US v. Garrett
Decision Date | 08 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 96-50609.,96-50609. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd Lentellis GARRETT, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Janice M. Deaton, San Diego, California, for defendant-appellant.
Roger W. Haines, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before: HUG, Chief Judge, and BROWNING, PREGERSON, O'SCANNLAIN, TROTT, FERNANDEZ, T.G. NELSON, KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, GRABER, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; concurrence by Judge FERNANDEZ
Defendant Floyd Lentellis Garrett appeals his convictions on two counts related to an armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and (2); and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (2). The district court denied Garrett's motion for continuance on the eve of trial. Garrett contends that, in denying this continuance, the district court committed reversible error. A divided panel of this court reversed Garrett's convictions. See United States v. Garrett, 149 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.1998). We granted rehearing en banc and withdrew the panel opinion. See United States v. Garrett, 161 F.3d 583 (9th Cir.1998).
We write today to make it clear that when we review a district court's ruling granting or denying a motion for a continuance the applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion. This standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) where the Court stated that "broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances." The Court wrote:
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon the expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay' violates the right to assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)).
Morris does not require either the defendant or the government to establish a compelling reason to obtain a continuance. To the extent that United States v. Lillie, 989 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. D'Amore, 56 F.3d 1202, require a trial court to find a compelling reason before granting or denying a continuance, they are overruled.
Here, the record demonstrates that the district court, in denying Garrett's motion for a continuance on the eve of trial, acted within its broad discretion. A review of the record demonstrates the care and patience the district court exercised:
The above recital demonstrates the patience and consideration that the district court afforded Garrett for almost a year. It also reveals the great care the court took to ensure that Garrett's right to counsel was respected. When a motion for a continuance arguably implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court must consider the effect of its decision on this fundamental right. A defendant's right to counsel is central to our system of justice. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ( ). In stating her reasons for denying Garrett's last-minute motion for a continuance, the district judge referred to her schedule and also stated that she believed the motion was being made "for purpose of delay."
When denying a continuance, especially one that arguably implicates the defendant's right to counsel, the district court should summarize in the record its reasons for the denial. This was not done here. But given the...
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