US v. Maragh, Crim. No. 88-0322-LFO.

Decision Date26 September 1988
Docket NumberCrim. No. 88-0322-LFO.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Mark A. MARAGH.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Theodore A. Shmanda, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., for U.S.

James E. McCollum, Jr., College Park, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

OBERDORFER, District Judge.

Defendant Mark A. Maragh, a twenty year old black male, disembarked at Union Station in the company of two other young black males from an Amtrak train that originated in New York City. He was carrying a small bag by a strap on his shoulder. A five-man squad of police detailed to interdict drug couriers at Union Station observed the three and deployed. One of the squad, Detective Vance L. Beard, observed two of the three separate from defendant and go to a phone; one of the two talked on the phone while the other observed. They rejoined defendant for a brief conversation. Defendant again separated himself from the two. In so doing he established eye contact with Detective Beard. Then defendant and the other two separately started walking toward the exit.

On the basis of the foregoing observations by Beard, the squad deployed. Detective Beard approached defendant. Detective Hanson positioned himself as a backup. Detective Cassidy, a distinctively tall, slender gentleman, left the immediate area to position himself at the exit, in Detective Beard's words, "in case anybody ran." Beard approached defendant from his left rear. According to Beard, he stopped at an oblique angle to defendant (so that defendant could continue walking if he chose to do so.) Beard then identified himself as a police officer, showed his badge and asked defendant if he would answer some questions. While Detective Hanson stood a few feet to defendant's rear and Detective Cassidy was positioned (presumably out of sight by defendant) to bar escape, a colloquy ensued between Detective Beard and defendant. There is no evidence as to Detective Beards' manner of speech when he identified himself. He is a distinguished-looking gentleman with a commanding appearance. Detective Beard asked where defendant was coming from (New York), asked to see the ticket (defendant produced it), and learned that defendant had lived in Washington for four months, went to New York the preceding Friday and was just returning (it was Tuesday).

Informed only by this colloquy and the observations preceeding his introduction of himself to defendant, Detective Beard then identified himself as an officer from the Narcotics Branch and explained that his purpose was to intercept drugs before they had a chance to reach the streets of Washington. Beard asked defendant if he was carrying drugs in what Beard describes as his "tote bag." Defendant responded in the negative. Beard then asked if he could look into the bag. Defendant acquiesced, placed the bag on the floor and started to open the zipper. Detective Beard stooped over (so that all he could see of defendant was his feet), took the bag, finished opening the zipper, felt inside, pulled out some pants (possibly swimming trunks), and felt a rock-like substance in a pocket which he suspected to be drugs. Detective Beard thereupon signalled by voice code to Detective Hanson, and told defendant he was under arrest. Simultaneously, Detective Hanson came up behind defendant, seized his arms and handcuffed him. After this exchange defendant stated that the drugs were not his.

The circumstances here raise two questions: (1) Whether an officer's commencement of a conversation with a person in a public place by identifying himself or herself as a narcotics officer constitutes a "stop" implicating the Fourth Amendment; and (2) If so, what if any level of suspicion must be generated by the circumstances to justify such a stop.

These questions have not apparently been addressed by our Court of Appeals. However, recent decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit commend themselves. The Fifth Circuit has stated

Prior to her arrest, defendant Gonzales was engaged in mere communication with officer Glenn, perfectly permissible under the fourth amendment. However, at the time Glenn informed Gonzales that he was "working narcotics" and requested to look in her bag, a reasonable person would no longer have felt free to leave.
U.S. v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988).

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has stated

when the agents informed defendant
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • U.S. v. Maragh
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • January 9, 1990
    ...did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Maragh; and that therefore the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Maragh, 695 F.Supp. 1223 (D.D.C.1988). The District Court also concluded that "the same threatening environment that converted the conversations into a 'stop' v......
  • U.S. v. Caballero
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • June 21, 1991
    ...trial court, relying on the Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions, concluded that the investigatory stop amounted to a seizure. 695 F.Supp. 1223, 1225 (D.D.C.1988). In reversing the lower court, we expressly rejected the bright line test used by our two sister circuits and held that the circu......
  • US v. Maragh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • February 1, 1991
    ...United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 214, 112 L.Ed.2d 174 (1990), rev'g 695 F.Supp. 1223 (D.D.C.1988). I find that he consented I. On remand, at an evidentiary hearing held on January 11, 1991, the government supplemented the record wit......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT