US v. King
Decision Date | 28 September 1988 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 85-90(2)-C. |
Citation | 695 F. Supp. 1325 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ronald B. KING, Defendant, pro se. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Ronald B. King, pro se.
In this Court in 1985 the defendant, Ronald King, pled guilty to one count each of perjury and conspiracy (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1623 respectively) and was sentenced to three years imprisonment for each count, sentences to be served concurrently. In the spring of 1988, after completing his incarceration for a state criminal law conviction and serving five months of his federal sentence, King came before the federal parole board for the first time. The board denied parole and rated King "a poor risk" based at least in part, King argues, on erroneous information contained in his presentence report ("PSR"). King, acting pro se, now petitions this Court to correct his PSR, claiming that he never viewed the report, and therefore had no opportunity to object to the inaccuracies contained therein before sentencing.
As a threshold matter, we note that when considering a motion made by a litigant pro se, it is the duty of the court to construe the pleadings liberally. Diskin v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 652 F.Supp. 553, 555 (D.Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.1987). King's motion to amend his presentence report, when read liberally, essentially asserts three claims: 1) that King's appointed counsel failed to show him the PSR; 2) that this failure deprived King of the opportunity to dispute its inaccuracies before sentencing; and 3) that this failure deprived King of his Sixth Amendment right to effective representation. We consider each claim in turn.
United States v. Mays, 798 F.2d 78, 80 (3d Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). Contra United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.1984). Thus, after giving the defendant and his attorney an opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing, so long as the court can reasonably conclude that both were familiar with and had discussed the PSR, the court need not pose specific questions concerning the defendant's access to the PSR. United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d at 931.
Here, as in Serino, the record "persuades us that defendant and his counsel were abundantly familiar with the presentence report." Id. King's attorney, Susan Crockin, received the PSR at least two days prior to sentencing. On the cover sheet attached to the PSR, Crockin checked the box indicating "I have read the presentence investigation report" and affixed her signature and the date in the space labelled "Counsel." Appendix I. In addition to Crockin's signature, the cover sheet is signed and dated by King's probation officer. The probation officer has noted, in the space provided for the defendant's signature, "Read by Defendant 7/31/85." Id. Thus, although King's signature does not appear on the cover sheet as it should, the fact that King's attorney signed the PSR two days before sentencing and the probation officer's notation both suggest that King reviewed the report before the sentencing hearing.
The transcript of the hearing also reveals that King's attorney did object to erroneous information contained in the PSR which the Court corrected before imposing King's sentence. When asked for a statement before sentencing, Crockin responded that the "only correction" required in the PSR was the deletion of a repetitive larceny charge that appeared in the summary of the defendant's criminal record on pages six and seven of the report. After that deletion was made, Crockin stated that no other "changes or corrections" were necessary. When asked whether he wished to make a statement, the defendant simply replied, "I'm sorry, your Honor." Neither King nor his attorney objected to the information now at issue, which appears on the very first page of the PSR. Based on the record, therefore, we find little factual basis to support King's claim that he did not review the PSR before sentencing and we find ample factual basis to support our determination that both the defendant and his attorney were familiar with the PSR, as required by United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d at 931.
Diaz Torres v. United States, 564 F.2d at 619.
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