US v. Kaczynski
Decision Date | 22 April 1996 |
Docket Number | No. MCR 96-6-H-CCL.,MCR 96-6-H-CCL. |
Citation | 923 F. Supp. 161 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Theodore John KACZYNSKI, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Bernard F. Hubley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Helena, MT, for plaintiff.
Michael Donahoe, Asst. Fed. Defender, Helena, MT, for defendant.
This opinion and order confirm the court's April 19, 1996, bench ruling on Defendant's motion for return of property, to dismiss complaint, to stay grand jury proceedings, and to prohibit further prosecution. The government opposed the motion. The court considered the briefs and entertained argument on the question of an evidentiary hearing on April 19, 1996. The court denied the motion for return of property, to dismiss complaint, to stay grand jury proceedings, and to prohibit further prosecution for the reasons stated on April 19, 1996, and for the reasons outlined below.
Defendant asserts that the government has deliberately leaked information regarding its investigation of the Defendant, and in so doing the government has violated Defendant's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. The primary relief Defendant seeks is a dismissal of the complaint and a permanent injunction prohibiting the United States from indicting the Defendant in any federal district for any crime connected to the Unabomber investigation. Defendant contends that: (1) Defendant has a right to an unbiased grand jury, U.S. Const. amend. V, a right to a fair trial, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, U.S. Const. amend. IV; (2) these rights have been irreversibly abridged by the government's deliberate disclosure of evidence seized and information obtained as a result of the search of Defendant's residence; and (3) the government should be held accountable for its misdeeds by the imposition of sanctions (return of property, dismissal of complaint, and permanent restraint against prosecution).
Defendant cites Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 546, 82 S.Ct. 955, 958, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962), for the proposition that Defendant has a right to be indicted by an unbiased grand jury. See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). Defendant also asserts that government leaks to the media regarding the search made the search "unreasonable," within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant ultimately asserts that these deliberate disclosures "poisoned the entire population of grand jurors within the United States against Mr. Kaczynski."
Defendant concedes, citing United States v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462, 76 S.Ct. 965, 970, 100 L.Ed. 1331 (1956), that he bears the burden of showing any unfairness claimed by him. Defendant argues that he should be granted an evidentiary hearing to prove that the government is in fact responsible for the "media blitz" that followed the execution of the search warrant.
However, Defendant may be required to show actual prejudice from the pre-indictment publicity. Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir.1964) (). See also United States v. Hoffa, 205 F.Supp. 710, 718 (S.D.Fla.1962) ( ). Thus, there is a requirement that Defendant show specific proof of prejudice of the grand jury that returns an indictment against him.
Without acknowledging any requirement that he show actual prejudice, however, Defendant asserts that this court should relieve him of that obligation. Instead, Defendant asks this court to find that any grand jury would be so compromised by the government's alleged misconduct that the court should make a presumption of prejudice and, further, that the court should punish the government by prohibiting any prosecution of the Defendant. Defendant relies on cases making a presumption of prejudice when the grand jury is selected in a racially discriminatory fashion, see e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), or when women are excluded from the grand jury, see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946). Defendant also relies on dicta in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1642-43, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), which is an entrapment case, in which Justice Rehnquist observed that one day a case might arise in which "the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction." However, in United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 299 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 1794, 60 L.Ed.2d 244 (1979), the Seventh Circuit has specifically rejected the presumption of prejudice based upon pre-indictment publicity. See also United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167, 1173-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867, 102 S.Ct. 330, 70 L.Ed.2d 168 (1981) ( ). Further, it is agreed that "the grand jury need not deliberate in a sterile chamber" in order to remain unbiased. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 82 (2nd Cir.1983). Even if the government engaged in intentional misconduct, the correct response would not be a dismissal of the indictment but instead to secure a fair trial for the accused. Stanford, 589 F.2d at 299 ( ).
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Archer v. Chisholm
...are not actionable under the Fourth Amendment. See Carter v. Buscher , 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir.1992) ; United States v. Kaczynski , 923 F.Supp. 161, 163 (D.Mont.1996). Because the plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a Fourth Amendment violation related to the scope of the search, ......
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Archer v. Chisholm
...are not actionable under the Fourth Amendment. See Carter v. Buscher , 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir.1992) ; United States v. Kaczynski , 923 F.Supp. 161, 163 (D.Mont.1996). Because the plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a Fourth Amendment violation related to the scope of the search, ......