US v. Odoms

Citation801 F. Supp. 59
Decision Date12 August 1992
Docket NumberNo. 87 CR 915.,87 CR 915.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Kimberly L. ODOMS.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Fred Foreman, U.S. Atty., Joshua T. Buchman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

John A. Meyer, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ZAGEL, District Judge.

The defendant, a postal employee, pled guilty to one count of knowingly and intentionally stealing from the United States Mail a first class letter containing U.S.D.A. food stamps. In calculating the appropriate sentence under the sentencing guidelines, the probation officer applied section 2B1.1 for theft, which required a base offense level of four. The base level increased to six, under section 2B1.1(b)(4), because the theft involved undelivered mail. After a two point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total base offense level reverted to four. The presentence report does not include the two point increase in the defendant's offense level under Sentencing Guideline 3B1.3, for abuse of position of trust.

I. Current, Disputed Standards

Guideline 3B1.3 imposes the two level increase "if the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. ..." The commentary to the guideline states:

The position of trust must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that could have as easily been afforded to other persons. This adjustment, for example, would not apply to an embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller.

The Ninth Circuit, affirming the application of the guideline in United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.1990), set forth one principle and two indicia for determining whether a defendant occupies a position of trust. After studying the commentary to the guideline and earlier cases applying the guideline adjustment1, the Ninth Circuit selected as the principle that "the primary trait that distinguishes a person in a position of trust from one who is not is the extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong." Id. at 506. The corresponding indicia adopted by the Ninth Circuit and also derived from the ordinary bank teller exclusion were the "inability of the trustor objectively and expediently to determine the trustee's honesty" and the "ease with which the trustee's activities can be observed." Id.

Using these standards, the Ninth Circuit determined that Hill held a position of private trust and abused it within the meaning of the guideline. Finding the ordinary bank teller reference in the commentary "significant," the court searched for characteristics which supported the exclusion. The bank teller is subject to a daily accounting of financial transactions and can be easily observed by branch manager, the court reasoned. The interstate truck driver, on the other hand, has the opportunity to steal the cargo unobserved and, in this case, the trustors, families moving overseas, had no expedient means by which to check for missing items. The court concluded that the bank teller was not in a position of trust and Hill was.

Once the court decided that Hill, as a truck driver transporting household belongings between states, occupied a position of private trust, it analyzed whether he abused the position "in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense," as dictated by the guideline. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Looking to the commentary for guidance on the question of facilitating the offense, the court focused on the language, "merely ... provided an opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other persons." It disagreed with the defendant that the other persons phrase meant compared to other truck drivers. Instead, the court held that the proper question "is whether Hill, relative to all people in a position to conspire to steal goods from interstate commerce (i.e., the public at large), was in a superior position as a result of a trust relationship." United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d at 507-08. Interpreted this way, Hill's position clearly gave him a special opportunity to steal the goods, and thus facilitated the commission of the offense.

The majority of courts which have confronted the applicability of the abuse of trust guideline use standards similar to the Hill principle and determining factors. The defendant receives the abuse of trust increase if his activities are not supervised, and are not routinely checked by his employer.2 Most courts have compared defendants to members of the general public in determining whether the same opportunity is afforded to other persons.3

In United States v. Arrington, 765 F.Supp. 945 (N.D.Ill.1991), Judge Shadur declined to apply the abuse of trust guideline to a "casual mailhandler" and took exception to both the Hill analysis and the United States Attorney's zeal in pursuing the upward departure for postal employees. The defendant, described as a "`casual mailhandler' — someone charged with various tasks involving the sorting, processing and stamping of mail," did not hold a position of trust because he had no "special level of responsibility" and "his access to mail was no different than that of thousands of postal workers." Id. at 947. Judge Shadur cited the applicability of the same guideline, § 2B1.1, for mail theft by a postal employee or any other person and the increase under § 2B1.1(b)(4) for a minimum offense level of six if the theft involved undelivered mail, again without distinguishing postal employees, as evidence that the Sentencing Commission did not intend the abuse of trust increase to apply to mail theft by postal employees.

