US v. Lester
Decision Date | 12 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91-093-Cr-HIGHSMITH.,91-093-Cr-HIGHSMITH. |
Citation | 785 F. Supp. 976 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Gary LESTER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Donald Chase, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.
David H. Lichter, Kenny, Nachwalter & Seymour, Miami, Fla., for defendant.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Gary Lester's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Indictment. The issue before the court is whether a nolo contendere plea, with adjudication withheld, in a prior state court proceeding is a "conviction" for purposes of the Federal Firearms Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.1 While we consider this a close and difficult question, we nonetheless conclude that, for the reasons which follow, and based on the particular record presented to this court, Defendant's Motion must be and is GRANTED.
On June 4, 1984, Gary Lester entered a plea of nolo contendere in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon, a felony offense. Notably, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and the Defendant was sentenced to a probationary period of two (2) years. Under the terms of his probation, the Defendant was required to receive psychiatric treatment; he was also required to forfeit his gun. In addition, he was required to obtain the consent of his Probation Advisor before changing his residence or employment. On March 29, 1991, a federal grand jury charged the Defendant, by way of superseding indictment, with, among other things, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defendant moves to dismiss that charge, asserting that his prior nolo contendere plea is not a conviction under Section 922(g).
We observe at the outset that state law governs in determining what constitutes a conviction for these purposes. The Federal Firearms Statute provides in part:
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added). Thus, Florida state law will determine the precise definition of the term "conviction." United States v. Thompson, 756 F.Supp. 1492, 1493 (N.D.Fla.1991). In Thompson, Chief United States District Judge Stafford construed Florida state law, and squarely confronted the precise issue before this Court. There, as here, the defendant pled nolo contendere to state charges, with adjudication withheld, and was later charged with violating Section 922(g). The district court held that, under Florida law, the nolo plea (with adjudication withheld) was not equivalent to a conviction for purposes of Section 922(g). 756 F.Supp. at 1497.
In ascertaining Florida law, the Thompson Court relied primarily on Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla.1988). In that case the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a prior nolo plea was not a "conviction" for purposes of capital sentencing proceedings, noting that:
it does not follow from McCrae v. State, 395 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1980) that a plea of nolo contendere amounts to either a confession of guilt or a "conviction" for purposes of capital sentencing proceedings. A nolo plea means "no contest," not "I confess." It simply means that the defendant, for whatever reason, chooses not to contest the charge. He does not plead either guilty or not guilty, and it does not function as such a plea. None of the factors which go toward evidencing a conviction are present in this case, therefore, the first aggravating factor must fail.
Id. at 360. The Thompson Court found Garron to be the best and most recent statement of Florida law on the issue, and thus extended Garron to the federal firearms context. Thompson also relied on Burkett v. State, 518 So.2d 1363, 1366 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1988), as evidence that "Florida courts require an adjudication of guilt before a `conviction' can be used as an element of a subsequent offense...." Thompson, 756 F.Supp. at 1493-94. The Defendant here urges the same construction of Burkett. See Def. Reply Memo. at 3.
Chief Judge Stafford also concluded in Thompson that the Federal Firearms Statute itself compelled the same result. The Court observed that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) "provides that any `conviction' for which a person has had his civil rights restored shall not be considered a `conviction' for purposes of section 922(g)(1)," and thus concluded that "a `conviction' based on a nolo plea, adjudication withheld which never results in a loss of civil rights ... should also not expose a person to section 922 liability." Thompson, 756 F.Supp. at 1497 (emphasis added). In this regard, the Court further noted:
756 F.Supp. at 1496. Since we find the language in Garron, the most recent Florida Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue, to be sufficiently broad and unequivocal to fairly extend to the federal firearms context, and since we agree with the Thompson Court's conclusion, we follow Thompson in concluding that, under Florida state law, a nolo plea with a withhold of adjudication is not a conviction for purposes of Section 922(g)(1).
In our analysis of Florida law, we noted that Florida state courts have made statements seemingly contrary to Garron, the principal Florida case relied upon by Thompson.2 In order to clarify the apparent ambiguity in Florida law, and to supplement the record, we directed the parties, by Order dated October 28, 1991, to file supplemental briefs on the issue of "whether the Defendant, upon successful completion of probation, was entitled to possess, carry, or own a firearm without obtaining permission from the State of Florida or without formally applying for restoration of his civil rights, or whether such procedures were in fact required." See Order, Oct. 28, 1991. Subsequently, on November 13, 1991, we again referred this cause to United States Magistrate Judge Linnea Johnson "for the limited purpose of conducting a hearing and preparing a Report and Recommendation" regarding this precise issue. See Order, Nov. 13, 1991. The parties submitted affidavits bearing on this issue, and most notably, "the parties specifically agreed that no further evidentiary hearing in light of the affidavits would be required." See Rep. & Rec., Nov. 27, 1991, at 2 (emphasis added).
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