US v. Miscellaneous Jewelry

Decision Date05 August 1987
Docket NumberCiv. No. N-86-2067,N-86-2069 and N-86-2071.,N-86-2068
Citation667 F. Supp. 232
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. MISCELLANEOUS JEWELRY, etc.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Brad Cates, U.S. Dept. of Justice, James S. Cohen, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty. for the District of Columbia; and Larry D. Adams, Asst. U.S. Atty. for the D. Md., for U.S.

Mitchell Myers, and Dacy, Myers and Suissa, Silver Spring, Md.; and David B. Smith, and English & Smith, Alexandria, Va., for defendant properties.

MEMORANDUM

NORTHROP, Senior District Judge.

This action is a forfeiture proceeding brought pursuant to the Drug Abuse Prevention Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., in which the plaintiff ("the Government") is seeking to have the defendant property, which includes over a million dollars in cash, two large checks, two pieces of real estate and miscellaneous jewelry and electronic equipment,1 forfeited on the theory that the property was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or property constituting proceeds traceable to such an exchange. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). The claimant is Alvin M. Walker, personal representative of the estate of Dennis Constantine White and guardian of Mr. White's alleged minor heirs. Jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and § 1355.

Presently pending before this Court is the Government's motion to strike answer and claim filed by claimant, the Government's motion for summary judgment and claimant's cross-motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on these motions.2

I. FACTS

The undisputed facts in this case are rather simple.3 On May 5, 1986, Dennis Constantine White ("White") was found dead along with his daughter, Donna Ann Marie White, in his residence at 5319 Old Branch Avenue Avenue, Temple Hills, Maryland, by officers of the Prince George's County Police Department ("PGCPD"). It is believed that White and his daughter were murdered. During the homicide investigation, the officers discovered the defendant cash, checks, jewelry and electronic equipment in the residence. Since March 1985, Prince George's County law enforcement officers suspected White of large-scale distribution of cocaine. According to the investigation by these law enforcement officers, between March 1985, or earlier, and May 5, 1986, White obtained uncut cocaine from New York City, which he distributed as "Jamaican Rock" in the Temple Hills area.

Records of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") reflect that White lawfully entered the United States on or about August 3, 1982, at which time he declared a small amount of cash and one automobile.4 Other than proceeds obtained from the joint operation of a small grocery store in Washington, D.C. from March 1986 to May 5, 1986, and possible sporadic earnings as a self-employed vendor of merchandise operating out of a vehicle, investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") does not reveal any source of legitimate income for White since his initial entry into the United States.

On June 26, 1986, warrants of arrest in rem were issued and the defendant properties were seized during the month of July 1986. This Court then issued, on August 21, 1986, a Show Cause Order why the forfeiture should not be ordered.

After a series of notices were sent to interested parties and published in several newspapers, Alvin B. Walker, claimant, filed a claim and answer regarding the defendant properties on October 21, 1986. Thereafter, the Government filed a motion to strike answer and claim of Mr. Walker asserting that claimant lacks standing to defend this action because he has no ownership interest in the defendant properties. The Government has also filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, based on the undisputed facts, there is probable cause5 to believe that the properties were exchanged for or intended to be exchanged for illegal controlled substances or proceeds traceable to such exchanges and therefore forfeiture is appropriate, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).

The claimant has filed oppositions to the Government's motions and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that the Government has failed to meet its probable cause burden, that the forfeiture should abate as a result of White's death and that the allocation of the burden of proof under 19 U.S.C. § 1615 is unconstitutional in the circumstances of this case. Claimant also asserts that White's alleged heirs are innocent owners whose interest in the property is exempt from forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).

The Court will now address each of these motions and the issues raised therein.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE: THE STANDING ISSUE

Section 2461(b) of Title 28, United States Code, provides in pertinent part that "whenever a forfeiture of property is prescribed as a penalty for violation of an Act of Congress . . . in case of seizure on land, the forfeiture may be enforced by a proceeding by libel which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty." Rule A, Supplemental Rules of Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Fed. R.Civ.P., states that these rules "apply to the procedure in admiralty and maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) with respect to . . . (2) actions in rem. . . ." Rule A further states that the "general Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are also applicable to actions in rem except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these Supplemental Rules."

Pursuant to Supplemental Rule C(6), a claimant of property that is the subject of an action in rem shall file his claim within ten (10) days after process has been executed and shall file an answer within twenty (20) days of filing a claim. The claim must consist of a verified statement which states the interest of the claimant giving rise to the demand for return of the property. If the claim is made by one other than the possessor of the claimed interest, it should specify the basis of the authority upon which the claimant is acting and state that the claimant is duly authorized to make the claim. 7A Moore's, Federal Practice ¶ C.16 at 700.16 (1983); United States v. Fourteen (14) Handguns, 524 F.Supp. 395 (S.D.Tex.1981).

This procedure is to demonstrate that a claimant has standing to seek return of the property. United States v. Properties Described in Complaints, 612 F.Supp. 465, 467 (N.D.Ga.1984), affirmed, 779 F.2d 58 (11th Cir.1985). It is well established that a party seeking to challenge a forfeiture of property must first demonstrate an ownership or possessory interest in the seized property in order to have standing to contest the forfeiture. United States v. $5,644,540.00 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d at 1373; U.S. v. One 1978 Piper Navajo PA-31 Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Three Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars ($364,960.00) in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 326 (5th Cir.1981) (citing numerous supporting cases). Congress directed that "the term `owner' should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized." Joint Explanatory Statement of Title II and III, P.L. 95-633, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 9496, 9518, 9522.

In the instant case, the Government argues that no claim, as contemplated and required by Supplemental Rule C(6), was filed by the claimant. In his claim, Mr. Walker states that he is the "Personal Representative of the Estate of Dennis White, appointed on August 4, 1986, by the Orphans' Court of Prince George's County, Maryland," and "makes claim to the Defendant properties on behalf of the deceased's heirs.6 The Government contends that, because Mr. Walker does not state that he personally has an ownership interest in the defendant properties, and is merely the person responsible for administering and distributing the assets contained in the White's estate, he has no standing to file a claim and answer. The Government goes on to state, that under the "relation back doctrine," as codified by Congress in 1984 "all right, title and interest in the property described in subsection (1) of this section shall vest in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h). Thus, the Government asserts, the United States became the absolute owner of the defendant properties as of the date they were unlawfully purchased or acquired by White prior to his death. Therefore, these properties would not be assets of the estate and are not available for distribution by Mr. Walker. Furthermore, the Government claims, because Mr. Walker is unable to rebut, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Government's showing of probable cause to believe that White purchased or acquired the defendant properties with the proceeds of his alleged cocaine distribution activities, Mr. Walker's role as personal representative of White's estate does not entitle him to defend against the forfeiture of White's assets.

It appears from the claim, the subsequent pleadings, and from the deposition transcript of Mr. Walker that he is actually proceeding in this action in two roles. First, claimant is acting as the personal representative of White's estate. See MD. Estates and Trusts CODE ANN. § 6-101 et seq. (1974, 1986 cum. suppl.) As such, claimant has the authority to "maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine title to it." Id. at § 7-102; DeFelice v. Riggs National Bank, 55 Md. App. 476, 479, 462 A.2d 88 (1983). It is without question that, if White were alive, he would have standing to defend against the forfeiture of his properties on whatever grounds are relevant, including the issue of whether the Government has probable cause to seize and seek the forfeiture of the defendant properties. U.S. v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, Serial No. 22186, 604 F.2d 27, 28 (8th Cir.1979) ("It is the...

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