US v. Ignacio Juarez

• Decision Date: 08 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-50323.,09-50323.
• Citation: 601 F.3d 885
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel IGNACIO JUAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

601 F.3d 885

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel IGNACIO JUAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-50323.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 5, 2010.

Filed April 8, 2010.

Amber D. Garza and Michael J. Raphael (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.

Gia Kim, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant Manuel Ignacio Juarez.

Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, RAYMOND C. FISHER and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Manuel Ignacio Juarez appeals the district court's judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to eighteen months in prison. Juarez contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release because his term of supervision expired before the district court either entered the order of revocation or issued a bench warrant that could have extended the court's jurisdiction to do so under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). The district court determined that it had jurisdiction to revoke Juarez's supervised release because his term of supervision was tolled during the period of time he was at large, after he absconded from supervision by changing his residence and not reporting it to his probation officer as required by the conditions of his supervised release. We hold that the district court did have jurisdiction and affirm in a published opinion to clarify that fugitive tolling of a defendant's term of supervised release begins when the defendant becomes a fugitive, not at the later time when a warrant is issued for his apprehension.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are important to our resolution of the jurisdictional question. Juarez pled guilty to bank robbery in 1989. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Under the conditions of Juarez's supervised release, he was required to notify his probation officer within seventy-two hours of any change in residence, and he was prohibited from possessing drugs or drug paraphernalia or committing any further crimes.

On August 26, 1992, the Bureau of Prisons released Juarez into the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") for deportation, and the Probation Office placed his case on "inactive" status. When the INS deported Juarez to Mexico, his supervised release was scheduled to terminate on August 25, 1995.

Sometime after his deportation, however, Juarez illegally reentered the United States. He did not inform his probation officer that he had reentered or that he had changed residences. On August 31, 1993, he applied for and received a California driver's license under a false name. The license stated his residence to be at an address in Riverside, California.

In November 1994, California law enforcement authorities arrested Juarez for possession of drug paraphernalia. Juarez identified himself using the false name on his driver's license and was released the same day. Juarez was again arrested by state authorities on June 23, 1995, and charged with two separate counts of robbery. This time, he remained in state custody pending resolution of the charges. Juarez eventually pled guilty to both robbery charges, and on October 4, 1996, he was sentenced to a cumulative term of fifteen years in state prison.

Juarez's illegal reentry and his two arrests all occurred before his supervised release was scheduled to terminate. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), the district court's authority to revoke a term of supervised release "extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation." Accordingly, Juarez's probation officer applied to the district court in July 1995 for a bench warrant authorizing Juarez's arrest for violating the conditions of his supervised release by illegally reentering the United States, by using drugs, and by failing to report his whereabouts to his probation officer. That warrant application was filed within the term of supervised release, but was not supported by an affidavit or any sworn facts. The district court issued a bench warrant on July 17, 1995, but it was not immediately executed because Juarez by that time was in state custody pending the resolution of the two robbery charges.

In November 2004, this court decided United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir.2004). We held that a district court's jurisdiction to revoke supervised release can be extended beyond the term of supervision under § 3583(i) on the basis of a warrant issued during the term of supervision, but "only if the warrant was issued `upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,' as required by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 907. When Juarez's probation officer recognized that the initial warrant issued by the district court for Juarez's arrest did not comply with Vargas-Amaya, he applied for a new warrant. This time, he included a sworn statement of facts in support of the application and alleged two new violations of Juarez's release conditions, on account of Juarez's two robbery convictions. On May 3, 2005, the district court issued a new bench warrant for Juarez's arrest. This warrant also could not be immediately executed, however, because Juarez was still serving his state prison sentences for the robbery convictions.

Almost four years later, on February 10, 2009, Juarez was paroled from state prison and transferred to federal custody pursuant to the 2005 bench warrant. He promptly moved to dismiss the petition to revoke his supervised release. He argued that because the 2005 warrant had been issued nearly ten years after his original term of supervision was to expire, the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).

The district court denied Juarez's motion. The court ruled that his fugitive status tolled the term of supervised release for close to two years, and that because the term as tolled by fugitive status was again tolled by reason of his state prison sentences, the court had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. The district court explained its reasoning as follows.

First, when Juarez applied for a California driver's license on August 31, 1993, he effectively admitted he had changed his residence from Mexico to Riverside, California. Juarez did not report this change in residence to the Probation Office within seventy-two hours as required by the conditions of his supervised release. Therefore, the district court found that Juarez had absconded from supervision and become a fugitive "on or about August 31, 1993, or within 72 hours thereof." This is because Juarez's reentry into the United States triggered reinstatement of the terms of his supervision, which Juarez then violated "in such a way as to disable the probation officer from knowing his whereabouts and being able to begin supervision." Thus, because Juarez was a fugitive until his arrest on June 23, 1995, the running of his term of supervised release was tolled for nearly two years.

Second, on October 3, 1996, during the extended period of supervised release, Juarez's term of supervision was again tolled as a result of his incarceration for his two robbery convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)("A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."). Because the May 2005 bench warrant was issued while Juarez was still serving his prison sentences for the two robbery convictions, and thus before the extended term of supervised release expired, the district court held it had jurisdiction to revoke Juarez's term of supervised release under § 3583(i).

On June 8, 2009, Juarez admitted to the violations of release conditions alleged by the government. The court revoked his supervised release on July 15, 2009, and sentenced him to eighteen months in prison. Juarez timely appealed the district court's judgment to this court. He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release because its term was not tolled by his nearly two-year status as a fugitive and had therefore expired. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release. United States v. Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2007). The fugitive tolling issue is an issue of law, and there are no factual disputes as to when the dispositive events occurred in this case.

Juarez argues that our case law establishes that fugitive tolling cannot begin until the government has information concerning a defendant's whereabouts and obtains an arrest warrant. In this case that occurred in July 1995, so the term, Juarez asserts, was not tolled during the first two years he was actually a fugitive. There is no question that the term can be tolled during the years Juarez was incarcerated for the two robbery convictions, see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), but unless it was first tolled during the two years that he was a fugitive, the district court lacked jurisdiction. This is because the term of supervision would have expired before his incarceration.

The district court held, however, that Juarez's fugitive status began in 1993, when we know he had become a fugitive from supervision. We agree with the district court, because we conclude that our case law establishes that fugitive tolling begins with fugitive status and not when the government is able to secure a warrant. This is apparent from a careful review of our cases.

We first recognized that a defendant's term of supervised release is tolled for fugitive status in ...