US v. Shea

• Decision Date: 05 November 1990
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 90-10204-K.
• Citation: 750 F. Supp. 46
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. John J. SHEA, a/k/a "Red," et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

750 F. Supp. 46

UNITED STATES of America v. John J. SHEA, a/k/a "Red," et al., Defendants.

Crim. No. 90-10204-K.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 5, 1990.

Richard M. Egbert, Boston, Mass., John C. Doherty, Andover, Mass., R. Marc Kantrowitz, William Brown, Eileen M. Donoghue, Patrick J. Murphy, Joseph P. Murphy, Regina L. Quinlan, Quinlan & Smith, Michael J. Liston, Palmer & Dodge, Peter T. Elikann, Boston, Mass., Richard M. Welsh, N. Grafton, Mass., Henry F. Owens, III, Owens & Associates, Kevin O'Dea, James E. Carroll, Peabody & Arnold, James S. Dilday, Daniel D. Gallagher, Matthew H. Feinberg, Segal, Moran & Feinberg, Alfred E. Nugent, Nancy Merrick, Merrick & Louison, Richard Bachman, Hale, Sanderson, Byrnes & Morton, Mark H. Ruby, Charles R. Dougherty, Hill & Barlow, Edward J. Lee, Hale, Sanderson, Byrnes & Morton, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND PROCEDURAL ORDER

KEETON, District Judge.

Given the number of defendants, the number of counts and estimates of probable length of trial, the court has an obligation to take steps early in the life of this case to ensure the goals enumerated in Rule Two of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 2 (emphasis added). The need to eliminate unjustifiable delay is underscored here by the pre-trial detention of the lead defendant, Shea (See Memorandum and Order of October 10, 1990, Docket No. 328, 749 F.Supp. 1162).

This action commenced on August 9, 1990, when a federal grand jury returned this and three other indictments, charging a total of 51 individuals with cocaine trafficking and related charges. The indictment in this case charges 23 defendants in a total of 57 counts.

At a conference held October 23, 1990 in this and the largest of the related cases (CR No. 90-10203-Wd), involving 19 defendants, government counsel stated that they would be ready to commence trial of all charges against all 23 defendants in this case by January 16, 1991, the "TRIAL DATE" specified in a Procedural Order entered in these two cases on September 27, 1990 (Docket No. 206). (That Procedural Order also specified a BACKUP TRIAL DATE, and included other provisions regarding coordination of the two cases.) Government counsel further stated on October 23, 1990, that they would propose to try these two cases concurrently, starting the second a week after starting the first. Finally, the government estimated that its case-in-chief would require approximately six to eight weeks of court time, on a schedule of five four-hour sessions per week.

Several of defense counsel predicted that they could not be ready for trial and would expect to ask for a continuance. The court scheduled a further conference for November 13, 1990, before which time government counsel is expected to file a written submission designating which portions of taped conversations (of a total length in excess of 1500 hours) the government proposes to offer in evidence at trial.

On the basis of information now before me, I find the government's estimate of length of trial to be unrealistic. Experience with trials involving fewer than half the number of defendants in this case leads to the expectation that the trial of all 23 defendants on all 57 counts would extend from six months to a year or longer, even under judicial control as rigorous as can be maintained consistently with the rights of the parties to a fair trial.

Because of the large number of defendants and the extensive list of charges (57 counts, 99 overt acts), this case illustrates a problem, recurring with increasing frequency, regarding the obligation of courts to use wisely their limited resources for the administration of justice. Courts must weigh not only the interests of the parties to a case (here, the government and all defendants) but also the public and private party interests in "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" (Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 2, quoted supra) of all other litigation, civil and criminal, pending in the court.

The issues presented by a criminal case of this nature are not simply issues regarding prosecutorial discretion in fashioning an indictment and the extent of judicial control over that discretion. Rather, a case such as this presents a potential clash among the interests of the government in the prosecution of the case, the interests (including procedural rights) of the defendants in the case, and the interests of all other litigants before the court, civil and criminal.

As this Memorandum and Procedural Order is being prepared, the court is advised that, through the routine random process, it has drawn another criminal case involving 15 defendants, 16 counts, and similar charges (CR No. 90-10241-K). In light of the growing docket of complex cases, trial of the instant case, if permitted to proceed untailored, will unreasonably impair the court's ability to provide prompt, fair and just disposition of this second complex case and of all other matters pending before the court now and throughout the duration of the instant proceedings.

The government, of course, has a legitimate interest in presenting its best case against every defendant. Judicially imposed orders of the kind considered in this Memorandum may impair this interest to some extent. The government's interest, however, is only one of many interests at stake. Prosecutorial discretion to choose among legitimate methods of serving the government's interest does not have automatic priority over all other interests that a court must take into account in docket and case management, both pretrial and during trial, to serve the interests of justice.

A federal court of appeals has authority, by rules and orders, to direct the management of cases in trial courts of the circuit. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir.1989) (offering directions to district judges in that circuit), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2564, 109 L.Ed.2d 746 (1990). To date, the First Circuit has not addressed the issue of docket and case management with regard to complex criminal trials. In the absence of direction from the court of appeals, each district court has authority and responsibility for managing both pretrial proceedings and trials before it so as to protect the interests of the parties and the public in just determination of a criminal proceeding with "simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." Fed.R.Crim.P. 2.

To serve these objectives, a court may tailor the size of a case and length of a trial by limiting the number of counts and the number of defendants. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1151-52. A court may also find it necessary to limit the scope of the evidence in such a tailored trial, and as well to limit methods of proof and examination of witnesses that impair fairness or produce unjustifiable delay.

The Second Circuit has explicitly authorized and encouraged, if not directed, district courts of that circuit to manage potentially unwieldy criminal cases pursuant to stated "benchmarks" that guide the exercise of discretion. In Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1151-52, having listed some of the advantages and disadvantages of multi-defendant "mega-trials," the Second Circuit declared as one of the benchmarks:

First, the district judge should elicit from the prosecutor a good-faith estimate of the time reasonably anticipated to present the government's case. Though the prosecutor's estimate should not become the subject of a contested hearing, the judge need not accept the estimate without question but should be free to make an independent assessment based on various factors including the number of defendants, the time and territorial scope of the crimes charged, the number of witnesses likely to be called, and the number and size of exhibits likely to be introduced, including wiretaps.

Casamento...