion returnable October 3, 1991, sought an order severing the trial of Thomas Gambino. That motion was not opposed and was granted in an order dated October 23, 1991. The trial of codefendants Gotti, Gravano, and Locascio was fixed for January 21, 1992. Gravano pleaded guilty in the interim. The remaining defendants, Gotti and Locascio, were found guilty on all counts on April 2, 1992 and sentenced on June 23, 1992. Post-trial motions were made following the verdict and following sentencing, the last being made as recently as February 3, 1993.
On August 4, 1992 a superseding indictment in which Thomas Gambino was joined with two other defendants was unsealed and filed. This indictment and the indictment originally filed on December 12, 1990, as to Thomas Gambino, are the same except that Gambino was joined with two new defendants and was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2 as a predicate racketeering act in Count One and as a separate offense in Count Three. Thomas Gambino appeared before this court for arraignment on August 14, 1992. A status conference was scheduled for August 21, 1992 at which counsel for all defendants appeared. Mr. Goldberg, counsel for codefendant Guiseppe Gambino, and Mr. Richman, counsel for codefendant Loscalzo, apprised the court of their respective prior engagements and of their need to review approximately 1,000 cassettes; they requested a trial date after the second week of January, 1993. Mr. Rosen joined in their application. (Tr. Aug. 21, 1992, at 4). The government announced its readiness to proceed within seventy days but agreed to abide by the court's direction. When the end of January or the first week of February was suggested as a viable trial date, Mr. Rosen stated as follows:
February 1, 1993 was then fixed as the trial date in this case, and an order of excludable delay based upon 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), in which Mr. Rosen concurred (Tr. Aug. 21, 1992, at 6), was issued to cover the period August 21, 1992 to February 1, 1993.
On that same day, August 21, 1992, the government filed a motion to modify the terms of Thomas Gambino's bail. A hearing was held on that motion on September 14, 1992, and it was denied from the bench.
On September 24, 1992 Mr. Rosen filed a motion for a severance on behalf of Thomas Gambino which was returnable on October 2, 1992. That motion was predicated entirely on Mr. Rosen's conflicting trial schedule. On the return date Mr. Rosen stated that "it would be very difficult, indeed, to go to trial in November, but I'm committed to do it, if the court sees its way clear of giving us this opportunity to fight this case the way I'm prepared to fight it and the time I put into it, ... We posed the alternative, either the severance and earlier trial or to put the case over beyond the Judge Leisure case." (Tr. Oct. 2, 1992, at 2-3). The government opposed the motion to sever and, for reasons indicated upon the record (Tr. Oct. 2, 1992, at 6, 10), the motion was denied. During the course of that proceeding, Mr. Burstein, co-counsel for Thomas Gambino, after alluding to the time gap between the verdict in the Gotti case (April 2, 1992) and the superseding indictment in this case (August 4, 1992) and without reference to the Speedy Trial Act, observed that "if this case went in May instead of February it would not be the end of the world." (Tr. Oct. 2, 1992, at 8).
The reference to the time gap which is the crux of this motion prompted the court to inquire of the government why the case was not brought on sooner. The government responded as follows:
MS. WARD: I can represent to the court between April and August we did investigations to make a determination as to whether or not we should be adding these two additional defendants. Based on testimony that had occurred during the Gotti trial and based on discussions with Mr. Gravano, we made a determination. We had to make the presentations to the Grand Jury, and we superseded as soon as we possibly could putting in the surveillances, and we thought it was in the best interest of the case and judicial economy, since we intend to try the two individuals on these charges, to combine them with Mr. Gambino because it would have been an identical trial.
At the next status conference, October 9, 1992, the following statement was made by Mr. Rosen:
(Tr. Oct. 9, 1992, at 2-3) (Emphasis added). During the course of the proceeding on February 19, 1993, the court was informed, without contradiction, that defense counsel indicated to the government that he did not want the matter calendared during the summer months of 1992. (Tr. Feb. 19, 1993, at 24).
On December 7, 1992, the defendant Thomas Gambino filed this motion seeking, among other things, an order "dismissing the superseding indictment against Thomas Gambino because the government failed to comply with the Speedy Trial Act, and instead trying Thomas Gambino alone on the original indictment." (Emphasis added). A hearing on this motion was delayed until February 19, 1993 due to the unavoidable unavailability of counsel, and the trial of this case was fixed for March 22, 1993. The defendant Thomas Gambino makes no Speedy Trial Act claim for...
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U.S. v. Gambino
...co-counsel observed that "if this case went in May instead of February it would not be the end of the world." United States v. Gambino, 818 F.Supp. 541, 543 (E.D.N.Y.1993). Two weeks later, on October 9, defense counsel renewed his motion for adjournment of the trial date, informing the cou......
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...v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816, 111 S.Ct. 57, 112 L.Ed.2d 32 (1990). See also United States v. Gambino, 818 F.Supp. 541, 552 (E.D.N.Y.1993). The nature of the indictment in this case, however, is exceptional. The government charges the defendants with activ......
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US v. Upton, CR-90-0629.
...counsel, namely, "that it is obviously designed to permit defendants to take advantage of government errors." See United States v. Gambino, 818 F.Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.1993). ...