US v. Ruiz-Villanueva, Crim. No. 87-1296-E

• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
• Writing for the Court: ENRIGHT
• Citation: 680 F. Supp. 1411
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Fernando RUIZ-VILLANUEVA, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Richard Arnold LINARES, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Charles SANTEE, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jane CASAREZ, Defendant.
• Docket Number: 87-1345-E and 87-1350-E.,87-1337-E,Crim. No. 87-1296-E
• Decision Date: 03 March 1988

680 F. Supp. 1411

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Fernando RUIZ-VILLANUEVA, Defendant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Richard Arnold LINARES, Defendant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Charles SANTEE, Defendant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Jane CASAREZ, Defendant.

Crim. Nos. 87-1296-E, 87-1337-E, 87-1345-E and 87-1350-E.

United States District Court, S.D. California.

February 29, 1988.

As Amended March 3, 1988.

680 F. Supp. 1412

Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., Roger W. Haines, Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D.Cal., San Diego, Cal., Douglas Letter, Thomas Millet, Civ. Div., John F. DePue, Karen Scrivseth, Crim. Appeals Div., Dept. of Justice, Paul M. Bator, Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Stephen G. Gilles, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Judy Clarke, Larry N. Ainbinder, Ezekiel E. Cortez, Steven Meinrath, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., Robert Carriedo, San Diego, Cal., Alan Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

John R. Steer, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Comm., Washington, D.C., Steer, Meyer & Brown, appeared through an amicus brief, for the Commission itself.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ENRIGHT, District Judge.

Defendants in the above-captioned cases move the court for an order declaring unconstitutional the sentencing guidelines (hereinafter "Guidelines") recently promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"). Upon due consideration of the memoranda and arguments of all parties, the court finds that defendants' arguments are not meritorious; accordingly, their motions must be denied.¹

INTRODUCTION

I.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

After several years of hearings and bipartisan negotiations, and with the apparent intention of overhauling the entire federal criminal justice system, President Reagan on October 12, 1984 signed into law the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 2017 ("CCCA") (codified in multiple Titles). Title II of the CCCA, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Act") (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98), effects monumental changes in the way in which defendants are to be sentenced in federal courts. It is this Act which defendants now seek to have declared unconstitutional.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the Act is its creation of the Commission. The Act provides in its first section that "there is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission...." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III 1985). This Commission is charged by Congress with the task of promulgating and distributing "guidelines ... for use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case...." 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). These Guidelines, which the Commission would establish with an eye toward a wide variety of congressionally enumerated criteria,

680 F. Supp. 1413

would produce for the first time a range of allowable sentences for a given defendant and a given federal crime. That is, the Act intentionally curtails the previously broad sentencing discretion of federal judges

The Act explicitly describes the two purposes of the Commission. The first is to establish federal sentencing policies and practices that:

(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code i.e., "(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner";

(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and

(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process....

28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). The second stated purpose of the Commission is to "develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2).

These purposes bear out several crucial congressional policy judgments. First, by directing the Commission to formulate ranges of allowable sentences, Congress sought to eliminate the sometimes wide disparities that had characterized federal sentencing. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-52 (1983) reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3220-35 ("S.Rep."). Congress understood, for example, that the de facto division of sentencing authority between the judiciary and the Parole Commission contributed to a nagging uncertainty about the length of time that offenders would serve in prison, thereby undermining both public confidence in the law and the law's deterrent force. Id. at 46-49, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3229-32. Congress therefore found that continuation of the Parole Commission would be "entirely at odds with the rationale of the proposed guidelines system." Id. at 53, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3236. Congress did not, however, mortgage fundamental fairness for uniformity or certainty of sentences. The Senate Report explained: "The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." Id. at 52, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3235. Congress also made plain the Act's subsidiary purposes of ensuring that a full range of options is available to a sentencing judge and of maintaining "consistency of purpose" in sentencing. Id. at 59, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3242. Finally, through the Act Congress unmistakably sought to retreat from the "rehabilitation" model for sentencing policy, which it found to be "not an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions." Id. at 40, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3223; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

In addition to setting up these overarching purposes and policies, Congress also identified many of the specific factors to be considered in constructing the Guidelines. In establishing categories of offenses, the Commission was directed to consider, among other factors:

(1) the grade of the offense;

680 F. Supp. 1414

(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;

(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of persons, or a breach of public trust;

(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;

(5) the public concern generated by the offense;

(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others; and

(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the Nation as a whole.

28 U.S.C. § 994(c). In establishing categories of offenders, the Commission was directed to consider, to the extent relevant, such factors as the offender's:

(1) age;

(2) education;

(3) vocational skills;

(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant;

(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;

(6) previous employment record;

(7) family ties and responsibilities;

(8) community ties;

(9) role in the offense;

(10) criminal history; and

(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.

28 U.S.C. § 994(d). Congress further mandated that the Guidelines be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." Id.

In later subsections, the Act's guidance becomes even more definite. Section 994(h), for example, provides that the Commission prescribe a sentence at or near the maximum for crimes of violence and certain narcotics-related offenses, as well as for certain repeat offenders. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Section 994(i) directs the Commission to ensure a "substantial term of imprisonment" for certain recidivists, pattern offenders, conspirators, and the like. 28 U.S.C. § 994(i). Conversely, the Act notes the "general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense...." 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). Section 994 also discusses a variety of other situations and factors, including prison overcrowding (§ 994(g)), incremental penalties (§ 994(l)), and cooperating defendants (§ 994(m)). It is thus apparent that through the express terms of the Act itself Congress provided the Commission with the makings of a blueprint for the Guidelines.

The Act provides for the Commission to establish ranges of sentences, using a two-dimensional matrix of offense and offender categories (constituted in light of the factors mentioned above). Ranges were to be set in accordance with both the Act itself and "all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1). If a sentence specified by the Guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, "the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except...