US v. Karagozian

Decision Date21 June 1989
Docket NumberCrim. No. H-89-9 (JAC).
Citation715 F. Supp. 1160
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Ohan KARAGOZIAN.

Peter D. Markle, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Haven, Conn., for U.S.

Robert I. Kalina, New York City, for Ohan Karagozian.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, District Judge:

The defendant is charged with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of conspiracy to do so. He moves to suppress all evidence seized from his person and his home following his warrantless arrest, and he separately moves to suppress all evidence and fruits thereof seized from a storage facility in Northborough, Massachusetts the day after his arrest (notwithstanding the existence of a warrant to search that storage facility signed by Judge Paul F. LoConto of the District Court Department of the Trial Court of Massachusetts). An evidentiary hearing on these motions took place on May 30, June 6, and June 9, 1989.1 Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e), the court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I.

On January 11, 1989 Trooper Jeffrey Hotsky of the Connecticut State Police, acting in an undercover capacity, purchased one ounce of cocaine from Eric Pepin.2 Previously, a confidential informant had told members of the State Police and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") that Pepin was a major cocaine distributor in Connecticut and that Ohan Karagozian, the defendant, was his source for the cocaine. The agents and police officers did not, however, know the specific details about the relationship between Pepin and Karagozian, and at no point while Trooper Hotsky was undercover did Pepin tell him anything about Karagozian or about Pepin's supply of cocaine. Sometime after the one ounce purchase of cocaine, Trooper Hotsky arranged for a January 13, 1989 purchase of eight ounces of cocaine from Pepin.

On January 13, a Friday, Special Agent John Bryfonski of the DEA, and a number of other agents and police officers, observed Pepin drive into the parking lot of a McDonald's Restaurant in Brooklyn, Connecticut. Karagozian, who was in a car with an antenna for an automobile telephone, also drove into the parking lot.3 Special Agent Bryfonski then saw Karagozian drive into a shopping center across the street, Pepin go to a pay telephone, Karagozian drive back to the McDonald's parking lot, and Pepin and Karagozian separately enter the McDonald's restaurant, where they stayed for ten to fifteen minutes.

After leaving the restaurant Pepin and Karagozian returned to their respective cars and drove out of the parking lot, with Karagozian behind Pepin. The agents and police officers followed. Special Agent Bryfonski observed both cars drive down Allenhill Road, a rural area. Both cars pulled over to approximately the same spot at the side of the road. Pepin got out of his car and went into Karagozian's car, where he stayed three to five minutes. Pepin then went back to his own car, and both cars continued down Allenhill Road. The agents and police officers followed Pepin, who drove directly to the place where the prearranged sale of eight ounces of cocaine to Trooper Hotsky was to take place. At some point while following Pepin, the agents and police officers lost surveillance of Karagozian. There is no evidence that Karagozian ever knew he was being observed by law enforcement authorities.

At the prearranged meeting place, Pepin delivered eight ounces of cocaine to Trooper Hotsky, and Pepin was then arrested. The arrest occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. At this point, prior to hearing any statements of Pepin regarding the charges against him, Special Agent Bryfonski, accompanied by Special Agent Aldridge and one or two State Police officers, went to Karagozian's house in Moosup, Connecticut. It is undisputed that Special Agent Bryfonski's purpose in going to Karagozian's house was to arrest Karagozian, if he could be located.

The agents and police officers arrived at Karagozian's house at some time before 4:00 p.m., and they parked in Karagozian's driveway. Special Agent Bryfonski then walked up some stairs located at the side of the house, which led to a raised wooden deck behind the house. A sliding glass door at the rear of the house opened onto this deck.4 Karagozian came to the sliding glass door, and Special Agent Bryfonski identified himself. Special Agent Bryfonski asked Karagozian to come outside; Karagozian asked why, and Special Agent Bryfonski told him he would rather talk to him outside. Karagozian then walked out onto the wooden deck. It is undisputed that, at least by the time Karagozian was on the deck and one or two steps away from the sliding glass door, he was under arrest. It is also undisputed that no force or deception was used to bring Karagozian from inside the sliding glass door to outside it.

Karagozian and Special Agent Bryfonski went to the driveway and then into a police car. Meanwhile, Special Agent Aldridge entered Karagozian's house through the sliding glass door, with his gun drawn. Karagozian was informed of his rights and was told what the police had seen him do that day with Pepin. When Karagozian did not agree to cooperate and give a statement, he was asked to get out of the car, where he was told he was under arrest, handcuffed, returned to the police car, and again informed of his rights. He was then asked if he would consent to a search of his home and his car. Special Agent Bryfonski told him he could refuse to consent, but Special Agent Bryfonski added that if he did not consent the agents and police officers would apply for a search warrant. Karagozian indicated that the agents and police officers could conduct a search. Karagozian understood what the agents and police officers were asking of him, and he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Karagozian was then brought back inside his house and handcuffed to a chair. While handcuffed he was asked to sign a DEA "Consent to Search" form, which he read and signed at 4:18 p.m.; Trooper Hotsky arrived at Karagozian's house at approximately this time. Karagozian does not dispute that he understood the contents of the form. Nevertheless, he now asserts, quite plausibly, that he felt "intimidated" by the number of police officers at his house and their conduct, and he felt something was "being done wrong."5

After the search began, Karagozian's wife left the house and consulted with an attorney, B. Paul Kaplan. She then returned to the house and advised her husband to stop the search. At this point Karagozian requested that the agents and police officers stop the search, which they did at 4:43 p.m. The agents and police officers left the house with Karagozian and the items they had seized up to the time they stopped the search, and they went to the State Police station in Plainfield, Connecticut.

Upon arriving at the State Police station, Special Agent Bryfonski learned that Pepin had been cooperating with the police and had made detailed statements. Among other things, Pepin had stated that Karagozian had told him of keeping cocaine in a storage facility in Massachusetts. Pepin did not know the precise location of the storage facility, but knew it was near a certain camera shop in Northborough, Massachusetts, because on December 20, 1988 Karagozian had dropped him off at the camera shop and returned some ten minutes later with cocaine.

Special Agent Bryfonski, the other agents and police officers, and Pepin then went to Massachusetts. The only storage facility they located near the camera shop identified by Pepin was the Space Station Storage facility in Northborough. The manager of the storage facility arrived, and they learned from him that Karagozian did indeed maintain a storage space there and that someone had entered that storage space on December 20, 1988 and on January 13, 1989.

Massachusetts State Police Trooper Thomas Duffy, on the basis of information given him primarily by Special Agent Bryfonski, applied for and obtained a warrant to search Karagozian's storage space from Judge Paul F. LoConto of the District Court Department of the Trial Court of Massachusetts. A search of the storage space took place at approximately 5:45 a.m. on January 14, 1989. The manager of the storage facility was present at the time. Entry to the storage space was gained by a key taken from Karagozian's jacket during the search of Karagozian's home. The evidence indicates, however, that the agents and police officers could have gained access to the storage space even without Karagozian's key.

II.

Special Agent Bryfonski did not have an arrest warrant when he arrested Ohan Karagozian. As an agent of the DEA, however, he was empowered to "make arrests without warrant ... for any felony ... if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony." 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3)(B). Probable cause to arrest is to be determined from the "totality of the circumstances" and exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and those of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. United States v. Giagoudakis, 693 F.Supp. 1417, 1419 (E.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).

Defense counsel conceded at oral argument that, at the time Special Agent Bryfonski arrested Karagozian, probable cause to arrest existed. In any event, I find that in the "totality of the circumstances" presented here, and, in particular, in light of the information provided by the confidential informant as corroborated by the ...

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