Drawing on his experience, Judge Shadur concluded that, contrary to the Hill court's analysis, the bank teller example must refer to low level, relatively unskilled employment. For one thing, many "ordinary bank tellers have engaged in long undetected and quite sophisticated embezzlements," a fact which undermines the soundness of both Hill indicia — the ease with which bank tellers' activities are observed and the ability to determine their honesty objectively and expediently. Arrington, 765 F.Supp. at 949. Recognizing that access to money is inherent to the bank teller's job and that "by its very nature it provides the employee with extraordinary opportunities for criminal activity," Judge Shadur found those qualities "equally true of ordinary postal employees." Id. Therefore, the abuse of trust guideline commentary which excludes bank tellers must exclude low level mail handlers, too. Expressing his concern with the consistent argument that low level postal employees should be subject to the increase despite unfavorable rulings in the Northern District, Judge Shadur admonished the United States Attorney's office to appeal or abandon its position.

II. Application of the Current Standards

The United States Attorney argues that by stealing mail while employed by the Postal Service as an automated mark-up clerk, defendant abused her position of public trust in the manner contemplated by the guideline. The defendant prepared forwarding address labels and affixed them to pieces of mail. As a daily part of her job, she had contact with numerous pieces of mail entrusted to her by the public. Thus, not only did the defendant have access to valuable pieces of undelivered mail, she also could physically handle the mail without arousing suspicion by fellow employees or supervisors because it was part of her job. Her employment by the Postal Service placed her in a position of public trust because there was no record or means to track the undelivered mail she handled and she could not be watched at all times by postal inspectors. Because she used her opportunity to handle the mail, not afforded to other people who might want to steal undelivered mail, she abused her position in a manner which significantly facilitated the commission and concealment of her crime.

The defendant argues that she should not be subject to the increase since her low level position, like that of the ordinary bank teller specifically excluded in the commentary, holds no special responsibilities or opportunities. She submits an affidavit to the Court, describing the ease with which the postal inspectors could observe her, both obviously and surreptitiously. She worked in the Main Post Office in an "open area" surrounded by observation portals and supervisors' offices equipped with one way mirrors. Therefore, she did not hold a position of trust within the guideline's intent.

The defendant uses Judge Shadur's opinion in Arrington to boost her argument that her "ordinary" low level position makes the guideline inapplicable. In his opinion, Judge Shadur points out the problems with squaring the ordinary bank teller exclusion with a finding that the guideline applies to a low level postal employee. She argues that since she did not have any special responsibilities and her access to mail is like that of thousands of other clerks working for the Postal Service, she is like an ordinary bank teller, excluded from the guideline. Additionally, the defendant argues that abuse of trust is accounted for in § 2B1.1(b)(4) which increases the base offense level to at least six if the theft involved undelivered mail, a provision which applies to any person including postal employees.

Under the current analysis, the defendant should be assessed a two level increase under § 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust. Using the Hill criteria, the defendant could commit a difficult-to-detect wrong. While the post office is equipped with one way mirrors and viewing portals, the open area where the defendant works is filled with employees. If she were under suspicion for some reason, inspectors could focus their attention on her, but otherwise her activities would not be easy to...

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5 cases
  • U.S. v. Lamb
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • August 27, 1993
    ...and appellee presented three alternative tests. The government urges this court to adopt the standard established in United States v. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. 59 (N.D.Ill.1992). In the alternative, they suggest that if we reject the Odoms standard, we should apply the United States v. Hill test. ......
  • U.S. v. Hathcoat
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • July 28, 1994
    ...with our holding today. In Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420, we analyzed the problem of the "ordinary bank teller." 1 Quoting United States v. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. 59, 64 (N.D.Ill.1992), we stated: " 'Ordinary bank tellers can and do embezzle funds, evading detection commensurate with their creativity, th......
  • U.S. v. Boyle
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • November 24, 1993
    ...has " 'access or authority over valuable things.' " United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. 59, 64 (N.D.Ill.1992)). Therefore, the sentencing court must look beyond descriptive labels to the actual nature of the relationship and the......
  • United States v. Nash
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • August 16, 2012
    ...to members of the general public in determining whether the same opportunity is afforded to other persons.3 See United States v. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. 59, 60 -61 (N.D.Ill.,1992). Under the Hill analysis, Nash should be assessed a two level increase under§3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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