US v. Guzman

Decision Date03 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-1693.,08-1693.
Citation603 F.3d 99
PartiesUNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Harry GUZMAN, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

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James L. Sultan, with whom Jonathan Harwell and Rankin & Sultan were on brief, for the appellant.

Sangita K. Rao, Attorney, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, with whom Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, and Robert Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for the appellee.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SOUTER, Associate Justice,* and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

LYNCH, Chief Judge.

Harry Guzman appeals from his January 2008 conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and his life sentence for his role in an April 3, 2003, arson that killed a mother and her infant daughter. As to trial error, Guzman primarily argues that the district court should have suppressed a November 2003 confession he made to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") agents, given that Guzman, when earlier arrested for a June 9, 2003, arson, had invoked his right to counsel and had been released on bail for that offense. At the time of his November 2003 confession he was in state custody for violating his July bail conditions. This claim requires us to apply the Supreme Court's recent decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010).

Guzman also raises claims regarding several of the court's evidentiary rulings, and whether the arson affected interstate commerce. As to his life sentence, Guzman argues the district court failed to give an adequate explanation for the sentence at the sentencing hearing, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

I.

We review the basic facts of the case. Where there are disputes of fact, they are not material to the issues we decide. There was also no clear error in the trial court's assessment of the facts for purposes of its rulings. Additional facts regarding Guzman's claims are developed as we discuss each claim.

The fatal fire took place around 3:00 a.m. on April 3, 2003, at a five-unit apartment building on Manchester Street, in Lawrence, Massachusetts. The building's owner lived in the building's first floor unit and rented out the remaining four units on the second and third floors. At least fifteen people lived in the building. The fire was started on the rear porch of the building and caused extensive damage. Matilda Medina and her two-month-old baby, Angelic Duran, who lived on the third floor, died as a result of the fire.

On the evening of April 3, 2003, Guzman was sleeping in his girlfriend's car outside her apartment, around the corner from Manchester Street. At some point in the evening, Juan Cruz arrived in the neighborhood. He approached Guzman, and the two agreed to burn the building. Accounts differ as to why they decided to light the fire at the building where Medina lived. By one account, the targeting of the building was motivated by a person living next door to the building having earlier sold Cruz bad drugs; since the drug dealer's building was built from bricks, Guzman and Cruz instead targeted Medina's building. By another account, it was the result of a fight Cruz had with a woman about unpaid drug money and was intended to "send a message."

Cruz and Guzman walked up a set of stairs behind the building and lit a fire on the building's second floor back porch, using a container of gasoline and a cloth. According to Guzman's November 2003 confession to an ATF agent that we discuss later, he supplied the gasoline and acted as the lookout. By other accounts, he was more actively involved and may have actually lit the fire.1

This April 3 fire was one of a series of arson fires that occurred in that neighborhood in the spring and summer of 2003. The last arson occurred on June 9, 2003. The same day, Guzman was arrested for the June 9 fire and taken to the police station. After a Massachusetts State Police officer read him his Miranda rights, Guzman invoked his right to counsel and was not questioned further. As Guzman was waiting in the police captain's office to be taken to his cell, State Trooper Matthew Gravini, whom Guzman already knew, arrived at the police station. After Guzman waved to Gravini, Gravini approached Guzman and asked how he was doing. Guzman expressed concern for himself and his family and then made statements implicating Juan Cruz in the earlier, fatal April 3 fire. When Gravini indicated that he wanted to "take his statement in written form," Guzman once again invoked his right to counsel, and Gravini immediately ended the conversation.

Guzman was charged in state court for the June 9 arson and was released on bail in July 2003 until November 2003, when he was returned to state custody for violating bail conditions. He was held at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Middleton, Massachusetts.

On November 12, 2003, two ATF agents traveled to the facility to interview Guzman about the April 3 arson. Pursuant to facility policy, the deputy superintendent of the facility asked Guzman if he would be willing to speak with the agents, and Guzman agreed and signed a form consenting to the interview. Guzman met the two agents in a large conference room. At the outset of the meeting, the agents advised Guzman of his Miranda rights, and Guzman signed the top half of a form acknowledging that he had been advised of his rights. The bottom half of the form, containing a waiver of Miranda rights, remained unsigned at this time. Guzman was also told by the agents several times that he could leave the meeting at any time.

The ATF agents told Guzman that they were there to speak about the April 3 fire. For the next hour of conversation, the agents told Guzman that he had been implicated in the crime and that there was a difference between an intentional killing and an accident. After listening to the agents for about an hour, Guzman responded, saying that the April 3 fire had been "bothering him." He gave his version of the events and admitted that he had helped Cruz commit the arson by providing fuel and acting as a lookout. After Guzman had told his story, the ATF agents asked Guzman to provide a written or recorded version of his statement. Guzman said that he would do so only with his lawyer present. The agents ceased questioning him but asked Guzman to sign the bottom half of the Miranda waiver form, indicating that he had waived his rights and agreed to talk with them. Guzman signed the waiver at approximately 1:15 p.m., but, at the agents' request, Guzman indicated on the form that he had waived his rights at 12:15 p.m., when he began telling his version of events to the officers.

II.

On September 8, 2004, a grand jury in the District of Massachusetts returned a two-count superseding indictment charging Guzman with arson of two separate buildings used in any way affecting interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), for the April 3 and June 9 fires. The district court later severed the two counts to proceed in separate trials, and this case concerns only the trial on Count One, the fatal April 3 fire.

Before trial, Guzman moved to suppress his June 9 statements to Trooper Gravini and his November 12 statements to the ATF agents, on grounds that they were elicited from him by the officers after he had invoked his right to counsel. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to suppress as to the June 9 statement but denied suppression of Guzman's November 12 admissions to the ATF agents. Those admissions were introduced at trial through the testimony of the two ATF agents. Neither Guzman nor Juan Cruz testified at trial.

Guzman also moved for dismissal before trial on the ground that the arson did not affect interstate commerce. The district court denied this motion.

The seven-day jury trial began on January 15, 2008. A government witness at trial was Guzman's former cellmate, Juan Ramos. Ramos testified that Guzman had confessed his involvement in the arson to Ramos; Ramos also testified to Guzman's description of the crime. Guzman's attorney elicited from Ramos that Ramos had alternate sources for this information: Ramos knew Guzman was keeping discovery documents in their shared cell, and Guzman had told Ramos about his conversations with Guzman's attorney. On the government's objection, however, the court did not allow Guzman's trial counsel to elicit from Ramos the contents of the discovery documents. Guzman objected in writing to the court's limiting of his cross-examination. The court rejected his argument.

The government also made a motion in limine to prevent admission of two hearsay statements by Cruz that Guzman claimed were statements against penal interest, which implicated Cruz in the fire and showed Cruz acted alone. The district court granted the government's motion without explanation in a ruling from the bench.

On January 24, 2008, the jury found Guzman guilty. Guzman already had four earlier convictions, including several charges of disorderly conduct, and two instances of resisting arrest, which, according to the presentence report ("PSR"), qualified him as a career offender. At the end of the May 13, 2008, sentencing hearing the district court sentenced Guzman to life in prison, three years' supervised release, payment of restitution in the amount of $380,695, and a $100 special assessment. The court did not explain its reasons for the life sentence at the hearing. In a written statement of reasons, filed June 2, 2008, the district court indicated that it adopted the PSR without change and within the sentencing guideline range, noting that it "imposed the sentence after considering all the surrounding circumstances and the probation department's...

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