US v. A Leasehold Interest in Property

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: JULIAN ABELE COOK, Jr.
• Citation: US v. A Leasehold Interest in Property, 789 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Mich. 1992)
• Decision Date: 06 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-CV-71173.,90-CV-71173.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. A LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN PROPERTY LOCATED AT 850 S. MAPLE, ANN ARBOR, WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICHIGAN, Defendant, v. Charlotte JUIDE, Claimant.

789 F. Supp. 1385

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. A LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN PROPERTY LOCATED AT 850 S. MAPLE, ANN ARBOR, WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICHIGAN, Defendant, v. Charlotte JUIDE, Claimant.

No. 90-CV-71173.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

April 6, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Julie Kunce Field, Mark D. Mitshkun, Paul D. Reingold, Nicholas J. Rine, Michigan Clinical Law Program, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich., for plaintiff.

Julie A. Caroff, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, Jr., Chief Judge.

On July 3, 1991, Charlotte Juide filed a motion, in which she sought attorneys' fees as a claimant under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for "the time spent contesting the Government's summary seizure of her interest without prior notice or hearing, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Local Court Rules...." Juide's Brief at 1. The Government has submitted its opposition papers which seek a denial of her motion. On January 23, 1992, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the sufficiency and reasonableness of her fee request.

For the reasons that have been set forth below, this court will grant in part and deny in part Juide's application for attorney fees.

I.

In April 1990, the Government commenced this civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against a leasehold interest which was located within a public housing complex at 850 South Maple in Ann Arbor, Michigan.¹ In its Complaint, the Government alleged that the property had been used by its occupants to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, and, by virtue of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7),² it was subject to forfeiture. Acting on the authority of a search warrant that had been issued by a federal magistrate on April 23, 1990, the United States Marshal and other law enforcement officials took possession of the apartment four days later and summarily evicted Juide and her two children.

Juide subsequently filed a claim and a series of motions with this court in an effort to obtain complete relief from the action that had been unilaterally undertaken by the Government, including the right to gain lawful entry into, and reacquire possession of, her Ann Arbor apartment. On July 30, 1990, this court issued an order which, in essence, determined that (1) Juide's constitutional rights to due process had been violated, and (2) she had been improperly evicted from her home. As a result, the magistrate's warrant was vacated, and Juide was reinstated into her Ann Arbor dwelling. U.S. v. 850 South Maple, 743 F.Supp. 505, 511 (E.D.Mich. 1990).

Thereafter, the Government, having unsuccessfully sought to obtain any judicial review by this court of its July 30th order, filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit). However, on May 29, 1991, Juide and her family moved from the 850 South Maple apartment, and this action was dismissed on June 11, 1991 with the consent of the parties because of mootness.

II.

In her motion, Juide argues that she is entitled to attorney fees³ under the EAJA which reflect, in part, the cost of living because (1) she is a prevailing party, and (2) the Government lacked substantial justification for its seizure of her apartment. In its opposition papers, the Government contends that (1) Juide voluntarily vacated the apartment and, hence, she cannot be a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA, (2) its position in this controversy was substantially justified, and (3) the amount of her request for fees is unjustifiably excessive.

A.

The EAJA provides that a court shall award attorney fees to "a prevailing party ... in any civil action ... brought by or against the United States ... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Congress' objective in its passage of the EAJA was to "encourage relatively impecunious private parties to challenge unreasonable or oppressive governmental behavior by relieving such parties of the fear of incurring large litigation expenses." Spencer v. N.L.R.B., 712 F.2d 539 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 1908, 80 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984) (citation omitted).

The initial inquiry under the EAJA is whether a litigant constitutes the "prevailing party" in the dispute. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. A prevailing party is one who "achieves some of the benefit in bringing the action," Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 887, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2255, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989)⁴, or who prevails on a key issue in the litigation, to such an extent that the legal relationship between the parties has been substantially altered. Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).

The Supreme Court has stated that "the touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute." Id. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. A prevailing party need not have succeeded on each and every issue that was raised in the law suit. However, a petitioner must receive some relief on the merits of the claim. Success on procedural or evidentiary matters will not suffice. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987); See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980).

Juide claims to be the prevailing party in this action because she received "substantive relief from this court that changed the legal relationship between the parties" following her challenge of the Government's seizure and eviction. Juide's Reply Brief, at 1. Moreover, she contends that the court order of July 30, 1990 resulted in "a limitation on the Government's procedures in forfeiture cases and a change in her substantive legal status." Juide's Brief, at 9 (emphasis omitted). It is her belief that this request falls into the realm which Congress intended the statute to cover.

this forfeiture action is the prototypical case to which the EAJA applies. Here the U.S. Government ... exercised a truly awesome power against individuals who were totally lacking in resources. With no warning, a welfare family in public housing was forcibly evicted by a small army of police. She was literally awakened with a gun in her face, and was forced to dress and to use the bathroom with federal agents present.... Juide and her family were then locked out of their own home and left on the street to fend for themselves.

....

Their successful challenge to the Government's policy (of summary seizures in forfeiture cases), and the substantive relief they won (permanent occupancy rights pending a forfeiture trial), fit exactly what Congress wanted the Government to pay for when Congress passed the EAJA.

Id. at 6-7.

The Government counters with the argument that Juide is not entitled to the status of a prevailing party merely because she was successful on a procedural point in this lawsuit. Furthermore, it contends that

despite the best efforts of Juide to characterize the motion to vacate the seizure warrant as a proceeding separate and distinct from the civil forfeiture case, the motion was in fact but one of a series filed as part of claimant's defense against the civil forfeiture action. Although resolution of the motion turned on an issue of constitutional law, the constitutional nature of that issue did not transmute it into a claim on the merits in the civil forfeiture litigation.

Government's Response Brief, at 6. Moreover, the Government submits that this court should not declare Juide to be a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA because, among other things, she voluntarily abandoned her claimed property interests prior to a final resolution of this controversy.

The Government's position (to wit, that, when taken as a whole, Juide's victory on the constitutionality of the summary eviction is a mere portion of the overall seizure action) has some merit. The underlying dispute in this litigation involved a seizure action of real property pursuant to federal civil forfeiture provisions which allow the Government to seize a leasehold interest. There is no question that, with proper compliance with the provisions of the statute and due process considerations, the Government may seize property which they have probable cause to believe is involved in illegal drug activities. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).

However, as this court later found, the Government did not have a right to the immediate seizure of the leasehold property in the absence of exigent circumstances and compliance with due process concerns. It was upon this basis that Juide sought to regain an immediate occupancy of her apartment. Therefore, although the Government's action may have been technically accurate in proceeding with the civil in rem action, it did not succeed in preventing Juide from reacquiring the immediate possession of her home on 850 South Maple.

Neither party can rightly debate that the ultimate goal for each side was to gain possession of the apartment. Juide makes it clear that a right of immediate reentry is what she sought to obtain through this court. The Government's explanations for these type of seizures are premised on the idea that an advanced notice to the occupant of the subject dwelling would defeat its effort to eliminate the infiltration of illicit drugs into this community:

According to the Government, seizure was necessary because of the likelihood that drug activity would continue on the premises unless there was a prompt and immediate seizure.

U.S. v. 850 South Maple, 743 F.Supp. 505, 511 (E.D.Mich.1990) (emphasis added).

With this as the mutual goal of the instant litigation, there can be no dispute as to Juide's victory. The longer term occupancy of the unit was not resolved, but the question about...