US v. ONE PARCEL OF R. PROP. IN WOONSOCKET, RI, Civ. A. No. 87-0203 P.
| Decision Date | 19 May 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-0203 P. |
| Citation | 696 F. Supp. 783 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. ONE PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY WITH BUILDINGS, APPURTENANCES, AND IMPROVEMENTS, KNOWN AS 147 DIVISION STREET, LOCATED IN the CITY OF WOONSOCKET, RHODE ISLAND. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Michael P. Iannotti, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., for U.S.
John Baccari, Wakefield, Mass., Douglas A. Giron, Providence, R.I., for respondent.
In this federal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(7), Paul Latraverse asks this court to suppress evidence seized by state police officers, alleging that the officers unjustifiably entered his apartment by force and that they executed the search warrant during the night without good cause for doing so.
1. On July 1, 1986, Paul Latraverse owned a multi-dwelling building located at 147 Division Street, Woonsocket, Rhode Island, and occupied a ground level apartment therein.
2. There are two entrances to the building: a front door and a side door, which is close to the back of the building. The front door, a thick oak door with no windows ("front building door") opens into a small communal area which contains the front door to Latraverse's apartment ("front apartment door"). The side door leads to a small hallway off of which is the back door to the apartment.
3. At approximately 9:30 p.m., a team of officers from the Woonsocket police department arrived at the building to execute a state search warrant.
4. Upon arrival, the officers divided into three groups. Three officers, Daniel Pion, Detective Sansuisi, and an unnamed other proceeded to the front building door. Four officers, Herve Landreville, Sergeant Richard Flood, Detective William Shea, and patrolman Luke Gallant proceeded to the side door. The remaining officers positioned themselves at the perimeter of the building.
5. As the four officers proceeded to the side door, Daniel Pion, in the presence of the other two officers, began to knock on the front building door. As they approached the side door, the four officers encountered a man named Donald Oben exit the building. After brief questioning, Oben was "detained" by officer Gallant while the other three officers, finding the side door open, entered the hallway and prepared to enter the apartment. Landreville entered the hallway first and Flood followed.
6. According to Flood, once inside the hallway, they could hear Pion at the front door knocking and shouting "police."
7. Landreville testified that, after entering the hallway, he knocked on the back door to the apartment and said "police." He further testified that after approximately five to ten seconds, Flood stated, "let's go in" and then Landreville forced the door open with one kick. Flood testified that he did not hear Landreville knock or say police. I credit Landreville's testimony as accurately describing what transpired; all things being equal, when confronted with testimony about what one did and said and testimony about what one saw and heard, I must acknowledge the vulnerability of observation and choose the former over the latter. (Officer Gallant, who was still outside "detaining" Oben, did not see or hear what went on in the hallway.).
8. After kicking down the door, Landreville and Flood immediately entered a kitchen area, which was empty. Landreville observed an open door off the kitchen leading to what appeared to be a basement; he descended the stairs. There was a bathroom off the kitchen and Flood observed the door closing and saw Latraverse and two other men inside. He ordered them to come out of the bathroom and had them sit at the kitchen table. Narcotics paraphernalia were found in the bathroom.
9. Meanwhile, the officers at the front door had encountered some difficulty. They finally managed to break through the front building door and officer Tempest immediately kicked in the apartment door. After passing through an empty living room, the officers proceeded to the kitchen area, where Latraverse and the other suspects were seated at the table under the supervision of Flood and Landreville. A full search ensued.
At the suppression hearing, there was considerable colloquy over whether state or federal law should be consulted to determine the validity of the officers' conduct. The government contends that federal law applies to all cases in federal court. Latraverse, however, argues that because the search was conducted by state officers pursuant to a state search warrant, Rhode Island law should govern.
While I would have presumed otherwise, this is a fairly disputed point among the federal district courts and courts of appeal. Some courts, for example, take the position urged by the government here. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir.1986) (); United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 578 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3495, 73 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1982) (); see also United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1535 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128, 106 S.Ct. 1657, 90 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) (); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F.Supp. 1451, 1452 (W.D.Okl.1986) (); United States v. Barker, 623 F.Supp. 823, 846 (D.C.Col.1985) (same). Other courts, however, have taken the position that state law should be consulted. See United States v. Speaks, 649 F.Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D.Wash. 1986) (). Indeed, this court has previously stated that, even though a federal prosecution had ensued, "the lawfulness of an arrest by state officers for a state offense is to be determined by state law" subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment. United States v. D'Alo, 486 F.Supp. 945, 948 (D.R.I.1979).
Two early cases by the First Circuit indicate that state law controls the validity of the execution of a warrant by state officers even though the resultant evidence is sought to be introduced in federal court. In Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1965), the court was confronted with a case somewhat similar to this one. There, four Boston police accompanied by two federal agents, executed a state arrest warrant at the defendant's home. In moving to suppress the evidence found in the course of the arrest, the defendant argued that the agents failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. section 3109. The court rejected this argument, however, holding that state law controlled the propriety of the entry. Id. at 981. Later in United States v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181 (1st Cir.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973), the court interpreted its Jackson ruling as standing for the proposition that "State law governs the arrest by state officials for federal offenses." Id. at 1185 n. 8.
Were these cases the last word in this circuit on the admissibility of state-seized evidence in federal courts, I would be inclined to test the officer's conduct under state law and would exclude the evidence for conduct that did not meet its requirements. A recent first circuit case, however, suggests that even if the state police violated some state law, the evidence would not be inadmissible in a federal trial.
In United States v. Aiudi, 835 F.2d 943 (1st Cir.1987), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1273, 99 L.Ed.2d 484 (1988), Woonsocket police officers, believing that Aiudi was receiving stolen good in violation of state law, executed a search warrant at the defendant's home. Prior to the search, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) was investigating Aiudi for possible violations of federal firearms statutes, and was exchanging information with the Woonsocket police. At the time the Woonsocket police executed the warrant, they alerted the ATF agent, who arrived after the search had begun and, after reviewing various records and inventory of firearms, concluded that firearms violations were evident and instructed the police to seize certain evidence that was later used to convict Aiudi at his federal trial. The defendant argued that the Woonsocket search warrant was invalid and moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that, under the teachings of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the constitution cannot be handed over to federal officials for use in federal trials. The court rejected this argument, holding that "even assuming that the appellant is correct in his contention that the weapons were in fact seized by the Woonsocket police in violation of the fourth amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the evidence must be excluded." 835 F.2d at 945.
The court noted that while the state warrant may have been invalid, the federal agent, under federal statute, had authority to conduct a warrantless search. The court reasoned that:
The Elkins rule was designed to protect fourth amendment rights by eliminating the incentive for federal law enforcement officials to encourage lawless searches and seizures by state officers. Where, as in this case, no incentive exists for federal officials to encourage misconduct by state police, exclusion of state-seized evidence is inappropriate without first considering whether the...
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U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property
...obtained in accordance with federal requirements even though it may have been obtained by state officers in violation of state law." 696 F.Supp. 783, 787. In Aiudi, we held that a search conducted by state police pursuant to an invalid warrant did not necessitate the suppression of evidence......