US v. Sandoval

Decision Date21 July 1993
Docket NumberNo. 93-CR-69 A.,93-CR-69 A.
Citation829 F. Supp. 355
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Miguel SANDOVAL, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Utah

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bruce C. Lubeck, Asst. U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff.

D. Gilbert Athay, Loni F. DeLand, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALDON J. ANDERSON, Senior District Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter is before the court on defendant Miguel Sandoval's motions to suppress evidence and statements. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 11, 1993, and arguments of counsel were heard on June 28, 19931. Between the evidentiary hearing and arguments, the court viewed Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a video tape taken of the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of defendant, Miguel Sandoval.2

Sandoval argues that evidence of cocaine found in his vehicle by the Utah Highway Patrol should be suppressed because the initial traffic stop of Sandoval was merely a pretext for undertaking a search. Further, Sandoval argues that the evidence should be suppressed because he was illegally detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, in support of the motion to suppress evidence, Sandoval argues that any consent he gave to search was not informed or voluntary, and even if informed and voluntary, that the consent was limited in scope which was exceeded by the government.

Sandoval also asks the court to suppress incriminating statements made by Sandoval, in the course of the traffic stop and arrest, because the government failed to give a Miranda warning at the time of his arrest.

Having reviewed the evidence, and considered the arguments of counsel, the court is persuaded that the cocaine and Sandoval were properly seized, and that evidence of the cocaine should not be suppressed. However, the court is also persuaded that incriminating statements made by Sandoval, subsequent to his arrest and prior to his receiving a Miranda warning, must be suppressed.

II. Facts

On March 22, 1993, Utah Highway Patrolman Jim Hillin stopped a pickup being driven by Miguel Sandoval. The evidence is clear that the stop was made for speeding (71-73 mph in a 65 mph zone), and that Hillin was acting as he would normally have done in carrying out his responsibilities.3

After Sandoval's vehicle came to a stop, Officer Hillin left the Highway Patrol vehicle and spoke with Sandoval through the open window of the pickup.4 Hillin asked for Sandoval's license and the vehicle registration. The registration showed that the pickup was registered to a Sandy Sandoval, who Sandoval claimed to be his daughter.5 Hillin then asked Sandoval where he was heading, and Sandoval responded that he was going to Denver to visit a friend.

Following the foregoing exchange, Hillin returned to his vehicle to write a warning citation for speeding. While in the vehicle, he called the dispatcher to ask for computer checks on both Sandoval and vehicle. This was standard operating procedure for Hillin.6 The dispatcher responded that the pickup was registered to Sandy Sandoval, and had not been reported as stolen. The dispatcher further informed Hillin that Sandoval had a criminal record which included a previous arrest for narcotic violations.7

Hillin then left his vehicle and asked Sandoval to accompany him back to the Utah Highway Patrol vehicle, where Hillin showed Sandoval the radar gun reading of 71 mph8. Hillin asked Sandoval to slow down in the future, and Sandoval responded "OK." Hillin then handed Sandoval a warning citation, the receipt of which is indicated on the video tape by another Sandoval "OK." Finally, Hillin returned Sandoval's license and registration, and Sandoval, again, on the video tape says "OK."

Following the handing back of the license and registration to Sandoval, Officer Hillin is heard on the video tape to say "no, wait a minute."9 Officer Hillin then informed Sandoval that dispatch had informed him that Sandoval had been arrested before, and Officer Hillin asked Sandoval if he could recall what the arrest was for. Sandoval was evasive in his answer, and said that he could not remember. Hillin then reminded Sandoval about the previous drug offense and asked if he was still into drugs. Sandoval responded no. Hillin then asked if Sandoval would be willing to have Hillin examine the pickup truck for drugs and weapons. Sandoval responded "sure."

While searching the vehicle, Hillin asked Sandoval about his trip to Denver. Sandoval responded that he was going to visit a friend by the name of Pablo. Sandoval did not know Pablo's address, however, and from the tone and substance of the exchange, Officer Hillin could have formed a reasonable suspicion that the proposed trip to Denver was not as represented by Sandoval.

Hillin's search of the pickup included a visual inspection of the truck's undercarriage. Sandoval observed the scope of the search, but made no apparent effort to stop it. Indeed, after Officer Hillin found spot welding and hinges to an access door on the driver side fuel tank10, and asked Sandoval if he could take a closer look, Sandoval responded in the affirmative.11

After closer inspection of the pickup's modification and the access door, Officer Hillin, and another peace officer who came to the scene after discovery of the modifications, opened the hidden access door and discovered packages which contained cocaine. Sandoval was then placed under arrest and asked about the cocaine.

No Miranda warning was given by Officer Hillin at the time of Sandoval's arrest. Instead, Officer Hillin asked Sandoval about the drugs, and whether or not Sandoval would be willing to work with the police to arrest the parties to whom the cocaine was to be delivered. Sandoval expressed some willingness to help. Sandoval was then transported to the nearest police station and given the Miranda warning. After receiving the warning, Sandoval decided not to cooperate with the police.

III. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress Evidence.
1. The Initial Stop of Sandoval Was Not Pretextual.

In support of Sandoval's motion to suppress evidence, Sandoval argues that Officer Hillin's initial stop of the pickup was merely a pretext to search the vehicle. The search was therefore illegal, and Sandoval asks the court to suppress the cocaine seized as a result of that search.12 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop. The classic example, presented in this case, occurs when an officer stops a driver for a minor traffic violation in order to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal drug activity.

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir.1988).

To establish a non-pretextual stop, it must be shown, using an objective standard, that a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the usual practice without regard to an invalid purpose. Id. at 1517.

Applying this standard to Sandoval's argument, it is clear to the court that the initial stop of the vehicle was not pretextual. The truck was traveling 71 to 73 mph in a 65 mph zone. The video tape and testimony offered by Officer Hillin establishes that he would have pulled over any vehicle under similar circumstances to issue a warning citation or a ticket. Further, the court believes that any reasonable officer would have acted the same way. Accordingly, no pretext stop has been shown, and the cocaine seized will not be suppressed under that standard.

2. The Temporary Detention and Questioning of Sandoval Was Proper.

The Tenth Circuit has held that where a law enforcement officer has legitimately stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may not use the opportunity to ask intrusive questioning beyond that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518-19. The officer may "request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation." Id. at 1519. The officer may also inquire as to the identity of the vehicle's passengers and travel plans. See United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir.1989).

In this case, Officer Hillin complied with the foregoing standard. Officer Hillin only held Sandoval's driver's license and the vehicle registration for as long as was necessary to obtain a computer check on Sandoval and the pickup. Officer Hillin was entitled to ask about Sandoval's travel plans, and did not use the initial stop to ask intrusive questions. Indeed, a review of the video tape shows that Officer Hillin was, at all times, courteous and polite and did not exceed his authority. Even the officer's initial invitation to Sandoval to join him in the Highway Patrol vehicle was made as a request, and not given as an order.

A closer issue exists, however, as to Officer Hillin's questions about Sandoval's criminal record and Sandoval's present involvement with drugs. The Tenth Circuit stated in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (1988), that once a valid license has been produced by the operator of a vehicle and it becomes clear that the operator is entitled to drive the vehicle, the operator "must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning."

The only exceptions to the foregoing rule are where the law enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or the questions and answers are part of "an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law enforcement official." United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990), distinguishing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.1988). Such a "consensual encounter" cannot take place, however,...

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