US v. Hildebrand

• Decision Date: 30 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. CR 95-2014.,CR 95-2014.
• Citation: 928 F. Supp. 841
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Scott E. HILDEBRAND, Sandra K. Hildebrand, Quentin E. Hildebrand, Joseph A. Mentlick, Jr., Donald W. Borgmann, David I. Gardemann, Kenneth L. Kraklio, Allen K. Zurcher, Larry A. Webb, and Joan M. Webb, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

928 F. Supp. 841

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Scott E. HILDEBRAND, Sandra K. Hildebrand, Quentin E. Hildebrand, Joseph A. Mentlick, Jr., Donald W. Borgmann, David I. Gardemann, Kenneth L. Kraklio, Allen K. Zurcher, Larry A. Webb, and Joan M. Webb, Defendants.

No. CR 95-2014.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

May 16, 1996.

Order Granting Reconsideration to Limited Extent May 30, 1996.

Robert Teig and Judith Whetstine, Asst. U.S. Attys., Cedar Rapids, IA, for U.S.

Joseph A. Mentlick, Jr., Larry A. Webb and Joan M. Webb, pro se.

ORDER ON TRIAL MANAGEMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

It would seem that early in the career of every trial lawyer, he or she has lost a case by leaving something out, and thereupon resolved never again to omit even the most inconsequential item of possible evidence from any future trial. Thereafter, in an excess of caution the attorney tends to overtry his case by presenting vast quantities of cumulative or marginally relevant evidence. In civil cases, economics place some natural limits on such zeal. The fact that the attorney's fee may not be commensurate with the time required to present the case thrice over imposes some restraint. In a criminal case, however, the prosecution, at least in the federal system, seems not to be subject to such fiscal constraints, and the attorney's enthusiasm for tautology is virtually unchecked.

United States v. Reaves, 636 F.Supp. 1575, 1576 (E.D.Ky.1986). Mindful of these insightful comments, this criminal case comes before the court sua sponte for consideration of the means to be employed to guarantee a just and efficient trial. Because this case involves multiple defendants and multiple counts, many of which charge violation of the same statute and all of which stem from the same alleged conspiracy or scheme, as well as many witnesses, and voluminous items of documentary and other evidence, at least some share of the evidence and testimony that could potentially be presented to the jury is likely to be cumulative. Thus, the case runs a substantial risk of being both confusing to a jury and excessively long. As the Supreme Court has observed, "If truth and fairness are not to be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings." Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1333-35, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). This order is designed to allow this court to exert the necessary control.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In a fifty-nine page, forty-four count indictment returned on September 14, 1995, eleven defendants¹ are each charged with one or more federal offenses, ranging from conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I), to mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 2 through 42), to conspiring to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 43), to criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982 (Count 44). The indictment alleges a complex scheme to defraud individuals whereby defendants falsely represented to individuals that, as a result of a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court in Colorado, the entire banking system in the United States, as well as the IRS and the Federal Reserve, were declared to be fraudulent and unconstitutional.² Defendants allegedly represented that as a result of the Colorado lawsuit, any individual who had ever paid taxes or used Federal Reserve notes was eligible to receive "damages" if that individual filed a claim on defendants' form and paid defendants a fee of $300.00. The indictment further alleges that, as a result of this scheme, defendants obtained some 6,832 claims from individuals in 49 states and two Canadian provinces.

In a status report filed on May 13, 1996, shortly before a scheduling conference on preparation of this case for trial to begin on June 27, 1996, the United States represented that the likely number of documents the prosecution must review exceeds 100,000. Furthermore, the government represented that over one hundred specific exhibits have thus far been identified, but the case agent identifying those exhibits estimates that she has "been through" only approximately ten percent of the potential exhibits. The government also represented that, to date, it has identified over three dozen potential witnesses. Thus, it is apparent that without some exercise of control by the court, this trial has the potential for mushrooming into a confusing, lengthy, and hence potentially unjust proceeding that makes inefficient use of the parties', the court's, and the jury's time and the public's resources. Although the court has severed out for trial on June 27, 1996, only three of the ten defendants, with the remaining defendants to be tried later this year, the court nonetheless views with concern the volume of evidence likely to be presented at the upcoming trial.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Legal Authority For Reasonable Limitations

Numerous courts have grappled with the authority of the district judge to impose reasonable limitations on the manner in which cases, both civil and criminal, are presented to the jury, including the amount of time afforded the parties to present their cases, the amount of testimony and other evidence that can be presented during trial, and other restrictions on the conduct of counsel and the parties. The court is particularly indebted to Judge Bertelsman of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for his insightful discussion of these questions nearly a decade ago. See United States v. Reaves, 636 F.Supp. 1575 (E.D.Ky. 1986). This court joins others that have been impressed with Judge Bertelsman's thoughtful analysis of the court's authority to exercise such controls over trials as well as his practical suggestions for the manner in which such controls may be effected. Among Judge Bertelsman's apt observations is the aphorism, "Advocates tend to confuse quantity of evidence with probative quality." Reaves, 636 F.Supp. at 1579.³ The judge also observed, in this court's view, quite accurately, that

It has become apparent that courts must recognize that it is they, rather than the attorneys, who have a more objective appreciation of the time a case requires when balancing its needs against the exigencies of the court's docket.

Id. He also sided with Judge Leval of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, who had discovered five primary benefits of a court's imposition of limits on trials:

It requires counsel to exercise a discipline of economy choosing between what is important and what is less so. It reduces the incidence of the judge interfering in strategic decisions. It gives a cleaner, crisper, better-tried case. It gives a much lower cost to the clients. Finally, it will save months of our lives.

Reaves, 636 F.Supp. at 1579 (quoting Leval, From the Bench, LITIGATION, 8 (1985)).

The Supreme Court stated at least the general principles under which the court must act to control trials in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), a case in which the Supreme Court overturned a trial judge's restrictions on contact between a criminal defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess in the middle of the defendant's direct examination on the stand. The Court stated:

Our cases have consistently recognized the important role the trial judge plays in the federal system of criminal justice. "The judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law." A criminal trial does not unfold like a play with actors following a script; there is no scenario and can be none. The trial judge must meet situations as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary process. To this end, the trial judge may determine generally the order in which parties will adduce proof; the judge's determinations will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Within limits, the judge may control the scope of rebuttal testimony; may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony; and may control the scope of examination of witnesses. If truth and fairness are not to be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings.

The judge has power to control the progress and, within the limits of the adversary system, the shape of the trial....

Geders, 425 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1334-35 (internal citations omitted). Other decisions of the federal courts have given more specific content to the judge's power to control the progress and shape of a criminal or civil trial.

There seems to be no disagreement among the federal courts that district judges have broad discretion in managing their dockets, including trial procedure and the conduct or pace of trials. See, e.g., Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1996) (the trial judge has "broad" discretion to regulate the pace of trial, and must not be a "passive spectator"); General Signal v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1508 (9th Cir.1995) ("Generally, a district court may impose reasonable time limits on a trial."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1017, 134 L.Ed.2d 97 (1996); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir.1995) ("We ... believe that courts have discretion to impose limits on a party's trial presentation without the necessity of ruling specifically on `each particular item of evidence offered,'" citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.Conn.1977)); United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1995) (although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "guarantee criminal defendants the right to present a defense," that right "must be balanced against a court's leave to set reasonable limits on the admission of evidence," citing Delaware v. Van...