US v. Rivas, Crim. No. 91-00031-P-C.

Decision Date23 January 1992
Docket NumberCrim. No. 91-00031-P-C.
Citation782 F. Supp. 686
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Alejandro RIVAS and Domingo Ramirez, Jr.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Andrew W. Sparks, Portland, Me., for Domingo Ramirez, Sr.

Jeffrey D. Clements, Portland, Me., for Domingo Ramirez, Jr.

Judy R. Potter, Portland, Me., for Alejandro Rivas.

Jonathan A. Toof, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.

GENE CARTER, Chief Judge.

The Court dismissed, by endorsement on December 26, 1991, the indictments in the above-entitled matter against Defendants Rivas and Ramirez on timely filed motions (see 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)) of Defendants (Docket Nos. 27 and 29) for failure to bring Defendants to trial within the period specified by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The Court indicated in the endorsement that it would file a Memorandum of Decision in due course.

It is undisputed that Defendants have not been brought to trial within the seventy-day period required by the application of section 3161(c) and (h) of the Act. The Government so concedes and admits that the indictment must be dismissed pursuant to the Act, reserving only the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to reindictment of Defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Government contends that the dismissal should be without prejudice to reindictment. Defendants vigorously resist such a result.

The factors that the Court is to consider in resolving the issue are set out in section 3162(a)(2) of the Act. Here, the offense is obviously one of very substantial seriousness. However, the factual circumstances that compel dismissal cut most strongly against the reprosecution of these Defendants. There is no indication on the record that Defendants or their counsel were in any way less than diligent in the exercise of their proper roles in defending against the charges. The case was one that simply slipped through the cracks of the Court's scheduling system: first, because the prosecutor's office apparently lost track of the case through inattention and failed to ask the Court to bring the case forward for trial on an expeditious basis in conformity with the requirements of the Act. The Court has historically relied upon the Government to keep track of the Speedy Trial Act status of its own cases and to at least bring impending cases under the Act to the attention of the Court in a timely manner. Once such a request has been made, the Court schedules the subject case for trial on an expedited basis.1 Second, because no attention was brought to the case by the prosecutor, it slipped through the system of administrative scheduling of such cases maintained by the personnel of the Clerk's Office. Neither of these failures is in any way attributable to Defendants or their counsel. Defense counsel have no duty under the statute other than to timely move for dismissal before trial or entry of a guilty plea. They are under no obligation to precipitate action in a case endangered under the Act, contrary to Defendants' own substantial interests. They may properly "lie in the weeds" in wait for the slumbering prosecutor.

Finally, in a case where the entire responsibility for the violation of the Act...

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4 cases
  • U.S. v. Dessesaure, Crim Action No. 03cr10191-NG.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • November 21, 2007
    ...is precisely the point." Dessesaure II, 323 F.Supp.2d at 213 n. 5. 6. Of the very few that have found a violation, United States v. Rivas, 782 F.Supp. 686 (D.Me.1992), aff'd, 973 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.1992), stands out. There, the district court found that the crime the defendants were charged w......
  • U.S. v. Ramirez, 92-1109
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • June 3, 1992
    ...from the District Court of Maine's dismissal with prejudice of an indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. 782 F.Supp. 686 The Speedy Trial Act ("STA") was violated when a number of pretrial motions were not ruled upon within the thirty day time period for evaluat......
  • United States v. Reese
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • July 19, 2019
    ...trial deadline was approaching or had passed. United States v. Moss,217 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Rivas, 782 F. Supp. 686, 687 (D. Me. 1992). Here, the transcripts from the November 10, 2016, conference indicates that all parties, the government and the defend......
  • United States v. Rosario
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • December 21, 2017
    ...up the process. Whether BOP, ICE, or even a court itself causes the delay, the outcome is effectively the same. See United States v. Rivas, 782 F.Supp. 686, 687 (D. Me.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1992). There is only one federal government, and ICE's ac......

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