US v. Haywood

• Decision Date: 03 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 3:92-cv-229-P.,3:92-cv-229-P.
• Citation: 864 F. Supp. 502
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. J. Marshall HAYWOOD, Defendant.

864 F. Supp. 502

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. J. Marshall HAYWOOD, Defendant.

No. 3:92-cv-229-P.

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division.

October 3, 1994.

James M. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney's Office, Charlotte, NC, for plaintiff.

John R. Cunningham, III, E. Fitzgerald Parnell, Charlotte, NC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION and ORDER

ROBERT D. POTTER, Senior District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant J. Marshall Haywood's (hereinafter "Haywood") motion, filed December 10, 1993, for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, United States of America (hereinafter "the Government") filed a response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 30, 1993. On February 11, 1994, the Government filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a reply to the Government's response on February 23, 1994 and a Memorandum in Opposition to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 25, 1994. Defendant also filed a series of motions on February 14, 1994, principally regarding a pending motion to dismiss and subsequent discovery in this case.¹

On May 9, 1994, following the extended discovery period, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment. On May 23, 1994, the Government filed its Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. That same day Defendant filed an additional Memorandum relating to the deposition of W. Dennis Purser.² The Government filed a Reply to the Defendant's Memorandum on May 27, 1994.

The Court has reviewed the motions for summary judgment and the briefs in support of them, each parties' responses and additional memoranda, and the relevant legal authorities. Based upon its review of this case, the Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 18, 1992, the Government filed the Complaint in this action against the defendant for a civil penalty pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b), a money laundering statute. The Government seeks this penalty against Haywood based on his involvement in arranging bail for one Charles Roy Langley in 1987.

Subsequent to the filing of the present civil action, a Grand Jury in the United States District of South Carolina returned a Bill of Indictment against the defendant charging him with violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 and 1956 and Title 21 U.S.C. § 846. On December 21, 1992, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the United States in which he agreed to plead guilty to a Bill of Information charging him with failure to file a required report for a cash transaction, a violation under Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 6050I and 7203, as well as a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. See Haywood Aff. ¶ 5-7 and Ex. C-E. The plea agreement was filed, a sentencing hearing held, and final judgment was entered on September 29, 1993.³

As noted above, at the heart of the Complaint is the allegation that Haywood played a role in arranging a financial transaction involving the payment of a $280,000 bond and the return of a portion of that bond in June and October 1987. Specifically, the Government alleges that attorney Haywood and Dennis Purser, head of a drug organization along with John Arrendell, participated in a scheme to pay the bond of Roy Langley, a member of the Arrendell-Purser drug organization, with drug trafficking proceeds in order to prevent Langley from cooperating with the Government.

The Government further alleges that a planned covert exchange of drug cash took place at a bank office located below Haywood's law offices. According to the Government, this exchange was planned and coordinated between Haywood, Purser, possibly Arrendell, and Haywood's associate Bart Menser. The Government's version of the exchange is essentially as follows: Under Haywood's direction, Dennis Purser would give the money to his brother, Donald Purser, who would in turn deliver it to the bondsman at the bank after receiving a signal (the flashing of window blinds) from Menser who was positioned at a window in Haywood's office. This scheme was successfully accomplished, the bond was paid and Langley was released. Soon thereafter Langley became a fugitive and was later returned to custody at which time Haywood arranged to have the remaining bond money, less fees, returned to Purser.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides,

... judgment ... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (West 1994).

Summary judgment must be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir.1984). To attain summary judgment, the movant bears an initial burden of demonstrating no genuine issues of material fact are present. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must point out specific facts which create disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, district courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Those facts which the moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are material. "The substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence ... creates a fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice. A trial, after all, is not an entitlement. It exists to resolve what reasonable minds could recognize as real factual disputes." Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only where no material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence from the entire record could not lead a rational fact finder to rule for the non-moving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53 (1986).

ANALYSIS

Properly used, summary judgment helps strip away the underbrush and lay bare the heart of the controversy between the parties. In this case there are essentially two issues which need to be analyzed in order to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. The first issue involves Defendant's claims that this action is barred under Double Jeopardy principles and the other issue essentially involves the scienter element required under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b). For the reasons stated infra, the Court believes there are no genuine material issues of material fact regarding the Double Jeopardy claim and such claim is without merit and must be denied.

The second issue concerning the scienter element under the statute is more problematic. Having spent considerable time probing the pleadings and assessing the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial, the Court concludes that a proper determination of Defendant's state of mind in this case, which is necessarily proved by inference from evidence of other facts, requires the resolution of disputes over the inferences to be drawn from the facts of this case. Such disputes concerning genuine and material facts and inferences clearly involves the kinds of decisions traditionally entrusted to jurors and certainly lies within their province, thus precluding summary judgment in this case.

1. Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. Const. amend V. This Court is of the opinion that these words, as first put forth by the framers of the Fifth Amendment, did not contemplate the prohibition of multiple punishments, but merely multiple prosecutions.⁴

However, the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause has clearly been expanded by a line of cases beginning with Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874) to include multiple punishments. Recently, this expansion was again validated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 441, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989), which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S., at 441, 109 S.Ct., at 1897; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). As in the Halper case, it is the third of these protections which is at issue here.⁵

In Halper, the Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances a civil penalty may be a punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S., at 447-448, 109 S.Ct., at 1901. The defendant in Halper was convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false-claims statute,...