US v. Jimenez
Decision Date | 08 March 1989 |
Docket Number | No. TH 88-14-CR.,TH 88-14-CR. |
Citation | 708 F. Supp. 964 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Thomas JIMENEZ, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Jessie A. Cook, Trueblood Harmon Carter & Cook, Terre Haute, Ind., for plaintiff.
Timothy M. Morrison, First Asst. U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant.
ENTRY
This matter comes before the court on defendant's Motion to Determine Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant Thomas Jimenez, who is charged with the offense of escape from a penal institution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1982), moves this court to determine the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (Supp. IV 1986) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986). This court has jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982).1
Defendant Jimenez was serving a sentence of five years in custody with a three year special parole term due to his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine when he escaped from the Federal Prison Camp in Terre Haute, Indiana, on June 5, 1988. He was subsequently arrested and charged, by indictment, with escape pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or from the custody of any officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both....
The defendant, who, if convicted, is to be sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines, challenges the guidelines on several constitutional grounds.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the United States Sentencing Commission's binding guidelines for use in sentencing federal defendants have been discussed extensively in many cases.2 Thus, this court will dispense with a detailed explanation of the Act and the guidelines that were promulgated by the Commission.
It should be noted that ruling on the constitutionality of a congressional act is "the gravest and most delicate duty" that a court is called upon to perform. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 107, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927). There is a strong presumption of constitutionality toward a law that has been produced by congressional enactment and presidential approval. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2771-72, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980). While this court has a duty to declare unconstitutional any statute or portion of a statute that conflicts with the United States Constitution, I also have a duty to weigh the presumption when reaching a decision.
Defendant argues that the Sentencing Reform Act impermissibly delegates a legislative function to the judiciary. Defendant further asserts that the Act violates the doctrine of separation of powers for two reasons. First, the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch violates the Constitution because the Commission does not function in a judicial capacity. Second, the doctrine of separation of powers is violated by the retention of power over members of the judiciary by the executive branch.
Eleven days after defendant made these arguments in its motion, which was filed on January 9, 1988, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Mistretta v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court discussed the precise issues cited above and held that the sentencing guidelines were constitutional since Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power to the Commission nor violated the separation of powers principle by placing the Commission in the judicial branch, by requiring federal judges to serve on the Commission and to share their authority with nonjudges, or by empowering the President to appoint Commission members and to remove them for cause. Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court in an eight to one decision, wrote:
Defendant's arguments regarding the delegation and separation of powers issues do not present any novel angles that were not considered by the Supreme Court. Thus, while this court is not in the habit of giving short shrift to constitutional arguments, I see no need to rehash areas recently and fully addressed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, this court finds that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not impermissibly delegate a legislative function to the judiciary and that the doctrine of separation of powers is not violated by the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch or by the executive branch's retention of power over Commission members.
The rest of defendant's arguments require more discussion because they present issues that have not been addressed by the Supreme Court, but only by a myriad of lower federal courts that have reached varying decisions. First, defendant argues that the application of the sentencing guidelines violates a defendant's due process right to an individualized sentencing decision. He asserts that the guidelines severely restrict judicial discretion and opposes what he perceives to be a mechanical application of the guidelines that were promulgated by Commissioners who are invisible to him and to the general public. He also argues that due process, which guarantees a defendant a fair opportunity to be heard, is violated because a criminal defendant has no opportunity to affect the court's assessment of the appropriate sentence by challenging the facts relied upon by the court or by pointing out circumstances peculiar to the case that are not considered adequately in the guidelines.
Defendant cites several decisions by lower federal courts that struck down the guidelines based, at least in part, on a violation of the due process clause.3 This court agrees with Judge Burns's observation in United States v. Belgard, 694 F.Supp. 1488 (D.Or.1988) that the analyses in many of these opinions seem to blur the distinction between substantive and procedural due process. The two central themes that are emphasized in these cases that find a due process violation are as follows:
Defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines only insofar as they have an adverse impact on his own rights. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 477 (3rd Cir.1985) (citing County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)). This court will not sustain a blanket due process objection to the guidelines. See United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F.Supp. 1252 (W.D.Mo.1988). Thus, I will scrutinize only the guidelines' impact on this defendant's due process rights.
Defendant argues that the application of the guidelines violate his right to an individualized sentencing decision. The Supreme Court has never recognized a due process right to individualized sentences in noncapital cases. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), a capital case, the plurality opinion stated, "We recognize that, in noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes." The Seventh Circuit has held expressly in cases that were decided before the promulgation of the guidelines that no such right exists. United States v. McCoy, 770 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oxford, 735 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.1984); accord United States v. Weidner, 692 F.Supp. 968, 971-72 (N.D. Ind.1988); United States v. Kerr, 686 F.Supp. 1174 (W.D.Penn.1988). In fact, lower federal courts have upheld mandatory sentences that eliminate judicial discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Smith, 818 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, this court holds that defendant has no due process right to an individualized, discretionary sentence.
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...though not conclusive, is that sentences not excluded are to be included. On this issue we finally note that in United States v. Jimenez, 708 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.Ind.1989), to be reported at 708 F.Supp. 964, the court rejected an argument identical to that made by We cannot regard Ofchinick's ......
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